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Summary 
 
The research presented in this PhD dissertation examines the phenomenon of semantic 
implicit learning, using semantic preferences of novel verbs as a test case. Implicit learning 
refers to the phenomenon of learning without intending to learn or awareness that one is 
learning at all. Semantic preference (or selectional preference – as preferred in computational 
linguistics) is the tendency of a word to co-occur with words sharing similar semantic 
features. For example, ‘drink’  is   typically  followed  by  nouns denoting LIQUID, and the verb 
‘chase’   is   typically   followed by ANIMATE nouns. The material presented here spans across 
disciplines. It examines a well-documented psychological phenomenon - implicit learning – 
and applies it in the context of language acquisition, thereby providing insights into both 
fields.   
 The organisation of this dissertation groups its experiments by their methodology. 
 Chapter 1 provides an overview of the current psychological and linguistic literature.  
 Chapter 2 includes a pen-and-paper study carried out in a classroom environment on 
Polish learners of English, where awareness is assessed by subjective measures taken 
at each test question as well as a post-experiment questionnaire. 
 Chapter 3 includes a collection of 5 computer-based experiments based on a false-
memory paradigm. After exposure to sentential contexts containing novel verbs, 
participants are shown to endorse more previously unseen verb-noun pairings that 
follow the correct semantic preference patterns to the pairings that violate it. The 
result holds even when participants do not reveal any explicit knowledge of the 
patterns in the final debriefing. Awareness is additionally assessed using indirect 
measures examining correlations of confidence judgements with performance.  
 Chapter 4 examines whether implicit learning of novel verb semantic preference 
patterns is automatic. To this end, a reaction time procedure is developed based on 
two   consecutive   decisions   (“double   decision   priming”).   The   method   reveals   that  
semantic implicit learning, at least in the described cases, exerts its influence with a 
delay, in post-processing.  
 Chapter 5 comprises research done in collaboration with Dr Nitin Williams, 
University of Reading. It documents an attempt at finding neural indices of implicit 
learning using a novel single-trial analysis of an electroencephalographic (EEG) 
signal, based on empirical mode decomposition (EMD) denoising. 
 Chapter 6 presents a final discussion and indications for future research. 
The main contribution of this dissertation to the general field of implicit learning 
research consists in its challenging the predominant view that implicit learning mainly relies 
on similarity of forms presented in training and test. The experiments presented here require 
participants to make generalisations at a higher, semantic level, which is largely independent 
of perceptual form. 
  
 Summary 
 
vii 
 
The contribution of this work to the field of Second Language Acquisition consists of 
empirical support for the currently popular but seldom tested assumptions held by advocates 
of communicative approaches to language teaching, namely that certain aspects of linguistic 
knowledge can develop without explicit instruction and explanation. At the same time, it 
challenges any view assuming that vocabulary learning necessarily relies on explicit 
mediation. The experiments collected here demonstrate that at least word usage in context 
can be learnt implicitly. A further contribution of this dissertation is its demonstration that the 
native language may play a key role in determining what is learnt in such situations.  
 A deeper understanding of the phenomenon of semantic implicit learning promises to 
shed light on the nature of word and grammar learning in general, which is crucial for an 
account of the processes involved in the development of a second language mental lexicon. 
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Chapter 1 
The context of implicit learning research 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Knowledge of word meaning is to a large extent intuitive. Native speakers are confident they 
know what a given word means, yet may have difficulty explaining the finer aspects of its 
meaning. This becomes particularly apparent in the case of understanding near synonyms. 
While most English speakers agree that in (1) and (2) either big or large is acceptable, such a 
simple interchange is not always an option. For example in (3) large appears to be a much 
preferred alternative, whereas in (4) big generally sounds more natural.    
 
(1) He entered into a room with shelves full of big/large leather-bound volumes. 
(2)  That  shirt  doesn’t  fit  me.  It’s  too  big/large.  
 
(3) DVDs are ideal for storing the large/*big amount of data associated with video. 
(4) How big/*large are you around the waist? 
 
The above examples illustrate implicit knowledge, the existence of which is rarely contested. 
It is the knowledge we are not aware that we have, yet which manifests itself in our behaviour 
in many areas of life, such as sports and games (e.g. knowing how to swim, ride a bicycle, 
play chess), music (e.g. dancing, playing an instrument), in creative processes (e.g. solving 
complex mathematical problems), in arts (e.g. having an intuitive sense of genuine art and 
fashion),   even   in   social   cognition   (e.g.   reading   other   people’s   intentions   and  mental   states,  
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understanding humour). A pinnacle  example  of  implicit  knowledge  is  the  command  of  one’s  
native language. People instantly notice sentences violating grammar, even without being 
able to state the underlying principles. Similarly, a wrongly played note will disturb even 
non-musicians, who cannot competently justify why. For some people, even cooking is a 
demonstration of highly impressive knowledge which unfortunately often remains 
incommunicable, despite efforts. Implicit knowledge is therefore the tacit, unverbalisable 
knowledge people may have, specific to a particular skill (Dienes & Altmann, 1997; 
Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; cf. Baars, 2002). 
An issue which has sparked more controversy over the last few decades pertains to the 
question whether knowledge can also be acquired implicitly. If implicit knowledge exists, 
could implicit learning also exist? It is commonly defined as learning occurring without 
intention and without awareness of what is being learnt. As such, it contrasts with explicit 
learning, which refers to situations where people intend to learn something (possibly 
expecting a test) and engage their conscious knowledge in the process. While explicit 
learning typically involves forming and testing conscious hypotheses, implicit learning is 
believed to reflect absorption of statistical regularities in the environment, resulting in 
knowledge which is difficult to introspect.  
Directly addressing these two types of learning bears particular importance for studies 
of the acquisition of both first and second languages. By popular assumption, the acquisition 
of the first language is an implicit process leading to implicit knowledge. To what extent a 
second language can also be learned implicitly, or in other words acquired, has been the 
subject of much investigation and rightfully deserves attention due to its important theoretical 
and practical implications, which will be discussed in this dissertation. 
To date, numerous aspects of language have been shown to involve implicit or 
statistical learning1, including, among others, word segmentation (Onnis, Waterfall, & 
Edelman, 2008; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), orthography (Pacton, Perruchet, Fayol, & 
Cleeremans, 2011), phonotactics (Chambers, Onishi, & Fisher, 2003), argument structure 
(Hudson Kam, 2009; Wonnacott, Newport, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Wonnacott, Boyd, Thomson, 
& Goldberg, 2012) and syntax (Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Rebuschat & Williams, 2009). 
Even though not all material may be equally learnable by implicit means, interestingly, those 
                                                          
1 It is assumed that implicit – or unconscious – learning operates as statistical learning. However, the converse is 
not true – not all studies demonstrating statistical learning address implicit learning (Perruchet & Pacton, 2006).   
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aspects of language which have proved challenging for learners, such as arbitrary gender 
categories (Braine et al., 1990; Brooks, Braine, Catalano, Brody, & Sudhalter, 1993; 
Guillelmon & Grosjean, 2001; Williams, 2003), or scrambling (Williams & Kuribara, 2008;  
Iwasaki, 2003), also tend to be the ones with which second language learners notoriously 
experience difficulties. Furthermore, individual differences in implicit learning have been 
shown to correlate with language abilities independently of other factors such as IQ or 
working memory (Conway & Pisoni, 2008; Conway et al., 2009; Misyak, Christiansen, & 
Tomblin, 2010; Misyak, Goldstein, & Christiansen, in press). Even language disabilities have 
been associated with impairments of particular types of implicit learning, for example 
dyslexia with impaired implicit sequence learning (Howard, Howard, Japikse, & Eden, 2006; 
Jimenez-Fernandez, Gracia Vaquero, Jimenez, & Defior, 2011), and specific language 
impairment and agrammatism with a deficiency in artificial grammar learning (Evans, 
Saffran, & Robe-Torres, 2009; Plante, Gomez, & Gerken, 2002; Christiansen, Louise Kelly, 
Shillcock, & Greenfield, 2010). Together these results point to the interrelation between 
language and statistical implicit learning mechanisms.  
In psychology, the research on implicit and statistical learning has so far focused on 
surface-form regularities. As a result, in language acquisition as well as psychology, much is 
now understood about the crucial importance of such factors as form frequency or salience in 
the input. The question which occupies much of the present day psycholinguistic 
investigations is: could all of language learning be modelled only by tracking surface form 
regularities? On the one hand, statistical models are capable of demonstrating some 
mechanisms of generalisation to new stimuli, which could be compared to generalised 
linguistic knowledge. On the other, inherent in language is the fact that words and structures 
carry meaning. Still relatively little is known about whether and to what extent meaning may 
contribute to the formation of linguistic knowledge. Research on whether and how people 
learn meaningful regularities automatically and without conscious control (implicitly) may be 
necessary in order to resolve this question.  
This relative lack of empirical evidence contrasts with the assumption put forward in 
numerous pedagogical approaches as well as theoretical accounts, especially the functionalist 
and usage-based ones, which often take meaning as a starting point for the formation of 
linguistic constructions or even syntactic categories. Even though many aspects of word 
meaning,  such  as  referential  meaning  (eg.  ‘cat’  picks  out CATS in the world), are assumed to 
be explicit, or declarative, nevertheless the learning which subsequently occurs, after the 
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word forms have been mapped to the relevant semantic representations, is predominantly 
implicit – although little is known about its scope. For example, Ellis (2005) proposes that 
fine-tuning or tallying of representations does take place without conscious involvement and 
that “the results of this tallying provide an optimal solution to the problem space of form-
function mappings and their contextualized use”  (Ellis,  2005, p.307). 
The proposition that implicit learning may be involved in the formation of form-
function mappings and their contextualized use is not as straightforward as it may seem. To 
date, the development of these aspects of linguistic knowledge has seldom been empirically 
addressed within an implicit learning framework. Indeed, such attempts have only been made 
in the last decade, and then not without controversy (Williams, 2005; Hama & Leow, 2010). 
 
 
1.2. Aim 
 
Is there or can there be, unconscious induction and abstraction?  
This is the heart of the acquisition versus learning distinction  
in the foreign language field and the heart of the controversy  
over implicit learning in psychology. 
(Schmidt, 1995, p. 31) 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to empirically examine whether implicit learning processes are 
involved in enabling adult learners to form semantic generalisations from linguistic input. It 
focuses therefore on semantic implicit learning, which can be defined as a specific type of 
implicit learning – one which operates on regularities involving meaning, as opposed to just 
perceptual forms. The experiments reported here address the development of implicit 
knowledge of word use in appropriate semantic contexts. Well-formedness of utterances, 
after all, does not only require satisfaction of syntactic constraints but of semantic ones as 
well. Do adult learners learn to satisfy these semantic constraints (or preferences) incidentally 
and without awareness?  
By addressing this question, the aim is to contribute to one of the major debates in 
modern cognitive psychology, namely: does learning without awareness exist and if so, what 
is and what is not learnable that way? Opinions are divided, and there is a fair amount of 
scepticism whether it is possible to learn even the simplest associations implicitly. For 
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example, Lovibond & Shanks (2002) argued that even simple Pavlovian conditioning relies 
on conscious predictive relationships between events. In psychology, the putative 
demonstrations of implicit learning so far have predominantly been based on perceptual 
form-level regularities, e.g. letter sequences. This has led to the conclusion that the implicit 
learning mechanism relies on unconscious counting, and the reported learning effects reflect 
sensitivity to form frequencies (Ellis, 2002). However, such demonstrations could be 
regarded as involving chunking, which could rely, at least in part, on conscious recognition 
(Perruchet & Vinter, 1998). Of crucial importance, therefore, is the adequate measurement of 
awareness. Current methods have often been susceptible to the criticism of not being 
sensitive enough (Shanks & St. John, 1994). And if implicit learning is viewed as a type of 
statistical learning and form-counting, even among those who do advocate its existence there 
remains much doubt whether it could lead to unconscious generalisation or abstraction, in 
other words whether it could lead to knowledge which is not dependent on the experienced 
perceptual forms (see Section 1.3). 
 In the field of second language acquisition research scepticism about the possibility of 
implicit learning is perhaps most clearly expressed in the work of Schmidt (e.g., Schmidt, 
1990; 1995),   and   resonates   in   his   seminal   “noticing” hypothesis. Schmidt was primarily 
concerned with the roles that attention and awareness play in the learning process. He 
proposed  “noticing”  to  be  the  minimal  combination  of  attention  and  a low level awareness, 
necessary and sufficient for converting input to intake (Schmidt, 1990). He proposed that 
stimuli outside focal attention and therefore outside awareness might activate preexisting 
memory representations, but only subliminally, and that subliminal learning is impossible.  
Once  ‘noticed’,  a  given  aspect  of language may be consciously analysed, compared to 
other   things   which   were   ‘noticed’,   giving   rise   to a higher level of awareness – 
‘understanding’  (which  involves  what  is  generally  understood  as  ‘thinking’). Schmidt wrote 
sceptically about the possibility of forming generalisations and abstract rules without noticing 
at the level of understanding. But, could it be it possible? This is the question which the 
research contained in this dissertation addresses. Schmidt himself identified “unconscious 
induction and abstractness of the knowledge that results from learning”   as “the most 
important issues involved in implicit learning studies”  (Schmidt,  1995,  p.35).  
Working from a more pedagogical perspective, Krashen (1981) first proposed the 
distinction between unconscious acquisition and conscious learning. While certain aspects of 
language may be naturally acquired, others require conscious learning. Identifying exactly 
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which ones can be acquired naturally is the Holy Grail for language pedagogues. In terms of 
lexical learning, Paradis, (2004) proposed  a  distinction  between  ‘vocabulary’  and  ‘lexicon’.  
With vocabulary encompassing referential   meaning   (‘cat’   picks   out   CAT in the world) 
requiring explicit processes (Ellis, 1994), other aspects of word-knowledge, such as 
collocational behaviour, belonging to the lexicon, may be implicit. 
Here implicit learning is investigated with respect to the   acquisition   of   words’  
semantic (selectional) preferences. The term dates back to Sinclair (1996). Semantic 
preferences are tendencies of words to co-occur with words of certain semantic classes in a 
given role, e.g., the verb chase is followed by ANIMATE nouns as direct object, or drink by 
nouns denoting LIQUID. Very often, as in cases like these, semantic preferences are logically 
determined by word meaning. They may, however, be arbitrary as well, such as the big/large 
examples (1)-(4) in the section above. The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 
(2001) gives a helpful elucidation of the difference between the two near-synonyms, 
mentioning that big is more often used to describe people than large, while large is used with 
quantity words such as amount, scale, number, quantity, extent, proportion, percentage, part, 
volume, and area. Indeed, the first sentence of this dissertation provides an example: 
“knowledge  of  word  meaning  is  to  a  large extent intuitive”. 
An important role for semantic preferences in meaning disambiguation has been 
identified in the field of machine learning and computational linguistics (e.g. John & 
McCarthy, 2000; Resnick, 1997). In natural language linguistics, so far, considerably less 
attention has been paid to them. 
Yet semantic generalisations are ubiquitous in language. They not only concern 
predicates, but can also be found in certain noun collocations. For example, in English it is 
correct to say ‘a pack of dogs/hounds/wolves/coyotes/mules/rats/weasels’ and ‘a swarm of 
bees/insects/mosquitoes/bats/ladybirds’. It sounds unnatural and even humorous to say *a 
pack of bats, *a pack of insects or *a swarm of dogs. It is therefore plausible that in the 
process  of  learning,  the  speaker’s  knowledge of the meanings of these words gains the shape 
of, roughly: SWARM + [ANIMAL, FLYING, rather SMALL, most likely an INSECT], PACK + 
[ANIMAL, FOUR-LEGGED, most probably DOG-LIKE]. Native speakers develop such generalised 
notions incidentally, and possibly are not always aware of what exactly categorises legitimate 
collocates. Second language learners may need to be explicitly taught about such regularities. 
However, the ubiquity of similar phenomena in language precludes the possibility of all of 
them being successfully taught that way. It therefore makes sense to assume that learners also 
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develop much of their knowledge about semantic preferences and semantically restricted 
collocations incidentally. Could this process also be implicit and lead to knowledge of which 
learners are not aware, similarly to native speakers?   
To date, conclusions from the mainstream implicit learning research cast doubt on the 
possibility that it could lead to the development of abstract generalisations going beyond the 
training material (e.g. Conway & Christiansen, 2006). On the other hand, semantic 
preferences are abstract as they reflect knowledge of conceptual categories rather than 
specific exemplars or perceptual surface features of the experienced exemplars (words). 
Should semantic implicit learning be demonstrated, how could it be reconciled with the 
current accounts of the implicit learning mechanism? The following section contains a 
summary of implicit learning research in experimental psychology and an overview of 
different paradigms used. It will be suggested that the perceived limitations on 
generalisation/abstraction could be the result of the fact that most research so far has focused 
on regularities only pertaining to surface forms, which do not lend themselves so naturally to 
generalisation/abstraction as do words in natural language.  
 
 
1.3. Form-level implicit learning 
 
The majority of implicit learning demonstrations to date have addressed learning perceptual 
surface-form regularities. Experimental stimuli usually involve strings of letters, sounds or 
patterns on a visual display, which are often generated by complex rule systems. Arthur 
Reber is considered the pioneer in this area (Reber, 1967, 1989 and other). His first evidence 
for learning without awareness involved participants developing unconscious knowledge of 
regularities in letter strings, which, unbeknown to them, were generated by an underlying 
system, such as the one presented in Figure 1.1. Such systems were known as finite-state 
grammars as, just like natural language grammars, they can generate an infinite number of 
well-formed strings with a finite set of rules. Later the term artificial grammar was coined. 
Historically, the idea was inspired by the project Grammarama, started in 1957 by George 
Miller, which aimed to examine the learnability of formal linguistic systems. Although the 
extent to which artificial grammars reflect the actual structure underlying natural language 
may be debated, investigating the nature of the knowledge gained through learning such 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
8 
 
 
sequences of letters or symbols may offer a first step towards understanding the nature of the 
implicit learning mechanism, in other words, the mechanism of acquisition.  
Typical artificial grammar learning (AGL) experiments consist of two parts. First, 
participants are exposed to letter strings, such as PVPXVPS, TSSXXVPS, TSXS and told to 
memorise them as part of an experiment on rote memory. They are not told that the strings 
are generated by an underlying system of rules. Afterwards, they are presented with new 
strings, informed that there was a system and asked to indicate which of the strings conform 
to  it,  or  are,  in  other  words,  grammatical.  Participants’  overall  performance is typically above 
chance, even though they claim not to have any idea of the underlying grammar. The results 
have been replicated even with improved methods for probing conscious knowledge, such as 
asking participants to provide subjective judgements of awareness (e.g. whether they are 
responding based on a guess, intuition, rule or memory for a fragment) and a confidence 
rating for each response. Participants still discriminate the correct and incorrect strings above 
chance when they claim to be purely guessing and when higher confidence does not correlate 
with better accuracy (Dienes & Scott, 2005). Particularly impressively, similar learning 
effects have been reported among amnesic patients (e.g., Knowlton, Ramus, & Squire, 1992), 
which adds weight to the theory that the knowledge in artificial grammar experiments 
develops without conscious mediation.   
                      
Figure 1.1. Schematic diagram of an artificial grammar, from Reber (1989). Stimuli are generated by 
following any path of arrows leading from the initial State 1 to the terminal State 6. 
 
The knowledge gained in such tasks has been shown to some extent to transfer to new 
stimuli. The issue has been examined by changing the letter set between training and test, e.g. 
PVPXVPS in training would correspond to the string AFAHFAC in test. The resulting strings 
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are thus compliant with the same grammar, but involve different surface forms. Typically, 
people’s  grammaticality  judgements  for  the  changed  letter  sets  remain  above  chance  (Reber, 
1967; Reber, 1969; Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Mathews et al., 1989), although the overall 
accuracy   is   lower   than   for   the   same   letter   sets   (the   so   called   ‘transfer   decrement   effect’).  
Interestingly, transfer has even been shown across modalities, as for example when colours 
presented in training are changed to colour names at test, or even more impressively, when 
the grammar used to generate letter sequences in training is used to generate tone sequences 
at test or vice versa (Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995; Manza & Reber, 1997; Gomez, 
Gerken, & Schvaneveldt, 2000; Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Tunney & Altmann, 2001; 
Tunney & Shanks, 2003), indicating that at least to some extent the knowledge gained in 
artificial grammar tasks is abstract – understood as generalisable to new stimuli. 
In a different paradigm relying on surface-form regularities, Lewicki and colleagues  
(Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987; Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988) demonstrated 
implicit learning of visual sequences. In a four-choice serial reaction time task (SRT), 
participants were asked to track the targets appearing in one of four quadrants on a computer 
screen by pressing the corresponding button as quickly as possible. The sequences were 
generated with highly complex rules. For example, in Lewicki et al. (1987) the stimuli were 
presented in blocks of seven trials. Unbeknown to the participants there was a regular, highly 
complex and non-salient relationship between the position of the target on the 7th trial and the 
quadrants in which it was presented on the 1st, 3rd, and 6th trials of that block, while the 
positions on the 2nd and 5th trials were random. In Lewicki et al. (1988) blocks contained five 
trials each; the target locations in the first two were random, while the last three were 
determined   by   the   rules.   Participants’   performance   on   the   final   trials   of   each   block,   the  
locations of which were predictable from the rules, was faster and more accurate than on the 
random trials, despite the fact that they expressed no awareness of any rules. Interestingly 
though, unlike in artificial grammar learning, transfer to stimuli with dissimilar surface 
features typically fails in SRT tasks (Stadler, 1989; Willingham, Nissen, & Bullemer, 1989; 
Perruchet, 1994). 
Another line of research has addressed unconscious learning of less complex 
regularities. In   ‘invariant   learning’   tasks,   initiated by McGeorge & Burton (1990), 
participants’ behaviour is biased according to whether or not a particular feature is present in 
a given stimulus. In the original study participants initially performed an arithmetic task on a 
set of four-digit numbers. They were not told that each of the numbers in the training phase 
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contained   the   digit   ‘3’   (the   ‘invariant’).   In   the   subsequent,   unexpected   forced   choice   task  
participants saw pairs of four-digit numbers and were asked to indicate which one in each 
pair appeared in the previous phase. In fact, all the numbers were new, but half of them 
contained   a   ‘3’,   while   the   other   half   did   not.   Participants   were   more   likely   to   choose   the  
numbers  containing  ‘3’,  even  if  they  had  no  awareness  of  the  invariant  and  expressed  surprise  
when informed about it.  
In all the above demonstrations, in AGL, SRT and invariant learning tasks, implicit 
learning was shown to influence   people’s   decisions.   There is evidence that knowledge 
acquired through implicit learning, at least in the context of visual covariation, can exert even 
further top-down effects in the form of attentional guidance: in other words, it can constrain 
what people expect and where they direct their attention.  For  example,  in  Chun  and  Jiang’s  
(1998; 1999) “contextual   cuing”   paradigm   participants   perform   visual   search   for   a   target  
object,   such  as   a   rotated   ‘T’,   in   an   array  of   rotated   ‘L’  distractor   shapes   (see  Figure 1.2a). 
Unbeknown to them, displays are repeated such that certain configurations of distractors 
(invariant contexts) are always paired with specific target positions so that visual context 
predicts target locations. If participants are sensitive to contextual information while 
performing the search task, then their performance for old displays should get faster over 
time, relative to trials where the distractor positions are determined randomly (baseline). This 
is indeed what is found (Figure 1.2b). Therefore visual context does serve to guide (or cue) 
attention to the target, facilitating search. Crucially, in a subsequent recognition task 
participants are unable to distinguish the repeated arrays from random ones, suggesting the 
effect is implicit. In daily life, such sensitivity to statistical regularities in the environment 
facilitates effective interaction with the visual world in general (e.g. Brockmole, Castelhano, 
& Henderson, 2006).  
Similar visual orienting effects were reported in Lambert, Naikar, McLachlan, & 
Aitken (1999) and Lambert (2003).  Participants saw pre-trial cues of two letters – ‘W’  on  the  
left  and  ‘S’  on   the  right,  and   in   randomly  chosen   trials  with   ‘S’  on   the   left  and  ‘W’  on   the 
right. What they did not know was that the display was programmed so that the target usually 
appeared  on  the  same  side  as  one  of  the  letters  (‘W’  for  half  of  the  participants  and  ‘S’  for  the  
other  half).  Again,  the  authors  found  evidence  for  participants’ attention being oriented by the 
predictive  cues  (and  called  this  phenomenon  “derived  attention”).   
 
 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
11 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.  Spatial contextual cueing, (a) a sample search array, (b) search performances as a 
function of epoch (groups of five blocks, each with 12 trials for each condition) faster for old 
configurations than new configurations. Data from Chun & Jiang (1998), image from Chun, 2000). 
 
 
Overall, the above presented experiments illustrate a sample of thoroughly different 
procedures which have been developed to address the phenomenon of implicit learning. They 
represent the mainstream strand of implicit learning research, which focuses on regularities 
occurring at the surface level, usually perceived visually. What participants learn, however, is 
clearly not tied wholly to the perceptual, surface features, because that would preclude the 
effect of transfer. For example, transfer between such equivalent concepts as digits and words 
for digits, colours and colour names, etc. indicates that the learning mechanism must, at least 
to some extent, operate on a conceptual rather than a perceptual level. But what about transfer 
across modalities, e.g. between letters and tones? Initially, the solution put forward in all of 
the above presented cases (apart from contextual cueing) was that participants indeed absorb 
complex rules. However, the fact that performance in transfer conditions is always lower than 
in non-transfer indicates that even if participants did absorb some rules, they would not 
correspond exactly to the ones used to generate the stimuli. Crucially, though, any potentially 
learned rules are clearly not consciously applied, because then the performance in transfer 
and non-transfer conditions would be equally accurate. If not abstract rules, what do people 
learn? And to what extent is such knowledge relevant to understanding linguistic knowledge? 
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Despite the initial assumptions that people could indeed learn the abstract rules 
generating the stimuli they are exposed to (such as the underlying artificial grammar 
systems), gradually the prevailing views shifted to accounts stressing the role of the actually 
experienced exemplars. It turns out that the learning effects could be explained by matching 
similarity between test and training items stored in memory (Brooks, 1978; Vokey & Brooks, 
1992). Moreover, people do not necessarily need to remember whole training items to 
discriminate the grammatical and ungrammatical test ones above chance. It is enough that 
they remember fragments. For example in AGL people may notice certain bigram and 
trigram  “chunks”,  such  as  PV,  PX,  VPS,  TSS  (as  in  Figure  1.1)  and  possibly  also  track  which  
occur at the beginnings and ends of the strings. It has been shown that the prevalence of 
salient bigrams and trigrams in a given item predicts how likely it is to be classified as 
grammatical, regardless of its actual grammaticality (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990; 
Johnstone & Shanks, 1999). Furthermore, training participants on just bigrams alone has been 
shown to lead to the same pattern of responses as training on longer strings, indicating that 
chunk frequencies are a strong predictor of participants’  performance  (Perruchet & Pacteau, 
1990). These findings suggest therefore a close relationship between the experienced stimuli 
and the resulting knowledge. 
In  numerous  currently  popular   statistical   accounts  people’s  performance   on   implicit  
learning tasks is successfully simulated in connectionist models operating on chunks 
(Perruchet & Vinter, 1998). One prediction could be therefore that humans are endowed with 
powerful statistical learning mechanisms (e.g. Saffran, 2003; Saffran & Wilson, 2003) which 
track when features co-occur and how frequently. On the other hand, instead of being inferred 
from statistical computation, chunk formation may in fact be the primary mechanism 
resulting from the laws of memory. For example, because frequently repeated information is 
less prone to being forgotten than less frequent information, natural forgetting results in 
sensitivity   to   event   frequency,   without   any   statistical   ‘computation’   (Perruchet, 2008 and 
other). On such a view, sensitivity to statistical regularities becomes a by-product of the 
selection of chunks due to the memory mechanism. Both interpretations explain learning as a 
result of reinforcement of information through accumulative experience with invariants and 
covariants in the input.  
Can the learning revealed by experimental paradigms other than AGL also be 
explained as essentially statistical in nature and possibly operating on stimulus fragments 
such as chunks? Lewicki's et al. (1988) study has sparked a discussion in the literature 
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(Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy, 1990; Ferrer-Gil, 1994; Cleeremans & Jimenéz, 1998), with 
ample evidence being presented in support of statistical over rule-based accounts. For 
example, Perruchet et al. (1990) demonstrated that participants become sensitive to the 
relative frequency of small sequences of two or three successive locations. Close examination 
of the rules revealed that back-and-forth movements were overall less frequent than other 
types. They also never occurred in the last three trials within each block of the main training 
trials, but did occur in the random trials and therefore could have been responsible for the 
longer response times on those. However, these findings are at odds with Ferrer-Gil (1994) 
who discussed the disappearance of the effect under transfer to different sequences based on 
the same rules. The distribution of target movement types during the transfer was almost 
identical with the training phase, including the occurrence rates of back-and-forth 
movements. This indicates that target movement frequency cannot account for all learning 
effects emerging in the SRT procedure. Cleeremans and Jimenez (1998) attempted to 
reconcile these different findings in their connectionist Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) 
model,  but  conceded  that  if  the  simulation  and  human  participants’  data  were  to  match  more  
closely one would need to posit some explicit strategies that people could develop but that the 
model could not. Overall, regardless of whether the knowledge gained in SRT tasks consists 
of sequence fragments or unconscious sensitivity to transition probabilities between single 
events, the crucial factor affecting the performance on each trial seems to be the degree of 
overlap with the prior material.  
Invariant learning has also been re-analysed in a similar vein. In McGeorge and 
Burton (1990) the stimuli which contained the invariant digit   ‘3’   also   had   proportionally  
fewer cases of repeated digits than those without it. Consequently, instead of only accepting 
the  items  with  ‘3’  participants  could  also  be  rejecting2 those containing repetitions. Wright & 
Burton (1995) showed that this indeed explained at least part of the original results, which 
provides   further   evidence   that   in   implicit   learning   tasks   participants’   knowledge   is   chiefly  
driven by similarity to at least fragments of the experienced stimuli, rather than by abstract 
rules.  
Sensitivity to repetitions in fact has been demonstrated to be another key factor, next 
to sequence fragments or chunks, underlying implicit learning and transfer. Knowlton and 
                                                          
2 Rejections may rely on explicit knowledge (Ellis, R, 2005); if performance was chiefly driven by rejections it 
would predominantly be explicit, which might be the case here because subjective awareness judgements 
revealed a high proportion of explicit responses. 
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Squire (1996) suggest that this is what permitted amnesics to perform similarly to a healthy 
control group in their artificial grammar learning tasks, including transfer to a different letter 
set. Because amnesics could not rely on declarative knowledge of permissible chunks, as 
evidenced by their poor chunk recognition memory, the authors concluded that apart from 
chunk  knowledge,  people  must  also  pick  up  “some rules about permissible locations of letter 
repetitions, alternations, or dependencies between different parts of the letter strings”  
(Knowlton & Squire, 1996, p.179). Sensitivity to repetition or alternation could be just a case 
of statistical learning leading to formation of highly salient chunks, or, as some behavioural 
and neuroimaging research may suggest, an altogether separate mechanism (Tunney & 
Altmann, 2001; Lotz & Kinder, 2006; Dominey & Ramus, 2000), perhaps less tied to the 
particular surface form features.    
Because amnesic patients cannot rely on their declarative memory for chunks, 
repetitions are for them a more salient aspect of the stimuli. Healthy participants, on the other 
hand, can rely on both chunks and repetitions, whenever possible. In general, in different 
experimental conditions one aspect can be more salient than another and therefore exert a 
stronger   influence  on  participants’  behaviour.  For  example,   in  non-transfer conditions, both 
chunks and repetitions are relatively easily recognisable. In transfer, however, chunk 
knowledge requires mapping between elements based on their frequency of occurrence in 
different locations. Repetition patterns, on the other hand, are easier to identify regardless of 
the   stimulus   type   and   therefore   a   more   likely   basis   of   participants’   performance   under  
transfer conditions than chunks. Indeed, studies where the chunk-related and repetition-
related factors are controlled, confirm that it is the repetition structure which is the primary 
basis for transfer (Scott & Dienes, 2010 ). 
The overall account of the transfer mechanism has implications for the research 
discussed in this dissertation as it directly addresses the question of the extent to which 
implicit knowledge is determined by the experienced material. Repetition patterns are clearly 
less dependent on particular surface features than chunks, but are they modality-independent 
in the same way as linguistic knowledge is modality-independent? After all, the hallmark of 
linguistic knowledge is its abstractness, understood as the property which allows speakers to 
both effortlessly comprehend and produce word combinations, in spoken or written form, 
bearing no similarity to previously encountered utterances. People can use language 
creatively. Therefore implicit learning is only an appropriate account of language acquisition 
inasmuch as it explains knowledge transferability to new vocabularies. Could transferability 
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be an indication that implicit learning develops some knowledge which is not dependant on 
surface features of the stimuli?  
Conway & Christiansen (2006) tested this question directly. They employed a dual-
grammar crossover design in which participants were simultaneously trained on two different 
artificial grammars in different modalities, one using colour sequences (visual) and the other 
using tones (auditory). Later they were informed that the items had been generated by a 
system and given a test with either a set of colour sequences or tones, half of which were 
grammatical with respect to one grammar and half with respect to the other. It was 
hypothesised that if implicit learning led to modality-independent knowledge then the test 
sequences generated by the two grammars would appear equally grammatical to the 
participants. On the other hand, if the statistical regularities were tied to the sense modality, 
people would only accept as grammatical those structures which had been presented in the 
same modality in training. One group of participants was only exposed to one grammar to 
provide a unimodal baseline measure. The results showed participants accepting fewer items 
from the grammar of the other modality than from the grammar of the same modality, which 
led the authors to conclude that the learning was modality-specific, and therefore the 
knowledge underlying implicit statistical learning must be closely tied to the sensory and 
perceptual features of the material. They suggest that the learning effects reported may rely 
on perceptual fluency, which means the items are processed more easily because similar ones 
had been processed before. Finally, the authors indicate   that:   “the ability to learn abstract 
principles and transfer them to new domains certainly appears to be a hallmark of explicit 
cognition; it is much less clear, especially in light of the current data, whether it is also a 
hallmark of implicit learning”  (Conway and Christiansen, 2006, p. 911).  
A strikingly different proposition was put forward by Scott & Dienes (2010), namely 
that it is mostly implicit transfer that leads to accurate performance, and conscious, explicit 
judgements are often influenced by factors which may decrease transfer accuracy. Their 
study involved a careful analysis of the role of various structural features of the stimuli as 
well   as   subjective   awareness  measures  on  participants’  decisions in an AGL task. The test 
phase was also combined with a clarification task to assess perceptual fluency. The authors 
found   that  although  perceptual   fluency   influenced  participants’  decisions,   it   could  not  have  
been the key factor responsible for transfer. Perceptual fluency was related to the conscious 
feeling of familiarity, defined as “the subjective feeling of oldness elicited by a stimulus”, 
which in turn correlated with the likelihood of the item being endorsed as grammatical. It did 
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not, however, predict accuracy. Accuracy only reached significance (60%) in the answers 
indicated as pure guesses, where familiarity contributed less than in other responses. The 
factor   identified   as   being   associated   with   these   accurate   guesses   was   ‘novel chunk 
proportion’,  namely  the  proportion  of  bigrams  and  trigrams  within  a  test  string  which  did  not  
appear in training.  
These findings suggest therefore, contrary to Conway & Christiansen (2006), that not 
only unconscious transfer is possible, but also that the unconscious might actually 
“outperform”  the  conscious.  A  natural  question  now  is  what  could  account  for   the  disparity  
between these findings and those of Conway & Christiansen (2006)? 
A question which may arise with regards to the findings in Conway & Christiansen 
(2006) pertains to the account of the transfer decrement effect. Cross-modal transfer is 
naturally expected to lead to lesser accuracy than a non-transfer condition. Therefore, if the 
stimuli in test were presented in one of the two modalities from training, it is expected that 
participants would accept more items from the tested modality than the other, which is 
precisely the reported pattern. However, perhaps the key issue pertains to the fact that there 
was no difference in performance between the dual modal and the unimodal baseline group. 
Participants who were exposed to both the visual and auditory grammars combined scored at 
the same level as those who were exposed to the visual grammar alone. For the uni-modal 
group, test items generated by the second grammar were ungrammatical in the conventional 
sense, whereas for the dual modal group all items were grammatical according to one or the 
other grammar. The fact that the two groups performed comparably is surprising, because if 
there had been at least a small amount of transfer then the dual modal group should have 
shown lower accuracy than the single modal group (because they would have tended to 
accept things from the 'other' grammar). This absolute lack of transfer in the dual modal 
group is surprising, and suggests involvement of a conscious strategy. 
Comparing this study with other artificial grammar experiments demonstrating 
transfer, there seems to be a crucial procedural difference. In the typical AGL task people are 
trained in one modality and then told that there was a regularity, and that they would be 
presented with stimuli in another modality which might or might not follow the same 
regularity. They are, in other words, told to transfer their knowledge. It is not clear whether 
participants here were instructed in this way. If not, it was natural for them to judge visual 
stimuli according to whether they conformed to the pattern underlying the visual stimuli in 
training.   The   lack   of   transfer   may   indicate   this   was   the   case.   Unfortunately,   participants’  
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
17 
 
 
strategies are not known because the procedure did not include any measures of awareness 
(despite which the authors concluded the learning was implicit).  
What the study shows, therefore, is that when making grammaticality judgements 
people can zoom in on the training experiences which they think are relevant – i.e. strings are 
judged grammatical with respect to some knowledge base. This does not rule out effects of 
implicit knowledge of the structure of that knowledge base, but does indicate that there is no 
interference between different grammars in different modalities. Transfer across modalities 
may require an analogical process when making judgements, unhindered by intentional 
adherence to an explicit strategy (here participants may have assumed they were to judge 
stimuli with respect to the grammar in the same modality). Could it therefore mean that 
participants’  potential  explicit  strategies  hindered  the  transfer  of  implicit  knowledge? 
This would be in accord with the conclusions put forward by Scott and Dienes (2010). 
However,   in   their   study   ‘chunk   novelty’   was   identified   as   the   key   factor   of   unconscious 
transfer. It is not stated, however, whether new chunks in test were used mainly in 
ungrammatical items. If that were the case, participants might consciously have recognised 
them as new fragments and discriminated the strings as ungrammatical, and have done so 
while being less confident of such decisions than when consciously recognising something 
they   had   seen.   This   would   augment   the   accuracy   of   the   ‘guess’   judgements.   It   has   been  
proposed in the literature that rejecting ungrammatical items primarily relies on explicit 
knowledge (Ellis, R. 2005). 
The debate about the conscious/unconscious nature of transfer remains unresolved. 
But what becomes immediately apparent is the fact that the implicit learning mechanism is 
highly sensitive to many factors. Particular task demands or even instructions may focus 
participants’   attention   on   those   features   which   later   determine   what   they   learn   and   which  
aspects of the structure of the stimuli they will be sensitive to in a subsequent test (Wright & 
Whittlesea, 1998). Simply the manner of stimulus presentation may turn out to be critical in 
making the relevant features salient. For example, groups of geometric shapes determined by 
an artificial grammar have been shown to induce implicit learning when presented together 
but not when presented as sequences of individual shapes (Pothos & Bailey, 2000). Prior 
knowledge may also exert a top-down influence on what people learn: e.g. in Brockmole, 
Hambrick, Windisch, & Henderson (2008) only advanced chess players showed contextual 
cueing when the context for learning was provided by the repeated chessboard arrangements, 
the   meaningfulness   of   which   depends   on   the   observer’s   knowledge   of   the   game.   Even  
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temporary explicit expectations may interfere with learning. Pothos (2005) performed a study 
in which the stimuli were sequences of cities on the route of a travelling salesman. When an 
explicit expectation that the salesman would choose shorter rather than longer journeys was 
violated, learning was inhibited. 
To summarise, the field of implicit learning research has been rapidly growing since 
its beginning in the late 1960s, with numerous methods developed to measure whether and 
how implicit learning may occur. So far it has become apparent that what people learn is 
determined by the information they process or are able to process (such as in the case of 
healthy vs. amnesic participants), which in turn is determined by what is salient enough in the 
input to be taken in. Also,   any   learning   situation   is   unlikely   to  be   “process  pure”,  but  will  
actually involve a mixture of both explicit and implicit learning, each of which may rely on 
different aspects of the stimulus material, to a different extent. Chunks, for example, may be 
primarily explicit, while the analogical mapping or sensitivity to repetition patterns may, at 
least in part, be implicit.  
To what extent could implicit learning of this kind, based on surface form regularities, 
be involved in language acquisition? Could it provide an accurate explanation of the 
emergence of linguistic knowledge? 
 
 
1.4. Form-level implicit learning in language acquisition 
 
Research on implicit learning in first and second language acquisition to date has revealed 
similar phenomena to the ones described above. For example, both adults and children (8 
months old) have been shown to use chunking in segmentation of continuous, unfamiliar 
speech into words (Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996a; Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996b). 
While listening to a stream of seemingly random syllables (e.g. ba-bu-pu-bu-pa- da-du-ta-ba-
pa-tu- bi-pi-da-bu-tu-ti-bu…) they rapidly acquired a sense of recurring fragments which 
could be regarded as words (e.g. babupu, bupada, dutaba, patubi, pidabu, and tutibu). 
Because in these experiments the only cue to word boundaries was a relatively low transition 
probability between syllables (there were no prosodic cues), the implication is that people 
unconsciously tally transition probabilities between elements in the input. In a similar vein, 
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the acquisition of phrase structure could be based on the fact that transitional probabilities 
between words within a phrase are higher than between phrases (Morgan, Meier, & Newport, 
1989; Thompson & Newport, 2007). Although  neither  participants’  strategies  nor  awareness  
were measured in the above tasks, it may be assumed that at least in such young children the 
learning was implicit.  
Statistical learning effects based on the distribution of sounds have also been 
demonstrated in discriminating phoneme categories in both children (Maye, Werker, & 
Gerken, 2002) and adults (Maye & Gerken, 2000). In these tasks participants were required 
to indicate whether two words were the same one repeated or two different words in the 
artificial language they had been exposed to. Although   participants’   strategies   were   not  
monitored, it is not unlikely that in a task like this – which addresses very fine perceptual 
contrasts – many   of   the   participants’   decisions   were   actually   guesses   (in   fact, they were 
encouraged to guess in cases of uncertainty), which means that to some extent the learning 
effects shown could have been implicit. There is less such uncertainty in the studies of Dell, 
Reed, Adams, & Meyer (2000) and Warker & Dell (2006) who demonstrated implicit 
learning effects in adults learning phonotactic constraints and orthography. Since the learning 
was assessed on speech errors, which are produced unintentionally and automatically, the 
authors concluded that it was implicit.  
Determining the extent to which a given learning effect is implicit or explicit is not of 
negligible importance. In light of the discussion in section 1.3, explicit and implicit learning 
mechanisms may be sensitive to different aspects of the stimulus material, and importantly, 
as in Scott and Dienes (2010), explicit strategies may sometimes dominate and yield different 
performance than if implicit learning was proceeding in isolation. For example, it may be the 
case that the difference between the two learning modes could explain such discrepancies as 
reported in Baese-Berk (2010). Two groups were trained on a novel phonetic category 
contrast using the same task as Maye & Gerken (2000). One group followed a perception-
only procedure, and the other a perception-and-production procedure, where they were asked 
to explicitly repeat tokens. In the following phoneme discrimination task, the perception-only 
group outperformed the perception-and-production one, suggesting that production training 
can disrupt perceptual learning (although marked individual differences were observed as 
well). It is rather likely that participants in the perception-and-production group relied on 
explicit learning more than the perception-only group. A replication of these findings with 
additional measures of awareness could illustrate the relative contribution of explicit and 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
20 
 
 
implicit learning in production tasks. For the time being, it can only be concluded, as in 
section 1.3, that task demands highly influence the learning which may occur, be it implicit or 
explicit or, most likely, both. 
Apart from chunking and tallying probabilities, sensitivity to repetitions has also been 
demonstrated to play a part in language acquisition, both first and second. For example, 
studies by Marcus, Vijayan, Bandi Rao, & Vishton (1999) revealed sensitivity to repetitions 
among 7-month old infants. In the initial habituation phase streams of syllables were played, 
which followed either an ABA pattern (e.g. ga ti ga) or ABB (ga ti ti). Although the test 
items were composed of novel syllables (wo fe fe), infants attended longer to those which 
followed the same pattern they had heard. In a statistical learning paradigm (with no 
measures of awareness), Onnis et al. (2008) showed that relatively close repetitions of 
artificial   ‘words’   in   a   speech   stream   also   help   adult   learners   to   detect   them.   Furthermore,  
even form-meaning mappings are easier to establish when input is structured as partial self-
repetitions, as reported in a cross-situational learning study by Onnis, Edelman, & Waterfall 
(2011). 
These experiments suggest that form-level implicit learning may play a prominent 
role in the initial stages of language acquisition and that it may underlie such processes as 
early speech segmentation and phoneme extraction, which subsequently link to form-
meaning mappings (Hay & Saffran, 2011).  
The above presented studies relied on artificial language streams. However, the 
picture is not complete until these findings are compared with similar investigations using 
natural language. These reveal that the language learning mechanism is more complex, with 
numerous top-down, mostly unconscious, influences from lexical information, the stage of 
language development or proficiency, and, at least in the case of L2 learning, from the pre-
existing grammar. 
One example of such top-down effects is the influence of lexical information on 
phoneme perception in adult second language learners (Feldman, Myers, White, Griffiths, & 
Morgan, 2011). Participants who heard the tah and taw syllables in distinct lexical contexts 
were more likely to treat the vowel sounds as belonging to different categories as compared 
to participants who heard tah and taw interchangeably in the same set of lexical contexts. 
These results show that adults alter their interpretation of acoustic variability on the basis of 
word-level information (unfortunately there were no measures of how conscious the 
performance was).  
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Not only the mere linguistic context may have top-down effects on learning, but also 
specific languages may exert different top-down effects. For instance, Eckman & Iverson, (in 
press) presented data showing that the differences in sound classification in   the   learner’s  
native language (Korean versus Japanese classification of [s] and [ʃ]) have different 
consequences for both the acquisition patterns and the error types produced in the course of 
learning the given contrast in L2 (English).  
Also, stages of first language development in infants correlate with their predominant 
reliance on different statistical cues for learning semantic information. A study by Lany & 
Saffran (2011) revealed that 22-month-old infants with smaller vocabularies generalised 
using phonological cues, whereas infants with larger vocabularies relied more on 
distributional cues, possibly due to having had more experience of weighing the importance 
of various types of statistical regularities in language. This suggests that language acquisition 
cannot be modelled purely in terms of statistics without considering prior knowledge or the 
amount of prior linguistic experience. Furthermore, Peperkamp, Le Calvez, Nadal, & Dupoux 
(2006) illustrate that distribution of allophones of a given phoneme is hardly ever as clear-cut 
in natural language as it is made out to be in artificial language experiments. An analysis of a 
natural corpus revealed a very large number of near-complementary distributions not 
corresponding to existing allophonic rules. The authors propose an algorithm to account for 
this situation, which involves a linguistically motivated filtering mechanism, suggesting 
therefore an important role of prior linguistic knowledge in the statistical learning of 
phonology. 
Together these findings suggest that purely statistical modelling does not always offer 
the most accurate account of language acquisition. Statistical modelling enriched with 
linguistically motivated factors (such as stages of development and prior knowledge) offers a 
more tenable approach. However, the extent of the influence of linguistic (and other) factors 
is not easy to detect and analyse. Implicit learning methodology provides one solution to this 
problem, by measuring knowledge unaffected by conscious, explicit strategies, working 
memory or general intelligence, which may potentially skew other experimental 
investigations addressing deeply automatic, unconscious knowledge – such as the knowledge 
of language.  
Recent research has provided evidence that implicit learning is indeed highly related 
to language abilities. For example, Kaufman et al. (2010) reported a study investigating the 
association of individual differences in implicit learning with numerous cognitive variables, 
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such as psychometric intelligence, working memory or academic performance. They found 
that implicit learning was not related to overall intelligence or working memory. It turned out 
to be related only to academic performance on foreign language exams, and two aspects of 
psychometric intelligence: verbal analogical reasoning and processing speed – arguably, 
crucially linguistic traits.3 
Also, language disabilities have been linked to impaired implicit learning. For 
example, there is a longstanding debate in the literature over whether dyslexia is linked to a 
breakdown of implicit sequence learning, with conflicting evidence being reported. Dyslexia 
is a cognitive disorder affecting reading and writing skills, with the absence of an intelligence 
deficit or other cognitive disabilities. For this reason it was hypothesised that its underlying 
cause does not relate to conscious learning processes, but rather the implicit learning 
mechanism underlying abilities relying on sequence processing, such as the ability to read or 
write. In a convincing recent study and analysis by Jimenez-Fernandez, Gracia Vaquero et al. 
(2011) the authors argue that those studies which claim to demonstrate successful implicit 
sequence learning among dyslexics are based on materials which allow participants to use 
complementary strategies. For instance, in a number of studies the events in sequences were 
not balanced for frequency, allowing participants to report based on event familiarity. Certain 
sequences also involved regularities which were simple enough to decipher consciously. 
When event frequency and cue saliency are controlled, only healthy control participants and 
not dyslexics show learning. These findings support the general conclusion that implicit 
learning is related to language and it is driven by those aspects in the stimuli which are salient 
enough to be processed. It is therefore related  to  people’s  processing  abilities.   
All in all, studies of language acquisition provide a natural reflection of what has been 
discovered in the field of psychology. Language acquisition, just like the domain general 
mechanism of implicit learning, is determined by such factors as form frequency and 
saliency, lending itself to statistical modelling. In   this  sense   language  can  be  considered  “a  
mirror of  the  mind”4. It is not, however, a model of it5. Language exerts top-down effects and 
has discrete stages of development of which learners are not conscious. Implicit learning 
research clearly offers a promising, empirical approach to better understanding the underlying 
mechanism of language acquisition. With the variety of methods developed to investigate 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, the authors also report a relation between implicit learning and aspects of personality including 
intuition, openness to experience and impulsivity. 
4 Chomsky (1993), p. 34. 
5 Ibidem. 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
23 
 
 
implicit learning – AGL, SRT, invariant learning, contextual cueing – it has already deepened 
our understanding of the processes involved in the acquisition of knowledge in general. 
However, most of the current research has focused on regularities in perceptual, mostly visual 
forms. Language, on the other hand, operates on intrinsically meaningful units. Can the 
mechanism of implicit learning be better understood when applied to meaningful material?  
 
 
1.5.  Higher-level (semantic) implicit learning 
 
So far, considerably less attention has been devoted to implicit learning of regularities at an 
abstract level of representation, not pertaining to surface forms of stimuli. Initial attempts to 
demonstrate it date back to the times when many researchers believed implicit learning could 
lead to knowledge of abstract rules. Showing the learning of abstract, meaningful 
generalisations was seen as a way of confirming that intuition.  
 Bright & Burton (1994) documented a study in which they showed learning of a non-
salient invariant feature. Participants saw a series of 30 clock faces and simply wrote down 
the times.  They  were  not  informed  that  all  of  the  times  fell  between  6  and  12  o’clock.  In  an 
unexpected test they were presented with pairs of clock faces and asked to choose the one 
which appeared in the previous phase. Even though in fact all of the clock faces were new, 
participants showed a preference for the ones displaying the times between 6 and 12, even 
when no awareness of the regularity was reported in the final debriefing. Crucially, the 
authors showed that the effect persisted under a transfer condition when analogue clock faces 
in training were changed to digital ones in test. Initially this was taken as an abstraction of the 
rule and demonstration of knowledge that was independent from the visual similarity to the 
experienced exemplars. Subsequently, however, this conclusion has been revised.  
Interestingly, in Bright and Burton (1994) participants showed no preference for the 
actual seen clock faces when they were included in the test (Experiment 4). Initially, this was 
taken as strong evidence for abstraction and form-independence of the resulting knowledge. 
However, Newell & Bright (2002) provided a revised explanation, namely that participants 
were  more  likely  to  encode  the  times  in  a  rough  manner,  rather  than  extract  the  “6  to  12”  rule,  
and judged test items with regards to how similar they were to the training ones stored in 
memory. In their replication study, they constructed test pairs with varying degrees of intra-
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pair similarity. Test pairs with a low similarity between times were separated by 6 hours, e.g., 
8:30 vs 2:30, those with a medium similarity were separated by 3 hours, e.g., 4:30 vs 7:30, 
and those with a high similarity were separated by 1 hour, e.g., 5:10 vs 6:10. If the originally 
proposed rule abstraction was the case, the degree of intra-pair similarity should not be of 
importance, and provided that one time in a pair fell between 6 and 12 it should naturally be 
preferred. Alternatively, if the learning effect was driven by similarity matching, then 
selection of the invariant in the 1-hour pairs would be lower (the times would seem equally 
close to the original item) than in the 6-hour pairs. The latter turned out to be the case, 
suggesting that the performance on such non-salient invariant learning tasks, just like in other 
implicit learning tasks – including the form-based ones – was driven to a greater extent by 
overall similarity than by an abstract rule. For further examples and discussion of invariant 
learning see Berry & Cock (1998). 
 Such findings combined with the mainstream results about the implicit learning 
mechanism – its reliance on chunking, repetition structure and statistical regularities in the 
input – led to a decline in the popularity of research addressing abstraction/generalisation. 
Recent years, however, have seen a gradual revival of interest in these issues, focused not 
necessarily on rule abstraction but rather on the formation of conceptual knowledge. It is 
known that existing conceptual representations can be activated without conscious 
involvement, as in, for example, semantic priming experiments (Neely, 1977), arithmetical 
processing (Van Opstal, de Lange, & Dehaene, 2011), or intuitive gestalt judgements (Bolte 
& Goschke, 2008). The controversial question is whether unconscious conceptual knowledge 
can not only be accessed without awareness, but whether it can also participate in novel 
associations. 
The current demonstrations of implicit learning involving abstract representations, 
although scarce, may be divided into two types. The first addresses the question of whether 
new associations between existing concepts can be formed implicitly, and the second whether 
connections between novel forms and (pre-existing) concepts can be established without 
awareness. Both of these types of learning are relevant for language acquisition.  
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Abstract sequences 
An example study of the first kind, involving learning a thoroughly conceptual 
sequence is Goschke & Bolte (2007). Participants named pictures of objects, e.g. table, shirt, 
nose, horse, trousers, ear. What they did not know is that the pictures followed a repeating 
sequence based on their underlying category (furniture-clothing-body part-animal-clothing-
body part). After some exposure people were faster to name new objects when the object 
sequence followed the category sequence than when it did not, thereby showing 
generalisation. The pattern remained significant when taking into account only those 
participants who had no awareness of the underlying regularity based on the follow up 
sequence reproduction and recognition tasks and in comparison with a control group. 
Learning of category sequences is most likely based on forming gradual associations between 
category representations which are repeatedly activated in succession. As a result, processing 
an exemplar from one category leads to preactivation of the next category, which speeds up 
naming of objects coherent with the preactivated category, and delays naming of those 
incoherent with it (see Figure 1.3).   
 
 
Figure 1.3. Schematic model of the cognitive processes underlying performance in the serial 
naming task (from Goschke and Bolte, 2007). 
 
Brady & Oliva, (2008) show a similar effect for pictures of scenes which followed a 
predictable sequence of categories (e.g. mountain-building-kitchen-forest), including transfer 
to word equivalents of the category sequences. Participants initially performed a simple task 
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(repetition detection) on a stream of pictures. They were then tested on pairs of triplets of 
pictures, one of which followed the category sequence from the training,while the other did 
not. The participants’   task  was   to   choose  which   triplet   they   felt  was  more   familiar.      They  
were able to discriminate the two types above chance, even when the exact pictures had not 
appeared in the combinations presented but the categories to which they belonged had, and 
while reporting no awareness of the category sequences.  These studies show that people can 
track sequential regularities at conceptual levels, rather than just the superficial level of letter 
identity (in artificial grammars) or spatial location (Lewicki et al, 1987; 1988). This may be 
quite beneficial in the daily interactions with the world since, as Brady and Oliva, suggest, it 
reduces information redundancy, which is ubiquitous in the daily organisation of objects and 
their locations.  
 
 
 Form-meaning connections 
One of the early studies showing that people are sensitive to covariation at different 
levels of representation (form-level and a higher conceptual level) is Lewicki (1986). He 
presented participants with a series of photographs of short and long-haired people (visual 
forms) together with short auditory   descriptions   describing   the   people’s   characters 
(concepts). Unbeknown to the participants, the long-haired   people   were   all   ‘kind’, while 
short-haired  people  could  be  more  accurately  described  as  ‘capable’ although neither of these 
precise words appeared in the descriptions.   The   participants’   subsequent   forced-choice 
judgements (e.g., ‘capable’   – yes/no) of new pictured people, as well as their response 
latencies, indicated that they indeed learned this covariation. They did so without being able 
to  report  any  dependencies  in  the  stimuli.  Because  neither  of  the  words  ‘kind’  nor  ‘capable’  
appeared in the descriptions, participants must have extracted the relevant general notions 
about characters of the presented people and associated them with hair-length.  This 
reinforces the notion that certain regularities based on semantic, conceptual generalisations 
are learnable without awareness. 
Further interesting demonstrations of this phenomenon come from the area of visual 
perception and the derived attention paradigm. Lambert & Sumich (1996) showed that 
participants can become sensitive to the predictive relationship between the semantic 
category of words appearing on screen (living or non-living) and the position of a target dot 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
27 
 
 
located in a subsequent display, without awareness of the regularity throughout the 
experiment. More recently, similar findings were obtained using the contextual cuing 
paradigm (Goujon, Didierjean, & Marmèche, 2007; Goujon, 2011). In Goujon et al. (2007) 
participants had to search for a target (a number 13 or 28) in a display containing other 
numbers as distractors. The time the participants took to indicate whether the target was on 
the left or right of the screen  was   recorded.  What   they   didn’t   know  was   that  whether   the  
target was on the left or right of the screen was predicted by whether the distractors were odd 
or even numbers. After some time performing the task, response times on such predictive 
trials were faster than on trials where the distracters were a mixture of odd and even numbers. 
This was the case even when the distractors were drawn from a different set of odd and even 
numbers from those encountered in training. Participants apparently had no awareness of the 
regularity, so they appeared to have unconsciously abstracted the relationship between 
odd/even numbers and the target position. This, again, appears to be a case of learning an 
abstract regularity based on a semantic generalisation.  
Goujon et al (2011) report a similar effect using real-world scenes, in which the 
category of the scene (e.g., a bedroom or a living room) predicted the location of a target. 
Interestingly, though, the effect only arose when participants were asked to categorise a 
preview scene (even when it was different from the subsequent search scene) or could at least 
preview the search scene before the visual search trial, indicating that some processing 
enhancement may be necessary for such semantic implicit learning effects to occur.  
 What is immediately striking in the presented studies is how readily people generalise 
when the experimental stimuli are intrinsically meaningful. Since the learning material 
pertains to abstract, conceptual categories, they naturally (possibly automatically) generalise. 
An obvious question at this stage is – do similar phenomena take place in language? 
Language, after all, does operate on intrinsically meaningful elements – words6. 
 
 
1.6. Higher-level (semantic) implicit learning in language acquisition 
  
To a large extent language research has mirrored the above findings. Here too there are 
demonstrations of implicit learning of abstract regularities, such as those governing word 
                                                          
6 The smallest meaningful units in language are morphemes, but this dissertation mainly concerns regularities 
based on content words. 
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order in a sentence, as well as form-meaning connections, the latter being most relevant to the 
research reported in this dissertation.  
 
 
Abstract sequences 
Rebuschat & Williams (2011) report a study showing implicit learning of abstract sequences 
in language. Participants were exposed to sentences using English words and, unbeknown to 
them, German word order, e.g. George repeated today that the movers his furniture 
scratched. In a surprise grammatical judgement task on new sentences containing different 
words, the sentences which followed the grammatical patterns from the training were 
accepted at higher levels (above chance and above a control group with no training) than the 
ungrammatical sentences. Therefore, clearly there was rapid incidental learning of abstract 
word order patterns. Participants most likely incidentally extracted template representations 
of sequences based on word categories, which were abstract enough to allow transfer to new 
lexis. However, analysis of the ungrammatical test items suggested that there was no learning 
of abstract word order rules as such (e.g. verb final in subordinate clauses). Williams & 
Kuribara (2008), and Williams (2010) report similar findings, again showing incidental 
learning of category sequences, rather than generalised word order rules. These results are 
consistent with evidence for learning chunks rather than abstract rules in artificial grammar 
learning (see section 1.4, above), but here learning is at the level of abstract grammatical 
categories, and hence is reminiscent of learning sequences of semantic categories (Section 
1.5). 
 
 
Form-meaning connections 
Initial reports cast doubt on the possibility of learning form-meaning connections implicitly. 
DeKeyser (1995) utilised an artificial language with rich inflectional morphology for marking 
gender, number and object role. In an extensive study involving 20 learning sessions, 
participants were initially asked to indicate whether a given sentence correctly described a 
picture or not, e.g., Bep-on warufk-at rip-us (Worker-PL build-PL house-OBJ). The 
subsequent test involved a production task, where they had to describe pictures using the 
novel language. It turned out that they were only able to do so when it was possible to use 
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stem-inflection combinations which had occurred in training. When items required novel 
stem-inflection combinations they performed at chance, indicating they did not learn the 
general, semantic properties of the inflectional morphemes. However, the sentence-picture 
training task that was used in this study did not appear to require participants to pay attention 
to the inflectional morphemes. Given the importance of noticing form for learning (see 
Section 1.2) it is therefore not surprising that no learning of form-meaning connections was 
obtained. 
Additionally, the findings by Leow (1997; 2000) challenge the idea that form-
meaning connections can be established without awareness. His studies involved the learning 
of irregular (stem-changing) verbs in Spanish. Participants were solving a crossword puzzle 
during which they were required to report any thoughts coming to their mind. Interestingly, 
only those who commented on the changes of stem in the critical items later showed 
significant gains between pre-test and post-test. The study therefore suggests that there is no 
learning   without   ‘noticing’ (see next section for discussion).   Before   Leow’s   experiments,  
Schmidt had also argued for the same conclusion on the basis of Schmidt & Frota (1986) 
where he performed a case study of his own learning of Portuguese over a 6-month period in 
Brazil. He documented all aspects of the language he became aware of in a detailed diary, 
which also included recordings and transcriptions of his conversations with the natives. 
Schmidt noted a strong tendency for the things he noticed in the input to later appear in his 
productions, which led him to advocate that conscious ‘noticing’   should   be   crucial for 
learning (as mentioned in Section 1.2).  
 More promising results come from the research by Williams (2005) and Leung & 
Williams (2011, 2012). In Williams (2005) participants were first taught a system of four 
determiners: gi, ro, ul and ne. They were told that they had a similar role to the English 
definite article but they were also sensitive to the distance between the speaker and the object. 
In the system, ul and ne were used for distant objects, whereas gi and ro were used for the 
near ones. They were not told, however, that the choice of the determiner also depended on 
animacy of the following noun. Animate objects required either gi (near-animate) or ul (far-
animate), while inanimates requried ro (near-inanimate) or ne (far-inanimate). The 
participants were shown correct sentences (e.g. I heard the sound of ul monkey in the tree; I 
knocked over ro cup and coffee spilled on my book) and were trained on the distinction 
between far and near objects. While reading the sentences they were also asked to form 
mental images of the described situations. After training, they were given a test, where they 
 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
30 
 
 
had to choose between two possible determiners. In the test, familiar words appeared in new 
contexts, e.g. The art collector went to Greece to collect ul / ne vases (correct   answer   “ne 
vases”).  Neither  ul or ne had occurred with the noun vase during training. Those who claimed 
not being aware of the relevance of animacy to article usage during training or testing phases 
answered accurately 61% of the time, which is significantly above chance, showing 
compelling evidence for implicit learning of form-meaning connections. 
Leung and Williams (2011, 2012) corroborated these findings and showed evidence 
for the learning of other meaningful distinctions between determiners, such as whether the 
noun describes an agent or a receiver of an action (thematic roles: agent versus patient). At 
the same time, they failed to show learning of a non-linguistically motivated distinction 
concerning the relative size of objects. They hypothesised that implicit learning of form-
meaning connections may be constrained by prior assumptions about potentially encodable 
distinctions. Bickerton, (1999) proposed a list of semantic features which could potentially be 
grammaticised in   language,   including   “number,   gender,   person,   sense,   modality,   aspect,  
specificity, possession, object-type (e.g., long/thin versus spherical), transitivity, agency, 
grammatical function,   and   so   forth”   (p.204).   Bickerton   suggests   that   without   such   a   list 
language would be unlearnable due to the infinite number of potential semantic distinctions.   
The material in this dissertation continues the research from this point. The potentially 
grammaticisable semantic distinctions could facilitate learning of functional morphemes, 
such as determiners. But what about non-grammaticised semantic relations, such as those 
between content words, e.g., verbs and their following nouns? Semantic distinctions relevant 
to a set of nouns which may appropriately follow a given verb are also potentially infinite. 
Would implicit learning occur in this context as well?  
Initial support for the idea that people may indeed form semantic generalisations on 
content words comes from the study by Guo et al. (2011) examining implicit learning of 
semantic prosody. Semantic prosody is a pragmatic phenomenon wherein a word has a 
positive or negative connotation. A grammaticality judgement task combined with subjective 
measures of awareness revealed   participant’s unconscious knowledge of the semantic 
prosody of 6 novel words, which were based on existing English words. However, this result 
remains controversial as it is not clear whether participants identified the direct translation 
equivalents of the words and simply applied the prosody of those. This could have been 
facilitated by the fact that the target words belonged to different syntactic categories and were 
easily distinghishable, e.g. tinberly – totally, lampit – promote, pooth - career. Furthermore, 
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semantic prosody may also be universal in the Bickertonian sense, whereas semantic 
preferences could potentially be infinite. Nonetheless, these encouraging results clearly 
demonstrate that more research is needed in the area of unconscious semantic generalisation.     
 
 
1.7. Types, tokens, syntagmatic and paradigmatic learning – the case of 
semantic preferences 
 
A semantic preference can be understood as a particular type of collocation, where 
collocation refers to higher than chance co-occurrence of two or more words. Collocates 
sound natural together and substituting one of them with a near-synonym results in a loss of 
naturalness for native speakers, for example in English it is better to say fast car and fast 
food, rather than *quick car or *quick food. Conversely, it is more natural to say quick glance 
and quick meal instead of *fast glance or *fast meal. 
  It has been traditionally proposed that collocations reflect syntagmatic relations 
between words, therefore related to their surface structure, rather than paradigmatic relations 
– regarding their meaning. “Meaning by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level 
and is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the meaning of words. 
One  of  the  meanings  of  ‘night’  is  its collocability  with  ‘dark’...”  (Firth, 1957)  
  This claim has been reinforced within the popular framework of statistical modelling 
of language learning. Words co-occuring with each other more often than chance can be 
perceived as chunks, similar to chunks in AGL (Ellis, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006; Hoey, 2005; 
Sinclair, 1991, 2004) Chunks are believed to be formed due to the principle of associative 
learning  which  Ellis  (2001)  calls  the  “Law  of  Contiguity”  according  to  which “objects once 
experienced together tend to become associated in the imagination, so that when any one of 
them is thought of, the others are  likely  to  be  thought  of  also” (James, 1890, quoted in Ellis, 
2001). In this way, long-term  memory  becomes   ‘tuned’ to frequent collocations. When the 
same items are encountered again in the subsequent input they are recognised as a chunk, 
which further reinforces their long-term representations. 
However, syntagmatic regularities may not be the optimal, or the sole way of 
accounting for the existence and acquisition of semantic preferences. After all, new collocates 
can be freely generated, as long as they follow implicit assumptions regarding applicable 
semantic sets. In the example from section 1.2 of this chapter, knowing that pack collocates 
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with dog, hounds, wolves etc. while swarm with bees, mosquitoes, bats, naturally suggests 
other animals which would be appropriate in either set. It makes sense therefore, to predict 
that the existence of such semantically preferred sets of collocates involves abstraction at a 
level higher than form. Intuitions about collocability form an important aspect of attaining a 
native-like command of a language. In fact, it has been suggested that the same process that 
guides formation of collocations (as one example of formulaic language) may be central to 
language acquisition in general (Ellis, 2001). In spite of the significance of this area, so far 
little empirical research has been reported. 
Two types of chunks may be distinguished: types and tokens. While tokens refer to 
particular words or phrases, types indicate the number of distinct lexical items which can be 
substituted in a given slot in a construction. Tokens would include, for example, the fixed, 
non-decomposable idiomatic expressions, such as kick the bucket, which cannot be broken 
into parts without a loss of meaning. *A bucket was kicked by the poor man loses 
idiomaticity. In such cases the meaning of the whole is not composed of the individual 
words’  meanings  and  the  sequential  order  must  be  kept  intact. Types, on the other hand, offer 
a range of options within a construction, and can be illustrated by various sorts of 
collocations, from non-compositional but decomposable ones, such as sharp contrast, bitterly 
disappointing, heated argument, where collocates can be separated, and where also the 
meaning of a construction goes beyond the sum of its parts, to compositional and 
decomposable ones like: fast car, juvenile delinquent which can be separated and the 
meaning of a whole is indeed the sum of its components. Within the statistical language 
learning framework, however, decomposability is not an issue, since chunking is claimed to 
be a purely syntagmatic process. Crucially, chunking is believed to happen implicitly, 
without  learners’  intention  or  conscious  monitoring.  “To the extent that language processing 
is based on frequency and probabilistic knowledge, language learning is implicit learning” 
(Ellis, 2002).  
So far, researchers have focused on token chunks. For example, the fact that fixed 
expressions, specifically binomials   such  as  “fish  and  chips”,   are   stored  as  a   single  unit  has  
been convincingly demonstrated by Siyanova-Chanturia, Conklin, & Schmitt (2011) 
However, as Ellis (2002) points out there is a growing number of studies according to which 
it is the type chunk frequency which drives human categorisation processes, and with them 
language acquisition. He quotes a study by Barsalou, Huttenlocher, & Lamberts (1998) which 
reports a series of experiments on face recognition. It has been demonstrated that rather than 
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track individuals across events (token frequency) people form representations of them, which 
they then apply in categorisation. In other words, they form abstract types. Human 
categorisation may be therefore more sensitive to type frequency rather than simple token 
frequency. Ellis put this forward as a key issue for language acquisition.  
 Idiomatic expressions may be numerous in language, yet even more numerous are 
arrays of less fixed constructions. The examples are plentiful and may involve various 
degrees of abstraction around the set of collocates. In phrases such as beyond 
belief/description/doubt/question/recognition the noun that follows the verb, although 
different  in  each  case,  always  indicates  some  “verbal  process”,  and  the  meaning  of  the  whole  
may   be   roughly   paraphrased   as   “too   great   to   believe/describe/doubt...”. Schmitt (2010) 
describes   such   phenomena   as   “formulae   with   open   slots”,   illustrating   them with a longer 
construction: ______thinks nothing of________. The slots are not restricted to specific 
words, yet impose more generalised, paradigmatic restrictions, namely the first slot requires 
an animate subject, and the second one an activity which is unexpected or unusual. So, while 
(5) is well-formed, clearly (6) and (7) violate the semantic constraints: 
 
(5) John thinks nothing of running a marathon each year. 
(6) *The cup thinks nothing of being plastic. 
(7) *She thinks nothing of tying her shoelaces.  
 
The existence of these variable expressions,   using   Sinclair’s   (2004)   terminology, poses a 
challenge for learners of both first and second language. Yet what the above examples show, 
is that having a generalised notion of what meaning is required in a given slot in a 
construction may potentially be very helpful in determining which words can and cannot be 
used. Native speakers develop such generalised notions incidentally, and possibly are not 
always aware of precisely what identifies legitimate collocates. Is it possible for second 
language learners to develop such notions implicitly as well? 
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1.8. Methodological issues 
 
The difficulty concerning accurate operationalisation of implicit learning is partially a result 
of the evolution taking place in the definition of the concept itself. Frensch (1998) groups the 
numerous definitions which had been proposed by that time according to whether a lack of 
conscious awareness should pertain to the learning process or to the learning and retrieval 
processes. Postulating that it should pertain to both learning and retrieval helps to clearly 
distinguish between incidental and implicit learning. Incidental learning takes place when 
people  ‘discover’  something  although  they  had  no  prior  intention  to  do  so.  A  natural  example  
of incidental learning could be realising the meanings of unfamiliar words while reading. In 
experimental conditions incidental learning refers to situations where participants are not 
informed about the coming test. Implicit learning usually refers to those incidental learning 
situations where participants also remain unaware of what they have learned. In the early 
studies, this was ascertained when people were unable to, post-experimentally, verbalise their 
knowledge (unlike the vocabulary example), hence the unconsciousness of retrieval. In sum, 
lack of intention to learn a particular thing combined with inability to verbalise what one has 
learned at the end, has often been assumed to indicate that the process occurred 
unconsciously.  
The conscious or unconscious availability of the end-state knowledge, however, may 
not always necessarily be an indicator of the process which led to it. For example, implicit 
knowledge may be developed in an explicit process which starts intentionally (e.g. learning to 
play an instrument), and through repetition and practice, gradually becomes more automatic 
or proceduralised. Competent composers of music, for example, are not always consciously 
aware of the details of musical structure while composing a piece. One could say that over 
time   it   becomes   “second   nature” to them. So, at least some aspects of initially explicit 
knowledge, through practice and proceduralisation, may lead to a different kind of 
knowledge, which is no longer available to conscious introspection. The reverse situation, 
where initially implicit knowledge spontaneously becomes explicit, is also possible, in what 
can  be  called  “insight”.  These processes are summarised in Figure 1-4.   
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Figure 1.4. Relationships between implicit and explicit learning and knowledge (reproduced with 
permission from (Williams, 2012). 
 
Since the process of implicit learning could lead to both implicit and explicit knowledge, the 
most promising approach to measuring it is to analyse people’s awareness of a given 
regularity and analyse their behaviour during the learning process. This could be done either 
directly or indirectly. Directly, this can be performed by asking questions requiring 
introspection during the test and analysing only those responses which are not linked with 
explicit   knowledge.   Indirectly,   implicitness   can   be   assumed   if   people’s   behaviour displays 
established characteristics of an unintentional and uncontrolled process, such as automaticity, 
and can be further validated by a post-experiment verbal report.7 
The endeavour of demonstrating learning without awareness becomes yet more 
challenging in light of the fact that the definition of awareness itself and its relation to 
attention as well as its role in learning in general remain contentious. While the debate 
remains unresolved, in implicit learning research it is best to establish functional implicitness, 
rather than absolute implicitness. Functional implicitness can be understood as occurring 
when we do not use whatever knowledge we have strategically. For example, in the case of 
social cognition, we may have a lot of explicit stereotypical knowledge about e.g. blond 
people or Polish (sic!) people, but not use it strategically. In the perception of art, experts 
                                                          
7 Implicit behaviour will be automatic, but not all automatic behaviour is implicit. 
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may possess much explicit knowledge about what makes a genuine kouros (ancient Greek 
sculpture) but still be influenced by intuitive, unverbalisable intuitions when making 
decisions8. This further illustrates the dissociation between knowledge and performance. That 
is why it is important to establish what was driving participants’ performance at the moment 
when learning effects were measured. 
As has been signalled in part 1.3 and 1.4, determining whether the learning has been 
implicit or explicit in a given task is of considerable importance. Experiments may yield 
different interpretations when participants’ awareness is taken into account compared to 
when it is not. Furthermore, establishing the level of awareness is also important in light of 
the debate concerning the very existence of the implicit learning phenomenon (section 1.7 of 
this chapter). Shanks & St John (1994) proposed therefore two criteria which need to be 
satisfied for implicit learning to be legitimately demonstrated: the information criterion and 
the sensitivity criterion. 
 
 
Information criterion: 
The information participants are asked to provide on the awareness test  
must be the information responsible for the improved level of performance. 
 
Sensitivity criterion: 
The test of awareness must be sensitive to all of the relevant knowledge.  
People may be consciously aware of more task-relevant aspects than  
an insensitive awareness test detects.  
 
Below is a summary and brief evaluation of different methods which have been used to date 
to  measure  participants’  awareness  in  implicit  learning  tasks.   
 
Verbal reports 
Method:  In many classic experiments on implicit learning, the lack of awareness was  
established on the basis that participants were unable to report what they had learned 
immediately after the test (Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Reber & Allen, 1978).    
                                                          
8 Gladwell, M. (2008). 
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Pros:   Even though the method has often been applied to experiments with complex 
systems underlying the stimuli, it is in fact more suitable when the learning target is simple 
enough that once acquired, learners would certainly be capable of reporting their knowledge 
of it. Post-experimental verbal reports also have the benefit that they do not introduce any 
extra awareness measures in the task, and thereby avoid prompting participants to 
intentionally guess the system or construct ad hoc hypotheses while performing the task. It is 
most appropriate as a method to double-check that the learning was implicit in procedures 
where the learning itself is measured by other means, e.g. reaction times, and only in such 
tasks where any conscious knowledge that might have arisen during the learning task would 
be unlikely to be forgotten by the time the test is applied.  
Cons:   The main problem with this method is that technically it can only reliably 
establish the state of resulting knowledge, rather than the level of awareness during the 
learning process. The overall crudeness of this method is what motivated Shanks & St John 
(1994) to postulate their criteria. One potential issue here   is   the   “retrospective   problem”.  
People indeed may have been aware of some relevant aspects of the task while performing it, 
yet forget them in the final debriefing (information criterion), or forget by the time the 
debriefing takes place. This could even be the case in amnesic patients – they may be rapidly 
forgetting what they had been fleetingly aware of during the task, leading researchers to 
mistakenly assume that they are capable of learning without awareness. Furthermore, the 
majority of experiments which relied on this method involved highly complex systems, for 
example artificial grammars, making any relevant knowledge difficult to verbalise and 
therefore easy to go undetected during the post-experiment checking of awareness (sensitivity 
criterion). This could be the reason why it is often assumed that implicit learning succeeds 
when the material is putatively too complex for explicit learning (Lewicki et al. 1987; Reber, 
1989). 
  
Concurrent verbalisation 
Method: The method has been proposed by Leow (1997) and Rosa & Leow (2004). It 
requires participants to report any thought that comes to their mind while performing a task.  
Pros: If participants reported absolutely any thought that came to their mind during 
the task, the method would provide a straightforward answer to the question whether the 
given participant developed any task-relevant knowledge. It would also enable detecting the 
moment when the relevant knowledge emerged and tracking its development. 
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Cons: Participants may have different reporting thresholds. Some of them might 
entertain ideas without mentioning them, or not describe low-confidence notions. 
Furthermore, this method has recently been shown to actually hinder learning, including 
explicit learning (Rebuschat, Hamrick, Sachs, Ziegler, & Riestenberg, in preparation.), cf. 
verbal overshadowing.   
 
Subjective measures 
Method:  This method was proposed by Dienes & Scott, (2005) and Dienes (2008)  
and relies on the definition of implicit learning based on two criteria: the guessing criterion 
and the zero correlation criterion. According to the guessing criterion – implicit learning 
occurs when participants respond accurately when they believe they are literally guessing. 
The zero correlation criterion   states   that   implicit   learning   occurs   when   participants’  
confidence in incorrect decisions is as high as confidence in correct decisions. The guessing 
and   zero   correlation   criteria   only   reflect   a   person’s   subjectively   experienced   confidence   in  
their judgement, as measured by ratings of confidence for each decision made. Dienes refers 
to this as judgement knowledge. This needs to be distinguished from the actual content of the 
knowledge that underlies a judgement – what Dienes has referred to as structural knowledge. 
For example, when a person makes a grammaticality judgment on a sentence in their native 
language they will usually have very high confidence in their answer; that is, they have 
conscious judgment knowledge. But this does not mean that they are aware of the underlying 
rules  that  determine  whether  a  sentence  is  grammatical  or  not.  In  Dienes’  terms  they  have  no  
conscious   structural   knowledge.  To  measure   this   aspect   of   a   person’s   subjective   state   they  
can be asked to indicate, in addition to confidence, whether their judgement was based on a 
guess, intuition, memory, or rule. Intuition means that they are confident in their answer 
without knowing why, which is the state assumed for native judgements about 
grammaticality in natural language, and assumed to be a valid measure of implicit structural 
knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 2005).  
Pros: Asking participants to introspect their mental states and the state of their 
knowledge taps on the issue of awareness directly. Also, awareness is measured concurrently 
with the test task, so the method does not face the retrospective problem faced by post-
experiment reporting. Furthermore, participants are not required to formulate their knowledge 
exactly, therefore even vague, imprecise notions can be reflected in answers with slightly 
higher confidence. The method is therefore more sensitive than post-experiment verbal 
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reports. It also provides a solution to the problem that any process is unlikely to ever be 
purely implicit or explicit, by filtering out the responses which were marked using explicit 
judgement and source knowledge. 
Cons: Again, the reporting threshold. Participants may have low confidence 
knowledge which they do not report. The method assumes deep and honest introspection. 
Furthermore, asking participants to provide the source of their judgement on every decision 
they provide is likely to prompt them to intentionally search for rules during the test task. 
This may be a particular   problem   when   using   source   judgements   that   include   the   “rule” 
category (Rebuschat et al., in preparation).  
 
Automaticity 
Method: Automaticity is an indirect measure of implicitness. It is the basis of 
numerous different tasks, in which participants do not fully control their performance, e.g., 
reaction time tasks, such as those reported in Leung & Williams (2011, 2012) studies or in 
the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991).  
Pros: Similarly to subjective measures, provides a solution to the problem that any 
process is unlikely to ever be purely implicit or explicit. Simply put, the presence of an 
implicit process can be detected if performance is different from what it would have been if it 
had been purely explicitly controlled. Also, the awareness of the learning target usually does 
not form part of the test task requirement, nor is this awareness even particularly beneficial 
for the task. For example, reaction time tasks – unlike grammaticality judgement tasks – can 
be performed without participants being aware of the existence of any regularity. It is not of 
any benefit in such a task to possess explicit awareness, which avoids the problem of 
participants intentionally constructing hypotheses along the way.  
Cons: Often the task instructions are too complicated to apply in disadvantaged 
populations, such as amnesic patients. Also, the external validity, especially in a linguistic 
context, may be compromised. After all, in a natural linguistic situation people are not 
usually pressed for time to give responses. Therefore it is not clear whether conclusions from 
this method may always be extended to situations outside the lab. 
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Neuroimaging  
 Method: Neuroimaging methods are rapidly developing. Currently available ones 
include event-related brain potentials (ERP), magnetoencephalography (MEG), functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and positron emission tomography (PET). 
 Pros: Although the methods so far have been rather crude, neuroimaging may prove 
more sensitive than behavioural data, or supply otherwise unobtainable data. For example, 
ERP studies carried out by Morgan-Short, Steinhauer, Sanz, & Ullman  (2012) revealed that 
among participants performing comparably on behavioural tests, some may exhibit a more 
native-like P600 effect, while others, a more non-native like N400. This suggests that people 
can accomplish the same means via different mental strategies, which would be unlikely to be 
possible to introspect. Also, PET studies have been reported identifying some areas of the 
brain being active when participants report awareness (Rauch et al., 1995). There has even 
been a report that some brain areas might be responsive to novelty in the absence of 
awareness (G. S. Berns, Cohen, & Mintun, 1997).  
Cons: The studies linking performance to awareness have been relatively scarce so far 
and the results may sometimes be difficult to interpret. Also, neuroimaging is an expensive 
technique. Furthermore, especially in the case of fMRI – it requires accepting at least one 
other method. 
 
It becomes clear that each method has its useful and not useful aspects. Perhaps it is 
difficult to make definite conclusions about new results given the outcome of just one 
method. An advantage of the investigations presented in this dissertation consists of 
addressing semantic implicit learning via an array of different methods based on subjective 
measures, automaticity, and in Chapter 5 ERP neuroimaging. The way in which the 
experiments address the methodological issues raised here will be discussed in the relevant 
chapters.  
 
 
1.9. Chapter summary 
 
This chapter introduces the research question: does implicit learning of semantic 
generalisations based on content words (such as verbs or nouns) exist? In particular, is there 
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semantic implicit learning of verbs’ semantic preferences? The literature overview places the 
question in the broader context of implicit learning research, most of which has so far focused 
on form-level regularities. It is argued that looking at implicit learning of abstract regularities, 
both outside as well as within language, can bring new insights into both fields: psychology 
and linguistics. On the one hand, investigating the phenomenon of implicit learning in this 
new domain can deepen our understanding of the mechanisms that underpin it. On the other 
hand, prior work on implicit learning provides a rigorous methodological framework to 
address the acquisition of word use in second language. Finally, the pros and cons of different 
methodologies were discussed. 
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 Chapter 2 
Semantic implicit learning in acquisition of L2 
English 
  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 Does semantic implicit learning naturally occur in a foreign language learning 
setting? Below is a report of the first empirical test of whether Polish learners of English 
indeed possess and develop semantic implicit knowledge at all. Determining the existence of 
such knowledge is an important step, not only in light of the controversies surrounding the 
existence and mechanism of implicit learning (as discussed in Chapter 1) but primarily in 
light of the pedagogical debate between advocates of communicative and functional teaching 
methods. 
 The communicative approach to teaching arose in the 1970s as both linguists and 
educators grew dissatisfied with the then predominant audio-lingual and grammar-translation 
methods. It became clear that even despite elaborate explicit knowledge of language, learners 
often felt robotic and at a loss in natural, social situations. A solution to that was the 
development of new classroom methods and activities with the chief focus on communication 
and meaning, such as role-plays, interviews, information gap-fills, games, surveys and 
pairwork. Margie Berns, an expert in language pedagogy and sociolinguistics wrote: 
“language study has to look at the use (function) of language in context, both its linguistic 
context (what is uttered before and after a given piece of discourse) and its social, or 
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situational, context(…)” (Berns, 1984, p. 5). Of course underlying this framework is the 
assumption that learners will acquire the crucial aspects of language automatically. 
 Currently, the extreme communicative approach is not favoured any more, after 
succumbing to the criticism   that   plain   “chatting”   does   not   stimulate   actual   learning   of   the  
material necessary to improve competence (and confidence). Currently, anyone who has 
followed a CELTA (Certificate of English Language Teaching to Adults) teacher course at 
least within the last few years will have  been   taught   a  mixture  of   “focus  on  meaning”  and  
“focus   on   form”   teaching methods and encouraged to balance them and apply them for 
different purposes. In sum, currently the question of high importance is which aspects of 
language can be acquired naturally, as communicative approaches suggest, and which aspects 
require explicit teaching, as favoured by functional teaching methods. Implicit learning 
provides an ideal methodological framework within which to find this out. 
 One may still wonder, however, why examine implicit learning, as opposed to only 
incidental? After all, surely learning that leads to explicit knowledge should in principle be at 
least as useful as the development of unconscious knowledge? There is evidence to believe 
that learning and acquisition processes not only are different (Krashen, 1981), but also 
involve mental linguistic representations of a different type. Morgan-Short, Steinhauer, Sanz, 
& Ullman (2012) showed that learned and acquired structures are associated with different 
neural signatures, and  only   learners  who  had  undergone   “implicit”   (i.e.   inductive   and  non-
instructed) learning displayed native like P600 responses to syntactic violations, whereas 
explicitly instructed learners, whilst achieving similar levels of proficiency on behavioural 
tests, did not display native-like ERPs. These differences, and their implications for the 
trajectory of learning versus acquisition, are only now beginning to be understood, despite 
their profound importance for strategies of language pedagogy. 
Is semantic implicit learning a real phenomenon in language acquisition? Do people  
acquire knowledge about the meanings of words in a foreign language? If so, what drives 
such learning? In the light of the discussion in Chapter 1, specifically the role of similarity 
between training and test stimuli, this initial experiment examines whether the knowledge of 
meaning – once acquired – can automatically be applied to various contexts in which a given 
word is used. Does it matter how similar the test case is to the contexts to which the learner 
has been exposed?  
In short, Experiment 1 examines whether participants exposed to novel L2 words in 
written contexts are able to: 
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 incidentally develop sensitivity to the legitimate and illegitimate usage of the words in 
new but similar contexts (where context is operationalised as the type of nouns with 
which a given verb collocates); 
 extend this sensitivity to new and semantically different contexts;  
 assess to what extent the performance is based on implicit knowledge. 
 
 
 
2.2. Experiment 1 
 
Participants: 68 university students at the University of Economics, Krakow, Poland. They 
were from 5 classes at the upper-intermediate/advanced level. The students in each class were 
divided into the experimental and control groups. 
 
2.2.1. Stimuli 
 
Four target words of English: DIMINISH, DEPLETE, TRUNCATE, MITIGATE. Chosen to 
specify the following conditions: 
 
 Not have an easily identifiable counterpart in Polish. Otherwise the experiment would 
amount to a simple test for how many people can find the right equivalent. This was 
ensured by a pilot questionnaire where 7 Polish native speakers of an advanced 
command of English, judged the fit of the strongest Polish equivalent for each 
experimental stimulus and suggested other Polish words where the fit was low. The 
results indicated that none of the words have a single best equivalent, with mitigate 
having one fit for the most contexts, namely the word: łagodzić,  which  also  means  ‘to  
ease’,  ‘alleviate’,  ‘smooth  over’  or  ‘commute’  as  in  ‘commute  punishment’.  The word 
mitigate does also have cognates in Polish: mitygować   and mitygować   się meaning 
‘stop someone  else  or  oneself,  respectively,  from  making  a  rash  decision’.  These  are,  
however, very old fashioned expressions, possibly not even known by a number of 
participants, and crucially, used that way the word takes an animate patient as 
argument, which would not match the contexts provided in the experiment. Further 
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elaboration on this issue will be mentioned in the discussion at the end. The Polish 
translation equivalents which could be applied in the experimental contexts are 
presented in Table 2.1 below. 
 
 
Table 2.1. Polish equivalents of the learning targets appropriate in the sentences used in 
Experiment 1. 
 
diminish deplete truncate mitigate 
zmniejszać 
umniejszać 
pomniejszać     
ograniczać 
wyniszczać 
niszczyć 
pochłaniać 
wypierać 
ściąć 
okroić 
obciąć 
łagodzić 
umilić 
 
 
 
 Be highly related in meaning, so that the context serves as the crucial cue for their 
differentiation.   Here,   all   the   words   indicate   ‘reducing   something’   or   ‘making  
something   smaller/weaker’. Mitigate indicates making an unpleasant situation or its 
effects less serious and less difficult to bear. Out of the four words it is the only one 
with a positive connotation. Diminish means   ‘to   make   something   smaller’,   and   is  
mostly used with abstract nouns, such as  ‘value’  or  ‘importance’,  rather  than  concrete  
nouns,   such  as   ‘food’  or   ‘house’.  Out  of   the   four  words,   only   this  one  may  also  be  
used to deliberately make someone or something appear less important than they 
really are. Deplete means to reduce supplies of something to a level that is too low. 
Unlike   ‘diminish’,   it   is  usually  used  with   tangible,  material   components.   ‘Truncate’  
suggests reducing the length of something by cutting off a part of it. 
 
 Be different enough from each other to find non-overlapping contexts where none of 
the other three words fits. This was ensured by a pilot study in which a group of 4 
English native speakers were individually presented with experimental stimuli and 
asked to indicate whether 1) they would naturally use a proposed word in the 
contexts, and 2) if any of the other three words were possible there as well.    
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 Be unlikely to be known by an intermediate-level L2 English learner.  
 
Contexts for training and test items were selected from the British National Corpus and the 
Brigham Young Corpus of American English which met the above contextual criterion. 
Figure 1 presents sample training sentences for each word and Figure 2.1 presents sample test 
stimuli. The stimuli material is presented in Appendix A. 
 
 2.2.2. Procedure 
 
Training 
The experiment took place in a classroom environment. Half of a class was given full 
experimental training with 50 sentence contexts: 8 with each target word and 18 filler 
sentences. The other half of the class served as a control group and were given sets with the 
same sentences but with the target words paraphrased by synonyms. In the training task 
participants rated each sentence for how important the information was to them on a scale 
from 1 to 5. 
Examples of the training items: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research shows that having strong ties to co-workers can help mitigate job related stress - a good reason to make some office buddies. 
 The economic crisis has visibly hit the university graduates who are just entering the workforce. Boston Consulting among many companies had to severely truncate the lists of accepted interns, leaving many hopeful youngsters jobless. 
 The public obviously has had enough of the prime minister trying to diminish the status of the president and vice versa. 
 In Nepal, 120,000 trekkers a year deplete forests by always using wood in lodges or houses for baths and cooking. Many forest dwelling animals are facing extinction as a result. 
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Each target word in the training constantly collocated with nouns from one semantic domain, 
and so:  
- mitigate – with negative psychological states  
- diminish – with nouns of importance  
- deplete – with natural resources  
- truncate – with words denoting measurable strings of text 
 
 
A full list of target word arguments used in the training as well as the test is presented in 
Table 2.2. 
 
Test 
The test was unexpected. Participants were not informed beforehand in order to create an 
incidental learning condition. Both the experimental and control groups received the same 
test. Stimuli were semi-randomised, with the same word never appearing twice on the same 
page. There were 48 sentence contexts: 12 for each word, 6 times used correctly, 6 times 
incorrectly. The task was to determine whether the target word, presented in capitals, was 
used correctly or not. Participants were also asked to indicate the source of their judgement. 
Figure 2.1 presents an example test sentence with the tasks. Subjective measures of 
awareness were modelled after Dienes & Scott (2005). “I  formulated  a  definition”  is  akin  to  
their   ‘rule’   category,   “I   remembered  a   similar   sentence”   is   akin   to   ‘memory’,   and  “I  knew  
before  what   the  word  means”  is   included  here  to  catch  cases  where the participants already 
knew the word. 
 The bad news did not DIMINISH her enthusiasm for the plan, she remained just as          excited as she was before.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Example test item. 
How did you mark your answer?  - by guessing  - intuition  - I formulated a definition and used it  - I remembered a similar sentence - I knew before what this word means 
Is the word 
correct? 
 
  YES  NO  
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The correct uses were divided into two subtypes: the items where the target collocated 
with semantically similar arguments, and those involving extension to a new semantic 
domain. To illustrate, the word truncate in the training only appeared collocating with 
members of the category of textual strings (e.g. message, lists). Therefore 3 of the 6 correct 
test items presented truncate with new textual strings (not encountered in training). The 
remaining 3 correct items involved truncate collocating with nouns from a new semantic 
domain, in this case nouns of temporal duration. In these sentences, like in all sentences 
where it appears, truncate is the only word out of the four targets to possibly fit semantically. 
However, in order to correctly judge the acceptability of truncate in the new, extended 
contexts the participants would have to have learned something about the meaning of 
truncate that differentiates it from the other words. Table 2.2 illustrates the distribution of 
nouns in the training and test, arranged into semantic types. 
       The 6 incorrect stimuli were also not random, as they consisted of the target words 
presented with the noun type where a different target word appeared in training (3 times) and 
where a different word was used as an extension context (3 times).  
 
Post-experiment questionnaire 
 The test was followed by a short questionnaire in which the students were asked 1) 
whether they saw the target words in the first part of the experiment (with the aim of 
indicating to the experimenter which group they belonged to), 2) whether they had any ideas 
about what these words mean, 3) to estimate how much of the training text they understood, 
4) whether they were trying to figure out the meanings of the target words as they were doing 
the test, 5) to provide any further comments.   
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    Table 2.2. Words and their arguments in the well-formed sentences in training and test. 
 TRAINING SAME TYPE EXTENSION  TO… 
MITIGATE Negative psychological 
states: 
 
Grief 
Pain 
Stress 
Depression 
Loss 
Suffering 
Despair 
Agony 
 
 
 
 
Humiliation 
Frustration 
Fear 
Natural disasters 
 
Climate change 
Global Warming 
Flood damage 
DIMINISH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Importance: 
 
Force 
Input 
Influence 
Significance 
Prominence 
Greatness 
Status 
Role 
 
 
Accomplishment 
Reputation 
Importance 
 
Feelings: 
 
Enthusiasm 
Gratitude 
Desire 
 
 
DEPLETE Natural/biological 
resources: 
 
Ozone layer 
Forests 
Nitrogen 
Oxygen 
Carbohydrates 
Natural resources 
Water reserves 
Essential nutrients 
 
 
 
White blood cells 
Serotonin 
Oil supply 
Financial resources: 
 
Money 
Treasury 
Savings 
TRUNCATE String of text (length) 
 
Line 
Message 
Text 
Lists 
Sentences 
File 
Section 
Website URL 
 
 
 
Password 
Document 
Manuscript 
Nouns for temporal 
duration: 
 
Transmission 
Show 
Presentation 
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2.2.3. Results 
 
Overall accuracy in the experimental group (n = 35) was 56.1%, SD = 0.11, whereas among 
the control group (n = 27) it was 51.8%, SD = 0.06. The difference between the groups 
achieved significance at t(26) = 1.97 p < 0.05 in a one–tailed t-test. Figure 2.2 below presents 
the distribution of responses across the source judgements. 
 
 
 
       Figure 2.2. Response proportions by category. 
 
 
 
 
Most participants cited ‘guess’ and ‘intuition’ as sources of their judgements. Following 
Dienes & Scott (2005), such responses are presumed to reflect implicit knowledge. The 
following analysis therefore includes only these answers.  
 
Truncate turned out to be the only word for which the trained group did not 
outperform the controls numerically. 
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 Figure. 2.3. Accuracy of the implicit source responses by word, 0.5 CI.  
 
 
The word truncate turned out also to be the only word that failed to show any learning effect 
even on the grammatical items in the similar contexts to training. Since there are independent 
reasons for expecting this word to be the hardest to learn (see Discussion) it has been 
excluded from the following analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Accuracy in similar and new contexts (extensions) for implicit source, 0.5 CI. 
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Excluding truncate, in the similar contexts the experimental group outperformed the control 
group, p < 0.05 (one-tailed t-test), whereas there was no significant difference in the 
extension context. This suggests implicit knowledge of word usage in similar contexts only. 
As mentioned above, in the test each word appeared 12 times, 6 times correctly and 6 
incorrectly. Out of these 6, 3 times the word was used in similar contexts as in training and 3 
times in contexts which were correct (grammatical), but semantically different to the training 
items (extended contexts). Figure 2.5 presents accuracy for the grammatical and 
ungrammatical items in similar and extended contexts for the answers marked as guesses and 
intuition. On these implicit judgements, planned comparisons showed that the mean accuracy 
of the experimental group on grammatical items appearing in similar contexts to the ones in 
training (70%) was significantly different from the control groups’ performance (59.5%), p < 
0.05. No differences were found in the other conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Accuracy for grammatical or ungrammatical items in similar or extended 
      contexts for implicit source, 0.5 CI. 
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2.3. Discussion 
 
Implicit learning 
Learners seem able incidentally to develop sensitivity for the legitimate uses of new words in 
novel contexts that are semantically similar to the ones to which they have been exposed. 
They do not appear to extend this knowledge to semantically different novel contexts, or to 
reject incorrect uses. Nevertheless, because their performance is so different on the two types 
of contexts (similar and new) they must implicitly have formed certain generalisations about 
the semantic environment accompanying the words. It is remarkable that an effect was 
obtained despite the fact that none of the words appeared with the same noun collocate more 
than once. This is the first demonstration of semantic implicit learning occurring on content 
words in language and suggests that abstract level generalisations, which have predominantly 
been denied to implicit learning processes, may indeed take place in language. 
The fact that that the experimental participants performed better on grammatical test 
items similar to the training items than on completely novel ones is reminiscent of the 
research in implicit learning in other domains (e.g., Rebuschat, 2009, Williams & Kuribara 
2008), where similar stimuli usually attract strongest learning effects, and learning is weaker 
– if at all – on novel applications. The results therefore support episodic models of semantic 
learning, but go beyond them through demonstrating that learning takes place not only at the 
level of form but at the level of semantic generalisation. Future work should shed light on the 
extent to which this generalisation may occur and what it is driven by. 
 
 
Second language pedagogy 
The results presented here provide empirical support for the assumptions underlying 
communicative approaches to language teaching, namely that learners can develop linguistic 
knowledge pertaining to word use without explicit mediation. Educators should however bear 
in mind that such knowledge will extend only to semantically similar (albeit new) instances. 
When it becomes known what drives or limits the process of semantic generalisation it might 
be possible to make specific recommendations about the optimal learner exposure of new 
words in different contexts for efficient acquisition.   
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Role of L1 
 The word truncate was excluded from the analysis as it did not show any learning effect 
even in similar grammatical contexts. This might be attributed to the fact that it is most 
dissimilar in form from any other words in the L1 Polish. Although unidentified in the initial 
study of Polish translation equivalents for the experimental sentences, there do exist Polish 
words which are similar in form to the English target words: mitigate – mitygować,  diminish 
– minimalizować,  deplete – wypleniać.  Truncate was therefore the only target word whose 
form had to be learned from scratch. The notion that pre-existing forms may have facilitated 
learning could also be supported by the fact that the control groups performed quite 
accurately on the word diminish, even on answers ascribed to an implicit source. This 
suggests possible availability of a concept connected to a cross-linguistically similar form, 
which may in turn, guide the intuitions about the use of a novel L2 word.9 
 
 
Indications for subsequent research 
Although the results support the hypothesis that learners indeed have implicit semantic 
knowledge about the meanings of words they do not explicitly know, still it is hard to say 
whether this knowledge was developed through the experimental training given. In particular, 
the fact that the control group was also above chance in their performance on grammatical 
items suggest that they overall indeed had some implicit knowledge. After all, the target 
words exist in English and it is impossible to quantify the possible exposure participants may 
have had to them prior to the experiment. It seems therefore advisable that experiments 
targeting the development of semantic knowledge should use novel word forms as targets. 
 Furthermore, as far as methodology is concerned, a potential problem concerns the 
fact that participants were given a grammaticality judgement task. They may have therefore 
been prompted to construct ad hoc knowledge (as discussed in section 1.8.). It is therefore 
better if experiments of this kind rely on methods where target knowledge is not required for 
the task. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The issue of form in semantic implicit learning will be re-addressed in Chapter 3, experiments 6a and 6b. 
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2.4. Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
 
This first empirical chapter contains one experiment, carried out on Polish learners of English 
in a classroom environment. The study provides initial support to the claim that learners do 
implicitly learn about semantic regularities pertaining to the use of words in context. The 
failure to show any learning effects in new contexts which considerably differed from the 
training ones points to the fact that semantic similarity plays an analogous role in semantic 
implicit learning to that of form-similarity in implicit learning targeting form regularities.  
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Chapter 3 
Semantic implicit learning and false memory 
 
 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a collection of seven experiments using an improved method for 
addressing the development of semantic implicit knowledge. Chapter 2 concluded by 
suggesting that other tasks than the grammaticality judgement should ideally be applied in 
order to prevent participants from actively constructing relevant ideas, and also that the 
stimuli should include novel word forms rather than existing words, to avoid the problem of 
accounting for possible prior knowledge. 
 To this end, the method used in this series of experiments is based on an adaptation of 
a false-memory task. False memory is an unintentional phenomenon in which a person 
erroneously recalls something which did not occur. Due to its involuntary nature it can be 
assumed to be implicit, for which reason it lends itself particularly well as a measure of 
implicit learning. The awareness in the current series of experiments is determined by 
subjective measures combining confidence rating and source judgements (Dienes & Scott, 
2005) and additionally in a post-experiment questionnaire. 
 Applications of false memory tasks have already led to a number of interesting 
insights in psycholinguistics. A classic procedure is known as the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger, H. L. III, McDermott, 1995). For 
 Chapter 3 Semantic implicit learning and false memory 
57 
 
 
example, people erroneously report that they previously encountered a word like mug if the 
study phase contains words that are highly related to mug (e.g., cup, beer, bowl, coffee). An 
explanation for these effects is tightly linked to one of the major debates in psycholinguistics, 
namely whether semantic representations consist of features (e.g., (Plaut & Shallice, 1993)  
or mere associations (e.g. Nelson, Bennet, & Leibert (1997), Lund & Burgess, (1996)). In the 
false-memory literature, opinions are divided into two main camps: fuzzy-trace theorists 
suggest that people form generalisations across items (Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian, & Reyna, 
2006), while others suggest that the key factor is the backward association strength between 
the critical lure (the tested target) and the words in exposure phase (Roediger, Watson, 
McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, 2001). The experiments reported here address the phenomenon 
of semantic generalisation, which, if confirmed, might be seem to lend support to fuzzy trace 
and prototype models. Models of semantic knowledge are not directly addressed here at this 
stage, but the issue will be discussed at the end of this chapter in light of the results obtained. 
More recently Cleary & Langley (2007) used a false memory procedure to investigate 
the question of whether syntactic priming effects are a reflection of sentence structure 
abstraction or processing facilitation. They showed their participants sets of eight 
syntactically identical but semantically nonsensical strings of words (e.g., MECHANICAL 
CONSUMERS SUBMIT COLDER SONGS, EFFICIENT DREAMS WRITE BETTER UMBRELLAS). 
Subsequently, they presented the participants with a recognition test containing previously 
seen strings, and unseen ones that either corresponded (critical lures) or did not correspond 
(new lures) to the structure in the previously seen strings, and they were asked to rate how 
confident they were that they had seen the string before. An example of a critical lure was 
TERRITORIAL DANCERS OPERATE FUZZIER CURTAINS; an example of a new lure was THE 
TRANSPARENT LECTURE BECAME A PRIVATE REVERENCE. Participants indicated overall higher 
confidence ratings for critical than for new lures. Interestingly, the effect only arose on 
strings which were naturally grammatical, while no confidence rating effect was reported for 
ungrammatical strings (e.g., SOUR A KICK CLEAN BALLOON HARD). This suggests an influence 
of prior syntactic knowledge, and is evocative of research reporting top-down effects on 
implicit   learning,  e.g.  Brockmole  et.  al.’s  (2008)  demonstration  of  contextual  cueing  effects 
for chessboard arrangements, which functioned only for advanced chess players for whom 
the arrangements were meaningful. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, a false memory task has also been used in the implicit 
learning literature to detect semantic implicit   learning   effects   in   “Past   Midnight”   studies  
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(Bright & Burton, 1994). Participants were first instructed to memorise the times shown on a 
series of 30 clock faces. Unbeknown to them, all of the times displayed fell between 6 and 12 
o’clock.  Then,  in  an  unexpected test, they were asked to choose from two presented pairs of 
clock faces, selecting the one which they thought appeared in the previous part of the 
experiment. Even though in fact all of the clock faces were new, participants showed 
preferences for the ones displaying times between 6 and 12, even when they reported no 
awareness of the regularity at the end. Although this finding was initially taken as a 
demonstration  of  an  abstraction  of  a  ‘6  to  12’  rule,  a  subsequent  replication  study  (Newell & 
Bright, 2002) revealed that this was not the case. Rather, participants encoded the times in a 
rough manner and most likely based their answers on how closely the test items resembled 
the ones they saw in the first part. Participants were therefore suggested to engage in general 
similarity matching. The fact that the effect did transfer from analogue to digital clock faces 
indicates that the effect could not have been driven by perceptual similarity, but was based 
upon   the   clock’s   ‘meaning’.   The   authors   conclude, however, that this fact does not allow 
them to distinguish between rule and similarity-based processing, because evidence for 
abstract representations is equally consistent with both forms of processing. Additionally, 
subjective measures of awareness applied in the test phase revealed potential explicit 
knowledge, which further disfavoured the hypothesis of implicit rule abstraction.  
 The fact that in the Newell & Bright (2002) study participants most likely engaged in 
similarity matching should not be sufficient reason to abandon the idea of semantic implicit 
learning. The fact that they encoded the times roughly could in fact be important for allowing 
subsequent semantic generalisations to occur. Furthermore, testing the phenomenon in a 
linguistic environment may more readily lead to the development of semantic generalisations, 
as will be demonstrated below, since the input provides material which is naturally 
generalisable, perhaps more automatically so than clock faces.   
 
 
3.2. Experiment 2a 
 
Participants: 36 students of the University of Cambridge. 22 of them were native speakers of 
English, 14 were non-native speakers whose L1s included: Bulgarian (n=1), Chinese (n=3), 
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Dutch (n=1), German (n=1), Hindi (n=3), Portuguese (n=1), Punjabi (n=1), Russian (n=2) 
and Slovenian (n=1). The mean age was 27 years. Twenty of them were male. 
 
3.2.1. Materials 
 
Materials were prepared based on the selectional preferences of four English words: diminish, 
deplete, increase and add. Both diminish and deplete can be used to convey the meaning of 
decrease. However as the following sentences illustrate, there are contexts in which only 
diminish can be applied, as they involve an abstract noun, and conversely, there are other 
contexts in which only deplete can be used without causing any semantic violation.  
Decrease:  
The fact that TV is still the most popular medium does not diminish/*deplete the 
significance of the radio.  
The body must first deplete/*diminish carbohydrates before it can begin to burn fat.  
 
Analogously, similar sentence contexts can be found to illustrate the contrast between the 
words increase and add. 
Increase: 
Nightingale worked tirelessly to improve public health and increase/*add the status of 
nurses.  
Your compost pile does not require you to add/*increase minerals. It only needs 
moisture and heat. 
A norming study was carried out in which a collection of sentences was presented to five 
native speakers of British English who rated the acceptability of the two alternative verbs. 
Only those in which the speakers unanimously indicated that only one was acceptable were 
included in the experimental materials. Subsequently, the English target words were 
substituted with four made-up words: gouble, powter, fonell and mouten. The material is 
presented in Appendix B. 
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3.2.2. Procedure  
 
Training task. Participants were told they were going to read sentences on the computer 
screen,   for  example  “Nightingale  worked   tirelessly   to   improve  public  health  and  POWTER  
the   status   of   nurses”,   and   asked   to   perform two tasks for each sentence. First, to indicate 
whether the word in CAPITALS indicates roughly 'becoming less of' (-) or 'becoming more of' 
(+). Here, POWTER means increase). They were not told which or how many of the novel 
words would be associated with which meaning, nor were they told that the novel words were 
going to be used consistently. This was in order to replicate as closely as possible a natural 
incidental vocabulary learning situation. However, in order to prevent the participants from 
forming incorrect associations, the programme would not proceed until the correct answer 
was given. In the training materials, there was a fixed relation between the novel verb and the 
semantic type of the following noun, specifically whether the noun denoted an abstract 
concept or a natural substance. Crucially, participants were not told of the existence of such a 
relation:  indeed,  their  attention  was  not  directed  to  the  following  noun  at  all.  The  participants’  
second task for each sentence was to rate the overall message as either important or 
unimportant in terms of their world-view.  
The training comprised a total of 64 sentences. Half of these contained one of four 
novel nonsense words: POWTER, GOUBLE, MOUTEN, FONELL, two consistently 
meaning to increase something, and two meaning to decrease (the assignment of meaning 
depending on the version). The other half were filler sentences. Fillers had no novel words 
but contained an undistinguished abstract or concrete noun which appeared later in the testing 
phase. For these sentences participants were only asked to perform the second task – rating 
the importance of the message.  
Each novel verb appeared eight times, collocating twice with the same noun. 
Therefore, throughout the training each verb occurred with four different noun collocates. 
There were two different sentences with POWTER the force, two with GOUBLE the 
authority, two with MOUTEN minerals, etc. This was intended to facilitate learning of the 
relevant semantic relations while avoiding repeating the same combinations too many times, 
which could lead to the formation of lexical chunks.  
In the cases where the collocate was abstract there was always an article between the 
article and the noun (e.g. POWTER the strength, GOUBLE the influence). For the concrete 
collocates there was an article in only 2 out of a total of 32 items. Thus, the presence of the 
article may have provided a syntactic cue to the differentiation of the collocates, potentially 
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“bootstrapping”  the  learning  process.  Note,  however, that in the test phase the article was not 
present as a cue in the test items (see below).  
The order of trials was independently randomised for each participant. 
 
Testing phase. The test was unexpected for the participants. They were told that now they 
were going to see pairs of words on the screen (e.g. GOUBLE significance) and asked to 
perform two tasks described in the following terms:  
1) Did you see these words appear together? All of the words will have appeared in 
the sentences, the question is, did these words appear together (i.e. more or less next 
to each other)?  
'yes, the pairing is familiar' or 'no, the pairing is unfamiliar'.  
2) How did you answer:  
Was it (g) guess, (i) intuition, (m) memory.  
 
The   instruction  was   followed  by   two  practice  pairs  and   it  was  explained   that   ‘more or less 
next to each other’  referred  to  the  fact  that  all  articles  (in  particular   the) had been removed. 
The words were presented simultaneously, for example gouble greatness, mouten vitamins.  
There were 40 test items, divided into three categories. Only 8 items involved the 
exact pairings of words that indeed appeared next to each other in the training part. They 
were  classified  as  “Old  Grammatical”  pairings.  The  remaining  32  items  were  equally  divided  
between   the   “New   Grammatical”   (well-formed)   and   “New   Ungrammatical”   pairings.   The  
“New  Grammatical”  ones,  although  combining  a  verb  and  a  noun  that  appeared in different 
sentences in the training part, still followed the semantic collocational regularity introduced 
initially, namely that POWTER and GOUBLE were being followed by an abstract noun, 
while MOUTEN and FONELL by a noun indicating a concrete substance (or the other way 
round  for  half  of  the  participants).  The  “New  Ungrammatical”  pairings were also composed 
of nouns and verbs which were individually old, but this type involved a two-fold violation. 
Not only the combinations of words that did not appear next to each other, also the pattern of 
which verb appeared with what kind of noun was violated. Examples of phrases in each 
category, together with their corresponding training sentences, are presented in Table 3.1. 
There were two versions of the test, equally divided between the participants.  The 
nouns  used   to   form  the  “New  Grammatical”  pairs   in  version  1,  were   included   in   the  “New  
Ungrammatical”  pairs  in  version  2,  and  vice  versa.  That  is,  across  participants,  each  collocate  
noun appeared equally often in ungrammatical and grammatical conditions, as did each 
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nonsense word. Unlike in the training, in the test phase novel verbs were presented in lower 
case  to  minimise  participants’  reliance  on  visual  memory. 
 
Table 3.1. Example test items with their corresponding training sentences. NG = New Grammatical, 
NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical.  
 NG NU OG 
 
Test 
 
fonell proteins 
 
 
powter potassium 
 
mouten nutrients 
 
 
 
 
Training 
Avoid stimulants because 
they FONELL serotonin 
over time - this works the 
same as stress does. 
 
 
In clinical trials, peptides 
derived from food 
proteins have shown an 
effect on blood pressure. 
 
Nightingale worked 
tirelessly to improve 
public health and 
POWTER the status of 
nurses. 
 
Emergency treatment is 
indicated if potassium is 
very high, or if severe 
symptoms are present. 
 
Start the day with a 
stewed apple - it will 
boost your health in a 
number of ways. It is 
light on your digestion 
and will MOUTEN 
nutrients rather than 
emptying calories. 
 
 
 
Post-test.  After the testing phase participants performed a multiple choice test and were 
encouraged to think aloud in the presence of the experimenter. The test was used as means 
for eliciting knowledge from participants, rather than an additional measure of acquired 
knowledge.   The   first   four   questions   probed   whether   they   learned   which   word   meant   “to  
increase”   and   which   “to   decrease”   something.   The   latter   four   probed   their   knowledge   of  
which verb was meant to be followed by an abstract and which by a concrete noun. No 
feedback was given during the first four sentences, though the experimenter made sure that 
the  participant  was  clear  whether  an  “increase”  or  “decrease”  verb  was  required  in  a  sentence.  
In the latter four sentences the experimenter asked for justifications for the correct decisions 
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and in the case of errors, feedback was given with further probing questions. Only those 
participants who remained oblivious of the regularity until the end of post-test were classified 
as  “unaware”.  The  entire  procedure  took  about 45 minutes.  
Prediction. If implicit learning takes place then the erroneous endorsement rate for the New 
Grammatical items will be higher than the New Ungrammatical ones for participants who 
show no evidence of awareness of the system in the post-test. 
 
3.2.3. Results 
 
In the post-experiment debriefing, only 2 out of 36 participants expressed awareness of the 
regularity from the training part. A further 7 participants made potentially crucial 
observations suspecting that the distinction between words related to either conceptual or 
physical adding/removing, or reported that having a chance to compare example sentences 
directly allowed them to figure out the system. Even though they claimed that these 
observations occurred to them only during the post-test, and could in fact themselves be an 
effect of   implicit   learning,   they   were   assigned   to   the   ‘aware’   group   in   the   interest   of  
maintaining a conservative measure of awareness. The remaining 27 participants were 
classified  as  ‘unaware’. 
The following data analysis is performed on means corrected for the small number of 
responses (unless otherwise stated). The correction corresponds to a Bayesian prior of chance 
performance worth one observation (Kiyokawa, Dienes, Tanaka, Yamada, & Crowe, 2012), 
and was calculated as (number of correct responses + 0.5)/(total number of responses +1).  
The analyses concentrated on the (erroneous) endorsement rates in the NG and NU 
conditions since the same items were used in each condition (rotated around participant 
groups). The (correct) endorsement rates in the OG condition are also shown for comparison 
and analysed separately. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the 
endorsement rates from the NG and NU conditions in which Condition (NG or NU) was a 
within-subjects factor and participant group a between subjects factor.  Weighted means are 
shown to correct for imbalances in the numbers of participants on each list after separation 
into aware and unaware groups. The mean endorsement rates for the aware and unaware 
participants are shown in Table 3.2. An ANOVA on these data showed that the aware group 
erroneously endorsed as familiar significantly more word pairs which followed the 
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selectional preference pattern (New Grammatical, NG) than those that did not (New 
Ungrammatical,  NU),  F(1,8)  =  6.08,  p  <0.05,  η2 = 0.43. Accuracy for the Old Grammatical 
(OG) items was very good, and a single sample t-test showed that it was significantly above 
chance, t(9) = 3.52, p <0.01.  
Crucially, the 26 unaware participants showed a similar pattern in their responses. An 
ANOVA showed that there was a significant difference between the NG and NU conditions, 
F(1,24)  =  9.75,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.29. Memory for the OG items was equivalent to the aware 
group, and significantly above chance, t(25) = 6.61, p < 0.001.  
 
Table 3.2. Mean endorsement rates (standard error in parentheses) 
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 10) .51   (.051) .39    (.053) .70  (.057) 
Unaware (n = 26) .54   (.034) .43   (.040) .70 (.030) 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
 
Analysis by noun-types  
Since   it   is   the   unaware   group’s   performance   that   provides   evidence   for   semantic   implicit  
learning, the following analysis predominantly concerns that group. First, the unaware 
group’s  data  were  analysed  to  check  for  any  differences  between  the  test  stimuli with abstract 
and concrete nouns. For example, the New Grammatical item gouble value was compared 
with the New Ungrammatical item mouten value, or fonell hydrogen (NG) was compared 
with gouble hydrogen (NU). That is, the effect of grammaticality on decisions to test items 
containing abstract versus concrete collocates was analysed. The results are shown in Figure 
3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Mean endorsement rates for pairs with abstract and concrete nouns among the 
unaware participants. 
 
An analysis of variance was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU 
conditions and noun type as within-subjects factors, and list as a between-subjects factor. 
There  was  a  main  effect  of  grammaticality  F(1,24)  =  9.75,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.29 and also of 
noun   type   F(1,24)   =4.35,   p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.15, but no interaction between noun type and 
grammaticality, F < 1.0. An analysis of the OG condition also revealed a main effect of noun 
type  F(1,24)  =  11.79,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.33.  
 
Analysis of source judgements 
For the unaware participants, the source proportions in each category of the stimuli are shown 
in Table 3.3. The different source attributions are evenly distributed over the three conditions.  
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Table 3.3. Source proportions  
Source proportions   
 NG NU OG 
guess 0.389 0.389 0.317 
intuition 0.325 0.349 0.308 
memory 0.286 0.262 0.375 
 
 
Figure 3.2.shows the endorsement rates by source.  The critical difference between the NG 
and  NU  conditions  remains  reflected  within  the  categories  of  ‘intuition’  (F(1,21)  =  9.88,  p  <  
0.01,   η2 =   0.32)      and   ‘memory’   (F(1,19)   =   6.61,   p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.26). The effect of 
grammaticality on intuition responses shows that when participants only have a vague feeling 
of having seen the word pair before, their responses are still affected by whether the pair 
respects the selectional preference pattern. The well-formedness effect is stronger in the 
memory category, where participants actually are relatively confident that they have 
experienced the word pair before, and not present in the guess category. Such a pattern, in 
which stronger effects arise for the more confident responses, is typical for false-memory 
experiments.  
According to the original logic of the source judgement method (Dienes & Scott 
2005)   it   may   seem   that   the   failure   to   meet   the   “Guessing   Criterion”   (above-chance 
responding when guessing) counts against the claim that the experiment taps unconscious 
knowledge of the semantic collocational pattern. However, it must be emphasised that the 
guessing criterion applies to tasks in which participants are required to give their opinions of 
acceptability. Then their performance on the task is crucially dependant on their knowledge 
of the system, which provides the relevant structural knowledge. This is not the case in the 
present experiment, as participants are only asked whether they remember seeing an item, not 
whether it conforms to a rule they might have observed. In fact, they do not need to 
presuppose the existence of any systematic regularity to perform the test. The relevant 
structural knowledge in this case is, simply, memory for word combinations. 
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   Figure 3.2. Mean endorsement rates by source among the unaware participants 
 
Although knowledge of the semantic regularity is strictly irrelevant to the familiarity 
judgment task, this does not preclude participants from using such knowledge strategically. 
This would be particularly evident in the case of New Ungrammatical items because the 
failure to conform to the regularity would immediately indicate that the pair had not been 
seen before. A participant who was using this logic would be expected to be relatively 
confident when rejecting New Ungrammatical items. Judging a New Grammatical item 
would be harder because it conforms to the regularity and so rejections would be made with 
less confidence.  
The participants in this experiment were not asked to indicate the confidence in their 
decisions, instead they indicated whether they had guessed, used intuition, or relied on 
memory10. In the case of endorsements it is plausible to regard these source categories as 
reflecting increasing subjective familiarity of the test item. This can be quantified by 
assigning  ‘guess’,  ‘intuition’,  and  ‘memory’  the  numerical  values  1,  2,  and  3  respectively. In 
the context of grammaticality judgements in an artificial grammar learning experiment Scott 
& Dienes (2008) show that familiarity judgements and confidence judgments are correlated 
(although it is possible to find variations in familiarity that are not reflected in confidence). 
                                                          
10 This method of analysis was only arrived at after Experiment 3, at which point it was realised that 
for a familiarity judgment task it is more useful to elicit confidence than source judgments 
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The scale of increasing familiarity can therefore be interpreted roughly as a confidence scale. 
In the case of rejections, however, the situation is less straightforward. In particular, if a 
person rejects a New Ungrammatical item on the basis of explicit rule knowledge, which of 
the source options would they be likely to select? It seems reasonable to assume that they 
would  opt   for   ‘memory’  because   they  would   essentially   remember  not  having   received   the  
item, but this would be on the basis of an inference based on rule knowledge, and not on low 
familiarity as such. If they were  less  sure  of  the  rule  they  might  opt  for  ‘intuition’,  but  they  
would  be  unlikely  to  opt  for  ‘guess’.  In  contrast,  when  rejecting  an  NG  item  they  would  be  
expected   to   experience   more   confusion,   and   would   be   more   likely   to   opt   for   ‘guess’   or  
‘intuition’. In the case of rejections, therefore, the source categories cannot be 
straightforwardly aligned with familiarity (and thereby with confidence), but it is still 
predicted that the numerical conversion of the scale will lead to higher mean values for 
rejecting  NU  than  NG.  For  convenience  we  shall  refer  to  these  values  as  “confidence”  (note  
that in Experiments 4 to 6 source judgments were abandoned in favour of confidence 
judgments  and  very  similar  results  were  obtained).  Figure  3.3  shows  the  mean  “confidence”  
for rejections and endorsements in the three conditions. 
 
  
Figure 3.3. Mean confidence for endorsements and rejections. Experiment 1, a) unaware, b) aware 
participants. 
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An   analysis   of   variance   was   performed   on   the   unaware   participants’   data   on   the   mean 
confidence in the NG and NU conditions with grammaticality and endorsement/rejection as 
within-subjects factors, and list as a between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of 
endorsement/rejection,   F(1,24)   =   5.62,   p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.19, and an interaction between 
endorsement/rejection   and   grammaticality,   F   (1,24)   =   8.83,   p   <   0.01,   η2 = 0.27. Further 
analysis revealed that the interaction arises because of significantly greater confidence for 
endorsing NG than NU, F(1,24) = 5.24, p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.18, and numerically greater 
confidence in rejecting NU than NG, an effect that approached significance, F(1,24) = 3.69, p 
=  0.07,      η2 = 0.13. A similar analysis on the data from the aware participants revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions. In both groups, confidence in the OG condition was 
significantly higher for endorsements than rejections (unaware: F(1, 20) = 18.27, p < 0.001,  
η2 =  0.48,  aware:  F(1,  7)  =  30.98,  p  <  0.01,    η2 = 0.82).   
In   terms   of   the   logic   of   the   “Chan   difference”   as   a  measure   of   awareness   (Dienes,  
2008) the higher confidence for endorsing NG than NU means that participants have a greater 
feeling of conscious remembering for grammatical pairs than ungrammatical ones, even 
though both types of new pairs have not been seen before. Note, however, that endorsements 
are errors for NG and correct responses for OG. The effect for new pairs therefore arguably 
reflects the influence of grammaticality on confidence judgements. Cleary & Langley (2007) 
showed a similar effect of grammaticality on confidence judgements in a false memory 
paradigm which they attribute to implicit memory of syntactic structure. We cannot tell, 
though, at this stage whether this reflects conscious or unconscious knowledge of the 
selectional preference rule.  
Crucially though, as argued above, if conscious knowledge of the rule were affecting 
responses it would have its greatest effect on increasing confidence of correct rejections of 
NU items as compared to NG ones. Although here the difference in confidence only 
approached significance, there is some suggestion of contamination from conscious 
knowledge. 
Strategic use of explicit knowledge would result in a positive correlation between the 
learning effect (measured as the difference in endorsement between NG and NU items) and 
the confidence pattern of conscious knowledge (higher confidence rejecting NU than NG). 
Scatter plots of the data in the unaware and the aware groups are presented in Figure 3.4. 
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 Figure 3.4. Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU endorsement 
difference), for a) unaware, b) aware groups. 
 
There was no correlation in the unaware group  (r(25) = -0.04). However, as Figure 3.4a 
shows, there were two participants for whom a large confidence difference was associated 
with a large learning effect. It is possible that these participants were strategically using 
conscious knowledge. Nevertheless, with these participants removed from the learning effect 
was still significant, F(1,22) = 6.72, p < 0.05,  η2 = 0.23. A mild positive, but not significant, 
correlation was detected among the aware participants (r(7) = 0.32, p=0.37). It is worth 
noting, that the two aware participants for whom a large confidence difference was associated 
with a large learning effect (the two points with an NG-NU endorsement difference above 
0.2) were the two participants who reported full awareness of the selectional regularity. It is 
arguably through them that the trend emerges. 
 
3.2.4. Discussion 
 
The experiment provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that people implicitly form 
semantic generalisations about the meaning of potential noun-collocates of a novel verb: in 
other  words  they  implicitly  learn  the  verb’s  selectional  preference.  The  learning  was  assessed  
through  an   indirect  measure  of  awareness   involving  participants’  subjective  confidence  and  
source knowledge judgements.  
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The analysis of noun-types revealed that participants in general endorsed fewer items 
with abstract nouns than with concrete ones. This situation could have been caused by the 
fact that in training between novel verbs and their following abstract nouns the definite article 
“the”  was  almost  always  present.  Its  absence  in  the  test  items  could  result  in  some  feeling  of  
ungrammaticality, as compared to concrete nouns which were not preceded by an article 
either in training or test. These items could be argued to have exhibited a better syntagmatic 
match between the training and test phases. Experiment 2b addresses this concern by adding 
the definite article to the test items involving abstract nouns. 
 
 
3.3. Experiment 2b 
 
Participants: 34 students of the University of Cambridge and the University of London. 19 of 
them were native speakers of English, 15 were non-native speakers whose L1s comprised: 
Polish (n=6), German (n=2), Chinese (n=1), Czech (n=1), Dutch (n=1), Hindi (n=1), Japanese 
(n=1), Macedonian (n=1) and Portuguese (n=1). The mean age was 25 years. Nineteen of 
them were male.   
 
3.3.1. Procedure 
 
Materials and procedure for the training part and post-test were identical to Experiment 2a. 
However, during the test phase, an article was included in the presentation of those test items 
which involved an abstract word. Well-formed pairings, for example: GOUBLE the 
greatness, MOUTEN vitamins, preserved the article the after GOUBLE and POWTER (for 
half the participants; and after MOUTEN and FONELL for those who did a rotated version), 
while the other two words, correctly, were not followed by the article. Conversely, the 
ungrammatical items, for example POWTER enzymes, not only contained a semantic 
violation (collocating with a concrete rather than an abstract word), but also a syntagmatic 
violation, since previously POWTER was always directly followed by the definite article. 
Similarly, phrases such as MOUTEN the value contained both a semantic violation and a 
syntagmatic one, as in the training MOUTEN was never followed by an abstract word or by 
the definite article.   
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This time there were four versions of the test, equally divided between the 
participants. As in Experiment 2a,   the  nouns  used   to   form  the  “New  Grammatical”  pairs   in  
version   1   were   included   in   the   “New  Ungrammatical”   pairs   in   version   2,   and   vice   versa.  
Furthermore, versions 3 and 4 were analogous to 1 and 2, but the novel verbs were ascribed 
opposite meanings and selectional preferences, e.g. gouble in version 1 selected for abstract 
nouns   and  meant   “decrease”,   while   in   version   3   it   selected   for   concrete   nouns   and  meant  
“decrease”. The material is presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
3.3.2. Results 
 
In the post-experiment debriefing 4 participants reported awareness of the semantic 
regularity, one of whom immediately denied using it strategically during the test. A further 6 
deciphered it during the post-test. Again, to assure a conservative measure of awareness, both 
groups  were   classed   as   ‘aware’,   despite   the   fact   that   awareness   among   the   latter   6   people  
could itself be a result of the phenomenon of implicit learning which we are addressing.  
Similarly to Experiment 2a, the analysis was done with a correction for small numbers 
of responses, calculated as (number of correct responses + 0.5)/(total number of responses 
+1). Table 3.4. shows the corrected endorsement rates for the two groups of participants. The 
aware group failed to show a significant difference between the NG and NU conditions, F < 
1.0, whilst their responses to OG items were significantly above chance, t(9)= 7.58, p < 
0.001. On the other hand, the difference between the NG and NU conditions was significant 
for the unaware participants, F(1,20)  =  4.82,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.19, and their responses to the 
OG items were significantly above chance, t(23) = 9.5, p < 0.001. It is worth pointing out that 
the failure to find an effect for the aware participants may not be conclusive, since the raw 
effect size is the same for the two groups.  
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Table 3.4. Mean endorsement rates in Experiment 2b (standard error in parentheses).  
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 10) .46   (.070) .39  (.058) .76  (.034) 
Unaware (n = 24) .53   (.034) .47  (.033) .79 (.030) 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
Analysis of noun types 
An analysis by noun type (abstract or concrete) was carried out as for Experiment 2a. The 
results are shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5. Endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates among the unaware 
participants. 
 
An analysis of variance was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU 
conditions with grammaticality and noun type as within-subjects factors, and list as a 
between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of collocate type, F(1,20) = 4.94, p < 0.05, 
η2 = 0.12, abstract collocates being endorsed more highly than concrete ones. There was a 
main  effect  of  grammaticality  F(1,20)  =  4.82  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.19, but no interaction between 
collocate type and grammaticality, F = 1.19. Numerically, though, the effect of 
grammaticality was larger for the items with an abstract collocate. Finally, for the OG 
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condition, endorsement rates were higher for the concrete items than the abstract, F(1,23 = 
5.24,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.19. Thus there is no general trend for the abstract collocate items to be 
endorsed more highly. Rather it appears that it is specifically the abstract collocate items in 
the NG condition which are endorsed relatively highly amongst the New conditions. 
 
Comparison between Experiments 2a and 2b 
In order to assess the impact of the addition of the articles to the test items containing an 
abstract noun in Experiment 2b an ANOVA was conducted to compare the results with those 
from Experiment 2a. In this analysis Experiment and presentation list were between-subjects 
factors, and condition (NG or NU) and noun type (abstract or concrete) were the within-
subjects factors. There was a highly significant main effect of Condition, F(1,46) = 14.72, p < 
0.001,  η2 = 0.24. The only other significant effect was an interaction between experiment and 
noun   type,   F(1,46)   =   8.59,   p   <   0.01,   η2 = 0.16. Whilst in Experiment 2a test items with 
abstract nouns were endorsed at a lower rate than those with concrete nouns (0.45 and 0.52 
respectively), in Experiment 2b they were endorsed at a higher rate (0.54 and 0.45 
respectively). This effect will be discussed below in Section 3.3.3. Importantly, there was no 
interaction between experiment and condition, F < 1.0, indicating that the size of the 
grammaticality effect was not affected by the inclusion of articles in test items with abstract 
nouns. The grammaticality effect was robust over this manipulation. 
 
Analysis of source judgements 
As in Experiment 1a, source attributions were fairly evenly distributed over the different 
categories, as shown in Table 3.5. 
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  Table 3.5. Source proportions for unaware participants. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the endorsement rates broken down by source. The critical difference 
between the NG and NU endorsement remained reflected in judgements attributed to memory 
F(1,20)  =  6.18,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.24. The effect for guess responses approached significance, 
F(1,20)  =  4.08,  p  =  0.06,  η2 = 0.17, while that for intuition did not, F < 1.  
 
Figure 3.6. Mean endorsement rates by source among the unaware participants. 
 
Again, it was hypothesised that conscious knowledge of the crucial semantic regularity would 
potentially be reflected by higher confidence in rejecting a new ungrammatical item than a 
new grammatical one. As in Experiment 2a, the source judgements were treated as a scale of 
confidence, and mean values for endorsements and rejections were calculated for the 3 
conditions. The results are shown in Figure 3.7. In this case for the unaware group there were 
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no significant differences in the level of confidence in endorsements and rejections in the 
New Grammatical and Ungrammatical conditions, F < 1.0, and likewise for the aware group, 
F(1,6) = 1.32. This suggests that conscious knowledge of the semantic regularity was not 
affecting the decision process in either group. Finally, in both groups, confidence in the OG 
condition was significantly higher for endorsements than rejections, (unaware: F(1,19) = 
6.12,   p   <   0.05,   η2 =   0.24,   aware:   F(1,9)   =   45.6,   p   <   0.001,   η2 = 0.83) suggesting, as in 
Experiment 2a, that recognition of OG items was accompanied by conscious recognition of 
the word pairs. 
 
   
Figure 3.7. Mean confidence for endorsements and rejections for a) unaware, b) aware participants. 
 
A finer-grained analysis looked at the correlation between the false-memory effect (the 
difference in endorsement between NG and NU items) and the difference between confidence 
rejecting NU and NG items. Scatter plots for both the unaware and the aware groups are 
presented in Figure 3.8. Similarly to Experiment 1a, there was no correlation in the unaware 
group, r(22) = - 0.05. However, as the scatter plot in Figure 3.8. shows, there is an outlier in 
the top left quadrant. This data point comes from a participant with only one rejection in the 
NG condition. With this point removed the correlation is mildly positive, but still not 
significant, r(21) = 0.29, p > 0.1. Neither is there a correlation for the aware group, r(8) = 
0.12. However, in this case there is one participant for whom a large learning effect was 
associated with a large NU-NG rejection confidence difference, showing evidence for 
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strategic use of conscious knowledge (point 0.63, 0.41). Interestingly, this was the person 
who reported the highest level of awareness in the post-test. Without this participant, the 
remaining  group’s  data  show  a  mild,  non-significant negative trend, r(7) = -0.38, typical for 
the unaware group. It suggests that those people who have been classified as aware on the 
basis that they became aware of the regularity during post-test were not using this knowledge 
strategically during the test itself (which is consistent with their reports).  
  
 Figure 3.8. Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU endorsement 
difference), for the a) unaware, b) aware group. 
 
3.3.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2b replicated the central finding of Experiment 2a, namely that people implicitly 
form semantic generalisations about the type of nouns which can follow novel verbs. The 
learning was revealed by a false-memory effect, wherein participants endorsed more new test 
items as familiar when they followed selectional preference patterns than when they did not. 
Awareness   was   assessed   through   an   indirect   measure   involving   participants’   subjective  
source knowledge judgements. The analysis of source judgements (interpreted as a 
confidence scale) provided more convincing evidence than in Experiment 2a for non-
conscious knowledge of the semantic regularity in the familiarity decision task. 
The analysis of collocate types shows that introducing the article into the test phase 
items did have an impact on the results. Specifically, test items containing an abstract 
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collocate were now endorsed at a higher rate than in Experiment 2b, and conversely test items 
with a concrete collocate were endorsed at a lower rate. This presumably reflects the effect of 
a match in the syntactic frame on familiarity decisions. That is, on seeing, for example, the 
NG item gouble the prestige,   the   fact   that   “the  prestige”   is   a   familiar   fragment  may  have 
elevated the endorsement rate, and likewise for an ungrammatical item like mouten the 
prestige. Crucially, though, the effect of matching at this level did not alter the size of the 
grammaticality effect, although it was numerically smaller in this experiment (0.06 versus 
0.11 in Experiment 2a). 
Overall, regardless of whether the article did appear in the test (Experiment 2b) or did 
not appear (Experiment 2a), the fact that in the training phase the definite article almost 
invariably followed GOUBLE and POWTER could have suggested to the participants that 
these two words are more similar to each other than the other two words. Learning could 
have  been  aided  by  “syntactic  bootstrapping”  which  contributed  to  the  subsequent conceptual 
differentiation between novel words collocating with abstract and concrete nouns. 
Experiment 3 addresses this concern and the question of whether learning would still occur 
without syntactic cues. In this experiment, the training was modified in such a way that the 
definite article appeared in all contexts. Furthermore, in order to eliminate the possibility of 
syntactic bootstrapping, all concrete nouns used were mass nouns which did not contain the 
plural  ‘s’. 
 
 
3.4. Experiment 3 
 
Participants: 33 people participated in the experiment, 32 were students at various UK 
universities, 1 was a university staff member.  
 
3.4.1. Materials 
 
Materials were similar to those in Experiment 2a and 2b. The word fonell was changed to 
conell to avoid the similarity with funnel, which could have suggested an action involving 
some tangible substance. Relatively long sentences were shortened. Crucially, any syntactic 
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cues  were  removed.  This   involved  removing   the  concrete  plural  nouns  with  an  ‘-s’  marker.  
All concrete nouns were mass nouns, such as sugar or magnesium. Furthermore, it was 
ensured that all target nouns, both abstract and concrete, were preceded by the definite article 
“the”.   
 
3.4.2. Procedure 
 
The task was the same as in Experiment 2, but administered online. The post-test 
consequently required greater elaboration, due to the absence of the experimenter. Apart from 
the 8 multiple-choice sentences, the following questions were added, which appeared at the 
end of the post-test, one by one:  
- Please describe what you have learnt about gouble, powter, conell and mouten. 
- Did you notice any regular pattern concerning the novel words? 
- If so, when did you realise this? In the first, second or final part of the experiment? 
- Did you realise that in the first part the words gouble and powter always appeared 
with abstract nouns, such as authority, while conell and mouten with natural, tangible 
substances? 
- If yes, when did you notice it? 
- If you did notice that regularity, did you use this knowledge in the second part? 
- Any other comments? 
  
There were two versions of the test, with half the participants randomly allocated to each 
version.  The  nouns  used  to  form  the  “New  Grammatical”  pairs  in  version  1  were  included  in  
the  “New  Ungrammatical”  pairs  in  version  2, and vice versa. 
 
3.4.3. Results 
 
In the post-experiment questionnaire 11 out of 33 participants expressed awareness of the 
regularity  and  were  classed  as  ‘aware’.  Two  participants  reported  a  wrong  pattern  and  were  
excluded from the analysis due to potential confounds. The remaining 20 participants were 
classed  as  ‘unaware’.   
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Similarly to Experiment 2a and 2b, the analysis was performed with a correction for small 
numbers of responses, calculated as (number of correct responses + 0.5)/(total number of 
responses +1). Table 3.6. shows the weighted mean endorsement rates for the two groups of 
participants. 
Participants in both groups erroneously endorsed as familiar significantly more word 
pairs which followed the selectional preference pattern (New Grammatical, NG) than those 
that  did  not  (New  Ungrammatical,  NU).  For  the  aware  group:    F(1,9)  =  10.70,  p  <0.05,  η2 = 
0.54;;   for   the   unaware   group:   F(1,18)   =   7.62,   p   <0.05,   η2 = 0.30. Also, in both groups, 
accuracy for the Old Grammatical (OG) items was significantly above chance; for the aware 
group, t(10) = 2.93, p < 0.05; for the unaware group, t(19) = 3.36, p < 0.01. 
 
Table 3.6. Mean endorsement rates (standard error in parentheses). 
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 11) .55   (.038) .37    (.045) .69   (.065) 
Unaware (n = 20) .50   (.045) .44   (.034) .63 (.038) 
 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
Analysis of noun types 
Figure 3.9 depicts the difference between the endorsements of pairs with abstract and 
concrete nouns among the unaware group, calculated similarly as for Experiment 2a and 2b. 
 Chapter 3 Semantic implicit learning and false memory 
81 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Mean endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates among the unaware 
participants. 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU conditions 
with grammaticality and collocate type as within-subject factors, and list as a between-
subjects  factor.  There  was  a  main  effect  of  grammaticality,  F(1,18)  =  7.62,  p  <0.05,  η2 = 030, 
and a significant interaction between noun type and grammaticality, F(1,18) = 10.95, p < 
0.01,   η2 = 038. It appears that in Experiment 3 participants differentiated NG and NU 
conditions only with pairs containing abstract nouns. Analysis of the recognition of the OG 
items  also  points  to  this  conclusion  F(1,  18)  =  35.60,  p  <  0.001,  η2 = 0.67.  
 
Analysis of source judgements 
The subsequent analysis will continue to focus on the unaware participants. Table 3.7 shows 
an even distribution of source knowledge attributions, similar to that obtained in the previous 
experiments.  
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Table 3.7. Source proportions. 
Source proportions   
 NG NU OG 
guess 0.302 0.316 0.208 
intuition 0.365 0.354 0.375 
memory 0.333 0.330 0.417 
 
 
Figure 3.10 shows the corrected endorsement rates by source. Similarly to Experiments 2a 
and 2b, the critical difference between NG and NU categories is mainly expressed in the 
source judgements  attributed  to  memory,  F(1,  14)  =  8.93,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.39 (intuition, guess 
F < 1.0).   
 
 
Figure 3.10. Endorsement rates by source, unaware participants. 
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for rejections of the New Grammatical ones. For this reason, again, the guess-intuition-
memory scale was interpreted as a confidence scale with values of 1, 2 and 3. The results of 
this analysis are shown in Figure 3.11.  
 
   
Figure 3.11. Mean confidence for endorsements and rejections.  
 
An ANOVA was performed on the unaware participants’  data  on  the  mean  confidence  rates  
in the NG and NU conditions with grammaticality and endorsement/rejection as within-
subject factors, and list as a between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of 
endorsement/rejection, F(1,18) = 9.56, p < 0.01,   η2 = 0.35, and an interaction between 
endorsement/rejection  and  grammaticality,  F  (1,18)=  6.44,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.26. The difference 
between confidence rejecting NU and NG, hypothesised to be an indicator of conscious 
knowledge, was significant: F (1, 18)  =  11.94,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.40,  indicating that this group 
of participants may have developed some conscious knowledge, which the final post-test did 
not pick up or which was still difficult to verbalise. Interestingly, this difference is not 
significant among the aware group. For each group, Old Grammatical (OG) pairs were 
endorsed with more confidence than pairs in the other conditions. 
The higher confidence exhibited by participants in rejecting NU by comparison with 
NG suggests that participants developed some conscious knowledge, but may not mean that 
they   used   it   strategically.   That   is,   even   though   participants’   confidence   pattern   suggests  
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conscious knowledge, it does not mean that it correlated with the learning effect. Scatter plots 
of the NU-NG confidence difference and the learning effect are shown in Figure 3.12.  
 
 
  
Figure 3.12. Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU endorsement 
difference with Bayesian correction), for a) unaware, b) aware group. 
 
Figure 3.12a for the unaware participants clearly shows that one participant was an outlier 
showing a particularly high difference between confidence for rejecting NU and NG. With 
this data point removed, the unaware participants showed no correlation between such 
confidence pattern and learning, r(17) = 0.089, n.s11. On the other hand, the correlation 
among the aware group approached significance, r(9) = 0.59, p = 0.056. This indicates a more 
consistent strategy in the performance of the aware participants than the unaware group. 
However, this must be interpreted with caution, because a test of the difference between two 
correlations (using the Fisher r-to-z transformation) showed no significant difference between 
two correlations, z=1.21, p = 0.23 (but note the small sample size in the aware group). It is 
worth noting that aware participants could have become aware at different points of the 
experiment and might have used their knowledge consistently to a varying degree. Figure 
3.12b could be interpreted as showing two subgroups among the aware participants: those 
                                                          
11 Prior to removal of this participant the correlation for the unaware group was r(18) = 0.318, p = 0.17 
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whose confidence difference and learning effect go hand-in-hand (the four points in the upper 
right quadrant), and those who behave more like the unaware participants. This issue will be 
addressed again in the analysis of the explicit variant of this task (Experiment 5).       
 
3.4.4. Discussion 
 
This experiment provides some support for the hypothesis that people may be able to 
implicitly  form  semantic  generalisations  pertaining  to  novel  verbs’  selectional preference in 
the absence of syntactic cues. Although the learning effect was significant (NG-NU 
endorsement difference) among those participants who did not report awareness of any 
relevant knowledge in the post-test questionnaire, the confidence analysis revealed higher 
confidence for correctly rejecting NU than NG items. This may indicate some potentially 
conscious knowledge relevant to the tested regularity, which the participants did not verbalise 
in the post-test. However, this confidence difference did not correlate with the learning effect, 
therefore   it   could   not   be   shown   to   augment   participants’   performance.   The   overall   result  
remains inconclusive.   
Methodologically,   rather   than   reflecting   implicit   generalisations,   participants’  
responses may have been influenced by the similarity between training and test items. In all 
of the experiments so far, the nouns used in test were highly similar in meaning to the ones in 
training, e.g. importance and significance, or authority and esteem. Although concrete nouns 
were also similar in training and test, for example oxygen and nitrogen, or calcium and 
potassium, they are not synonymous to a similar extent as the abstract nouns. The effect of 
synonymy could also account for the fact that participants mainly discriminated between 
correctly and incorrectly associated abstract nouns, whereas this effect was weaker among the 
concrete nouns. In other words, participants might simply have confused the words they saw 
with their synonyms, rather than learning the semantic regularity. Experiment 4 addresses the 
issue of whether what is observed here pertains to implicit learning or simply a similarity 
bias, by including a much more heterogeneous set of abstract and concrete nouns. 
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3.5. Experiment 4 
 
Participants: 70 participants, all native English speakers from the USA, were recruited online 
via the Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
 
3.5.1. Materials 
 
Materials were similar to those in Experiment 2a, 2b, and 3. The target nouns in training and 
test were changed so as to formulate more heterogenous sets of abstract and concrete nouns. 
The broadened category of abstract nouns included ones as different as: happiness, wisdom, 
impact, understanding. The category of concrete nouns was similarly broadened to include, 
for example: chocolate, luggage, metal and paper. The motivation for this change was that 
the test item should not be similar to an item that had collocated with the nonword in training 
(whereas in previous experiments it was). Just like in Experiment 3, all concrete nouns were 
mass  nouns,  and  all   target  nouns  were  preceded  by  the  definite  article  “the”  in   the  training. 
The material is presened in Appendix D. 
 
3.5.2. Procedure 
 
The task followed the same procedure online as Experiment 3, except instead of the source 
judgements (guess, intuition, memory) participants indicated their confidence on a three-point 
scale (guess, somewhat confident, very confident). This removed the problem of translating 
the source judgements into a numerical scale. There were four lists (formed as in Experiment 
2a and 2b) equally distributed among the participants.  
 
3.5.3. Results 
 
The data from two of the participants were excluded because they misunderstood the 
instructions. Of the remainder only 7 participants became aware of the regularity and the 
remaining 61 were classed as unaware. 
 Chapter 3 Semantic implicit learning and false memory 
87 
 
 
The mean endorsement rates, corrected with the Bayesian prior (as in the previous 
experiments) for the aware and unaware participants are shown in Table 5. Among the aware 
group the difference between the endorsement of the New Grammatical and New 
Ungrammatical   items   only   approached   significance,   F(1,6)   =   5.63,   p   =   0.055,   η2 = 0.48. 
Accuracy for the Old Grammatical (OG) items was significantly above chance, t(6) = 4.04, p 
< 0.01. 
 
Table 3.8. Overall endorsement rates (standard error in parentheses) 
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 7) .63 (.04) .42 (.06) .71 (.02) 
Unaware (n = 61) .53 (.02)  .48 (.02) .62 (.02) 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
Among the 61 unaware participants there was a significant difference between the NG and 
NU   conditions,   F(1,57)   =   5.9,   p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.09. Memory for the OG was highly 
significantly above chance, t (60) = 5.3, p < 0.001. 
 
Analysis of noun types 
Figure 3.13 depicts the difference between the endorsements (corrected with the prior) of 
pairs with abstract and concrete nouns among the unaware group. 
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Figure 3.13. Endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates among the unaware 
participants. 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU conditions 
with grammaticality and collocate type as within-subjects factors and list as a between-
subjects factor. There was no main effect of collocate type, F < 1.0. There was no interaction 
between grammaticality and word type, F(1,57) =  1.61. For the OG condition the items with 
abstract collocates were recognised significantly more often than those with concrete 
collocates,  F(1,59)  =  5.98,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.09. 
 
Analysis of source judgements and confidence 
The subsequent analysis will mainly concern the unaware participants. Table 3.9 summarises 
the distribution of confidence judgements. Unlike in the previous experiments, the 
“moderately  confident”  category  was  used  more  often  than  the  others.  This  can  be  explained  
by the fact that the stimuli are considerably more dissimilar from each other than in the 
previous  experiments,  resulting  in  participants’  lower  overall  confidence. 
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    Table 3.9. Source proportions.  
Source proportions   
 NG NU OG 
1 0.237 0.234 0.189 
2 0.517 0.543 0.464 
3 0.246 0.223 0.347 
  
 
Endorsement rates broken down by confidence are presented in Figure 3.14. The rates were 
corrected with the Bayesian prior analogously to the previous experiments. Again, cases 
where there was no response in one category were excluded pairwise.   
 
 
Figure 3.14. Endorsement rates by source, corrected, unaware participants. 
 
An analysis of variance on the data from the NG and NU conditions showed a main effect of 
confidence,  F(2,58)  =  11.2,  p  <  0.001,  η2 = 0.279, but no interaction between confidence and 
grammaticality, F < 1.0. Tests of the grammaticality at each level of confidence were not 
significant: guess, F(1,38) = 1.16; somewhat confident, F(1,57) = 1.67; very confident, F < 
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1.0, although note the reduced number of participants in these analyses because of missing 
data. 
 
 
Figure 3.15.  Mean confidence for endorsements and rejections. 
 
An analysis of variance on the NG and NU data for the unaware participants showed only a 
main  effect  of  endorsement/rejection,  F(1,56)  =  25.4,  p  <  0.001,  η2 = 0.31, and likewise for 
the  aware  group,  F(1,6)  =  2.34,  η2 = 0.82. For both groups the confidence in rejections was 
almost identical in the NU and NG conditions, thus providing no evidence for the strategic 
use of explicit knowledge. 
A correlation analysis of the learning effect (NG-NU endorsement difference) and 
confidence rejecting NG and NU further reinforced this conclusion for the unaware 
participants. A positive correlation was taken to indicate strategic use of some explicit 
knowledge. The scatter plots of these correlations are presented in Figure 3.16. The unaware 
group turned out to show a negative trend, r(59) = -0.33, p < 0.01. In accordance with our 
prediction, the aware group showed the predicted positive trend, r(5) = 0.79, p < 0.05, 
indicating strategic application of knowledge. However, note that the correlation appears to 
be due to just two participants with a large NG-NU confidence difference and a large learning 
effect. Overall, the confidence analysis in this experiment produced similar results to the 
analyses   in   Experiments   2   and   3   where   “confidence”   was   derived   indirectly   from   source  
judgments. 
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Figure 3.16 Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU endorsement 
difference), for the unaware and aware groups. 
 
 
3.5.4. Discussion 
Overall, the pattern of responses in Experiment 4 has provided further support for the notion 
that people are able implicitly to form semantic generalisations pertaining to the selectional 
preferences of novel verbs. They are shown to do this even when the material includes 
semantic categories with highly heterogeneous words, such as for abstract words: happiness, 
wisdom, impact, understanding, and for concrete words: chocolate, luggage, metal, paper. 
However, although the numerical size of the effect in the unaware group was comparable to 
that in experiment 3, the effect size was much smaller (η2 = 0.30 in experiment 3 versus η2 = 
0.09 in experiment 4), and achieved the same level of significance despite being based on a 
much larger sample size (20 unaware in experiment 3 and 61 unaware in experiment 4). 
There is some indication, therefore, that when the similarity between the test items and the 
training items was reduced, the size of the learning effect was reduced also. Thus, although 
the semantic generalisation that is learned is broad enough to survive the reduction in 
similarity, this does not mean that semantic similarity is completely irrelevant to the effect, 
and   it   cannot   be   claimed   that   participants   are   necessarily   learning   an   abstract   ‘concrete’  
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versus   ‘abstract’   distinction   as   such.   Interestingly,   the   decrease   in   effect   size   across  
experiments 3 and 4 is only marked for the unaware groups. The aware groups showed 
comparable effect sizes (η2 = 0.54 in Experiment 3 and η2 = 0.48 in Experiment 4). This 
might suggest that in both experiments the aware participants were just as likely to conceive 
of  the  underlying  regularity  in  terms  of  an  abstract  ‘concrete  vs.  abstract’  distinction  that  was  
immune to the reduction in semantic similarity between items. This issue will be discussed 
further in the General Discussion to this chapter. 
The conclusion that the learning which has occurred is implicit crucially hinges on the 
methodology used. Here, the task is based on the false memory phenomenon. It is assumed 
that the creation of false memories is an automatic process happening involuntarily. To assure 
the accuracy of this prediction, and therefore the methodology applied here, Experiment 5 
was devised. Another group of participants was tested on an explicit variant of the task used 
in Experiment 4. In the new variant, the target regularity was revealed upfront in the initial 
instructions. The test was still unexpected, just like in the previous experiments. We tested 
whether participants naturally used their explicit knowledge strategically in the test. If so, 
endorsements of New Ungrammatical items would be close to zero. If not, the pattern of 
results would resemble that in the previous experiments. This last group was also predicted to 
outperform the implicit groups on the final, short post-experiment test.  
 
 
3.6. Experiment 5  
 
 
Participants 24 native speakers of English were recruited online from the USA via the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The mean age was 34.6 years. 9 of them were male.  
 
3.6.1. Materials 
 
The materials were exactly the same as in Experiment 4 (see: Appendix D), only the 
instructions revealed the target regularity upfront. Participants saw the following text: 
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     ‘You  will  see  sentences  on  the  screen.  Please  read  them  carefully.  
      They are taken from various newspaper articles, each sentence from a different article.  
      Some of them contain novel words in CAPITALS.  These words are MOUTEN, CONELL, POWTER   
      and  GOUBLE. They are acting as verbs.  
 
       MOUTEN means to increase an abstract thing (e.g. MOUTEN the approval),  
      POWTER means to increase a concrete thing (e.g. POWTER the aluminium)  
 
       CONELL means to decrease an abstract thing (e.g. CONELL the speed),  
       GOUBLE means to decrease a concrete thing (e.g. GOUBLE the rubber)  
 
      As you read each sentence notice how the novel words are used and this will reinforce their      
     meanings in your mind.  You will be tested on their meanings at the end.  
 
      In addition, for each sentence:  
      1) Please indicate whether the word in CAPITALS indicates roughly 'becoming less of' (- ) or   
          'becoming more of' (+).  
      2) Imagine what each article is about and indicate whether it talks about issues which are  
          personally Important or Unimportant to you.  
 
      Bear in mind that your main task is to learn the meanings of the novel verbs (whether they  
      mean increase or decrease and whether they go with  abstract  or  concrete  things).’ 
 
 
3.6.2. Procedure 
 
The experiment followed exactly the same procedure as Experiment 3 and Experiment 4. 
There were four versions equally distributed among participants.  
 
3.6.3. Results 
 
The mean endorsement rates and significant deviations from chance are presented in Table 
3.10. 
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Table 3.10. Overall endorsement rates (standard errors in parentheses) 
 NG NU OG 
All (n = 24) .57   (.048) .38   (.052) .64  (.042) 
Perfect post test (n = 15) .62   (.059) .32   (.077) .68   (.051) 
Not perfect post test (n = 9) .52   (.082) .43   (.076) .59  (.076) 
 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
Participants endorsed significantly more New Grammatical pairings than the New 
Ungrammatical ones, F(1,20) =  9.31,  p  <0.01,  η2 = 0.32. Accuracy for the Old Grammatical 
(OG) items was significantly above chance, t(23) = 3.73, p < 0.01. This was the case both for 
the participants who were perfectly accurate in the final post-experiment test of explicit 
knowledge, F(1,13)  =  8.59,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.4, and for those who were not perfectly accurate 
at  the  end,  F(1,7)  =  5.76,  p  <  0.05,  η2 = 0.45. The learning effect was numerically larger in 
the perfect group, but the interaction between group and grammaticality was not significant, 
F(1,20) = 2.95, p > 0.1. 
 
Analysis of word types 
Figure 3.18 depicts the difference between the endorsements of pairs with abstract and 
concrete nouns. 
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Figure 3.18. Endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates.  
 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU conditions 
with grammaticality and collocate type as within-subjects factors. The main effect of 
collocate type was not significant, F < 1.0, nor was the interaction between collocate type and 
grammaticality, F < 1.0. The OG condition also showed no effect of collocate type, F < 1.0. 
 
Analysis of source judgements12   
Table  8  shows  proportions  of  participants’  confidence  judgements.  As  expected,  source  
proportions reveal very few responses attributed to the lowest confidence. 
Table 3.11. Proportions of confidence judgements. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Equivalent to source analysis in Experiments 2a, 2b and 3.  
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 NG NU OG 
guess 0.211 0.164 0.161 
somewhat 0.435 0.391 0.323 
very 0.354 0.445 0.516 
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Figure 3.19 shows the endorsement rates by confidence. Since some participants may have 
small numbers of responses attributed to different confidence judgements, just like in 
Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4, the same Bayesian correction was applied. The critical 
difference between the NG and NU conditions is revealed   only   in   the   ‘very   confident’ 
category,   F(1,15)   =   8.18,   p   <   0.05,   η2 = 0.353. This pattern follows the trend from the 
previous experiments, although differs from its twin in Experiment 3. This difference is not 
surprising taking into account the fact that explicit knowledge of the semantic rule could 
naturally raise the overall confidence of responses. 
  
 
Figure.3.19. Endorsement rates by confidence source. 
 
Similarly to the previous experiments, an analysis of confidence was performed to see 
whether participants used their knowledge strategically. Again, this is hypothesised to result 
in higher confidence for correctly rejecting New Ungrammatical items than rejecting New 
Grammatical items. Figure 3.20 shows mean confidence for endorsements and rejections.  
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Figure 3.20. Mean confidence for endorsements and rejections. 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the confidence data with grammaticality and 
endorsement/rejection as within-subjects factors, and list as a between-subjects factor. There 
was   a  main   effect   of   endorsement/rejection:   F(1,15)   =   3.65,   p   <   0.01,   η2 = 0.488, but no 
interaction between endorsement/rejection and grammaticality, F < 1. This pattern was 
similar among both groups, those who were perfect and those who were not perfect on the 
post-test. Crucially, the difference in confidence for rejecting New Ungrammatical items and 
rejecting New Grammatical items was not significant in either group (perfect: F(1,12) = 1.09, 
not perfect F < 1.0).13 This is a crucial finding, indicating that even the explicit group did not 
apply their knowledge strategically on the current false-memory task. Arguably this validates 
the task as a measure of semantic implicit learning effects.  
As expected, the correlation analysis between the learning effect (NG-NU 
endorsement difference) and confidence pattern predicted to reflect conscious responses (NU 
rejection - NG rejection confidence) among all participants in Experiment 5 revealed a 
significant pattern, r(22) = 0.497, p < 0.05. 
                                                          
13 Due to reduced numbers of participants only the rotation of the collocates was used as a list factor here. 
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Figure 3.21. Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU 
endorsement difference). 
 
However, an interesting difference is revealed when contrasting the group who were perfect 
on the final test with those who were not (see Figure 3.21). The correlation between the 
learning effect and confidence rejecting NG-NU was significant for those participants who 
were perfect on the post-test, r(13) = 0.523, p < 0.05, and negligible for those who were not, 
r(7) = 0.064. Those who were not perfect on the post-test reveal behaviour similar to the 
implicit groups in previous experiments. This suggests that the correlation analysis used here 
can be usefully applied as an indirect measure of strategic use of conscious knowledge during 
the test. However, this must be interpreted with caution, because a test of the difference 
between two correlations (using the Fisher r-to-z transformation) showed no significant 
difference between two correlations, z=1.21, p = 0.23, possibly due to the small sample sizes. 
This is reminiscent of the finding in Experiment 3 (p. 83).   
 Interestingly, even amongst participants who were perfect on the post-test, the 
correlation is driven by people in the upper right quadrant. Still, there are people who do not 
show a learning effect (even though they know the system, they fail to apply it in the 
familiarity task), and there are two who show large learning effects but no confidence 
difference – which can be taken to indicate that they are using implicit knowledge (i.e. they 
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have the explicit knowledge but they are not using it intentionally in the test – there are a few 
cases  like  these  in  the  previous  ‘aware’  group  scatter  plots  as  well).  To  conclude,  even  when  
people have explicit knowledge of the rule they do not necessarily use that knowledge 
strategically in the recognition memory task.  
 
 
3.6.4. Discussion of the English experiments 2-5 
 
Overall, the above experiments suggest that people form semantic generalisations about 
nouns which can follow novel verbs. A false-memory task was adapted to measure learning 
as difference between erroneous endorsement of new items which followed the correct 
regularity and the new items which did not. The method combined a false-memory procedure 
with subjective measures of awareness and confidence. The overall analysis of mean 
confidence in different categories revealed no differences between those who were able to 
report the system at the end (aware), and those who were not. This, combined with the results 
from the explicit group (Experiment 5), indicates that in a false-memory procedure people in 
general do not use their knowledge strategically, even if such knowledge is provided 
explicitly. The procedure therefore offers a useful and valid method to address implicit 
learning, as it minimises the often quoted methodological counter-arguments to implicit 
learning research, including the fact that people  may  construct  knowledge  which  they  don’t  
report, or have some partial relevant knowledge which is responsible for the effect. The 
measure which turned out to be very sensitive to whether a group used knowledge 
strategically or not was a correlation analysis between the learning effect and the confidence 
pattern hypothesised to reflect conscious knowledge (higher for rejecting NU than rejecting 
NG). In experiments 2a, 2b and 4, and 5 there was a significant correlation or trend among 
the aware groups, but not the unaware groups.  
Although collectively the experiments seem to point to the conclusion that implicit 
semantic generalisations are formed through normal sentence reading, and the proposed 
methods for detecting conscious knowledge suggest that the process is indeed implicit, a 
counter-argument of a different kind can be put forward. We might in fact not be dealing with 
learning as such, but with identification of translation equivalents for the target words – even 
at a subconscious level. To test whether the effect was facilitated by translation/recognition of 
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equivalents, the following experiments attempt to replicate the above findings using Polish 
translations of the materials. Although   Polish   does   have   equivalent   words   for   ‘diminish’,  
‘deplete’,   ‘increase’   and   ‘add’,   these   words   would   not   be   followed   naturally   by   the   same  
nouns as in English. Indeed, in the following experiments people often reported that the 
sentences sounded somewhat unnatural.  
 
 
3.7. Experiment 6a 
 
Participants: 24 Polish students of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow and Krakow 
University of Economics. 15 of them were male. 
 
3.7.1. Materials 
 
To allow for comparisons with the previous experiments, the materials comprised the 
translations of the training and test stimuli from Experiment 2a. Unlike in the English 
experiments, Polish speakers could not substitute each novel word for a single existing Polish 
word. In fact, the sentences were checked by eight Polish native speakers in order to ensure 
that no one substitute for each novel word could be identified. The four novel verbs were: 
uzopyć, staleć, wpełać, and zomić. Care was taken to ensure that they did not resemble any 
existing Polish words, which could suggest a relation to abstract or concrete objects.  As in 
Experiments 3, 4 and 5 the absence of syntactic cues was ensured and all target nouns 
appeared in the same Dative case. Keeping the case the same resulted in some sentences 
sounding  ‘slightly  unnatural’,  though  not  ungrammatical.  This  fact  should  have  also made it 
more difficult for participants to look for single translation equivalents of the novel words. 
 An example training item: 
 
Fakt,  że  telewizja     jest nadal najpolularniejszym z mediów     nie  oznacza,  że   
Fact that the TV  is  still  the most popular of the media does not mean  that  
 
moża       GOSZYĆ     znaczenie                radia         w kreowaniu opinii publicznej 
one can GOSZYĆ  the meaning[+Dat] of the radio in shaping the public opinion. 
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           3.7.2. Procedure 
 
The task followed the same procedure as the Experiments 2a and 2b. Participants were tested 
in person and performed the task on a computer, with the stimuli displayed in Superlab 4.0.  
 
 3.7.3. Results 
 
8 out of 24 participants expressed at least some awareness of the regularity, or made 
potentially  helpful  observations.  They  were  classified  as  the  ‘aware’  group.  The  remaining  16  
participants  were   classified   as   the   ‘unaware’.  As   in   the   previous   experiments,   the   analysis  
was performed on means corrected for small number of responses (unless otherwise stated). 
The mean endorsement rates for the aware and unaware participants are shown in Table 3.12 
below. 
 
Table 3.12. Mean endorsement rates (standard error in parentheses) 
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 8) .44  (.039) .41   (.077) .53   (.058) 
Unaware (n = 16) .55  (.035) .49   (.047) .71   (.030) 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
Unlike in the previous experiments, here neither group exhibited a significant difference 
between their endorsement of the NG and NU type items: aware F(1,4) < 1.0, unaware F(1, 
12)  =  1.63,  p  =  0.23,  η2 = 0.12. However, note that the numerical effect size is the same as in 
Experiment 3 (p.79), suggesting the possibility there may be an effect of grammaticality on a 
larger sample size. Accuracy for the correct endorsement of the Old Grammatical (OG) items 
was significantly above chance only among the unaware group, single sample t-test: t(15) = 
6.90, p < 0.001.  
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Analysis of word types 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates. 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU conditions 
with grammaticality and collocate type as within-subjects factors. The main effect of 
collocate type was not significant, nor was the interaction between collocate type and 
grammaticality. 
 
3.7.4. Discussion 
 
Unlike the previous experiments, here Polish native speakers did not reveal a statistically 
significant evidence for implicit learning of the selectional preferences of four novel verbs 
(though notice the raw effect size). It was particularly surprising that the overall memory for 
OG should be relatively low among the aware people, who expressed some awareness of the 
selectional  preference  rule.  The  ‘by  noun  type’  analysis  revealed  that  this  was  the  case  mainly  
due to low endorsement rates for the combinations with abstract nouns. These particular 
combinations turned out to be especially difficult to remember, despite participants having 
some relevant rule knowledge. 
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A potential reason why this situation occurred may concern the forms of the novel 
words. They were indeed devised to be as dissimilar as possible to any feasibly fitting, 
existing Polish words. In the light of Monaghan, Christiansen, & Fitneva, (2011), this level of 
artificiality  may  have  hindered  participants’  differentiation  between  the  noun  types  following  
the novel verbs. It has been shown that categorising is impeded by arbitrariness of the word 
form. Categorisation requires some non-arbitrary cues, which may be in the form of, e.g. 
onomatopoeia (Langdon, 1984, mentioned in Monaghan et al. 2011), phonaesthemes (e.g. 
words referring to large sizes tend to contain low vowels: large/vast/humongous and those 
referring to small sizes contain high vowels: little, tiny; Monaghan et al. 2011), or 
synaesthetic relations between certain sounds and meanings. Nygaard, Cook, & Namy, 
(2009) showed facilitation of sound-meaning relationships on the learning of Japanese words 
by English monolinguals. Participants showed learning after being exposed to matching 
equivalents (e.g. akurai and bright), and, to a lesser extent, opposites (e.g. akurai and dark), 
but not random pairings. These findings suggest that learners do make use of the non-
arbitrary links between sound structure and word meaning. 
For current purposes it would not be desirable if the novel words intrinsically 
suggested abstract/concrete context (e.g. word forms resembling pour, chop may prime 
concrete nouns or escalate, reduce abstract ones). But the problem of arbitrary novel word 
forms may still be alleviated by creating them in such a way as to plausibly imply an 
increasing/decreasing meaning, which is a separate dimension of meaning to the one being 
tested (abstract/concrete object). The task instructions required participants to focus on the 
increase/decrease distinction, hence the novel words should plausibly indicate it. A norming 
study was first conducted to establish a set of words with these characteristics. 
 
 
 3.8. Norming study 1 
 
 
Participants: 12 Polish native speakers, average age 28. 
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 3.8.1. Materials 
 
The materials comprised of a list of 36 nonsense but phonotactically possible Polish words, 
including the 4 words used in Experiment 6a. 
 
 3.8.2. Procedure 
 
Participants were asked to rate each word on a scale of -5  to  5  in  terms  of  whether  it  “sounds”  
like decreasing/removing or rather increasing/adding. -5 indicated   ‘definitely  
decreasing/removing’,   0   indicated   the   word   sounded   neutral,   and   +5   indicated   definitely  
increasing/adding. The task was performed online using SurveyMonkey©.  
 
 3.8.3. Results 
 
Participants’   ratings   are   shown   in   Table   3.13.      The   average word ratings spanned 
between -3.33 and +3.75. Out of the four words used in Experiment 6a, only one turned out 
to be moderately suggestive of increasing (wpełać: +1.83), whereas the other words were 
clearly neutral in that respect (uzopyć -0.92, staleć -0.5, zomić -0.08).  
 
 
3.8.4. Conclusion 
 
As became clear, the words used in Experiment 6a were very neutral in terms of potential 
increase/decrease meaning. It should be of interest to replicate Experiment 6a using the two 
most  ‘increase-like’  and  two  most  ‘decrease-like’  words  from  the  list.  This  will  test  whether  
the failure to induce learning could have been caused by arbitrariness of the novel word 
forms. 
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Table 3.13. Polish non-words norming study results. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  pokrawać 25.0% (3) 25.0% (3) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -3.33 12 
zemlać 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 25.0% (3) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -2.67 12 
złuszać 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -2.17 12 
krąbać 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) -2 12 
wyteniać 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (4) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -1.5 12 
przenić 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -1.42 12 
lipnić 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -1.33 12 
goszyć 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -1.08 12 
uzopyć 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -0.92 12 
wnopić 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) -0.92 12 
remić 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 66.7% (8) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -0.83 12 
mutnić 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 50.0% (6) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -0.67 12 
złuścić 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) -0.58 12 
staleć 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 41.7% (5) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) -0.5 12 
pejąć 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 50.0% (6) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -0.42 12 
spiszać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 33.3% (4) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) -0.33 12 
kszenić 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 41.7% (5) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) -0.33 12 
zomić 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 41.7% (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) -0.08 12 
pieczyć 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 66.7% (8) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.17 12 
wdyrać 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 0.33 12 
toleć 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 33.3% (4) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.42 12 
wiczyć 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 66.7% (8) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.5 12 
trużyć 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 50.0% (6) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.5 12 
szwyrać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 58.3% (7) 33.3% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.67 12 
kładnić 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 33.3% (4) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.67 12 
pniczyć 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 1.17 12 
skopiać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 1.17 12 
wpełać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 25.0% (3) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 1.83 12 
wtężyć 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 33.3% (4) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 2 12 
pększać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 0.0% (0) 50.0% (6) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 2.08 12 
mecnić 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 2.17 12 
składzić 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 41.7% (5) 16.7% (2) 2.58 12 
namiecić 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 25.0% (3) 8.3% (1) 50.0% (6) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 2.75 12 
pętrzyć 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 16.7% (2) 33.3% (4) 2.92 12 
nabrzeć 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 16.7% (2) 25.0% (3) 33.3% (4) 25.0% (3) 3.67 12 
zwięczać 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 8.3% (1) 58.3% (7) 3.75 12 
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3.9. Experiment 6b 
 
Participants: 55 students of various Polish universities participated in the experiment online.   
 
3.9.1. Materials 
 
The training sentences and test materials were the same as for experiment 6a except that the 
novel verbs were changed. The four novel verbs were: pętrzyć ,   nabrzeć,   zemlać,   krąbać, 
chosen  after  the  norming  study  as  suggesting  “increase”  or  “decrease”  (the  ratings of the four 
words were 2.92, 3.62, -2.67, -2.00 respectively, see Table 3.13). As in Experiments 3, 4 and 
5, the absence of syntactic cues was ensured and all target nouns appeared in the same Dative 
case (which resulted in some sentences sounding a little unusual, albeit still grammatical).  
 
3.9.2. Procedure 
 
The task was the same as in the previous experiments. It was administered online, 
participants were recruited from student internet fora and volunteered to participate. There 
were four versions of the experiment equally distributed among the participants. 
 
3.9.3. Results 
 
One   person’s   data   was   removed   due   to   accepting   everything   as   a   ‘guess’.   Out   of   the  
remaining 54 participants, 10 expressed awareness of the regularity or reported potentially 
helpful  observation,  hence  were  classified  as  the  “aware”  group.  The  remaining  participants  
were   classified   as   the   “unaware”   group.   As   in   the   previous   experiments,   the   analysis   was  
performed on means corrected for small number of responses (unless otherwise stated).  
The mean endorsement rates for the aware and unaware participants are shown in Table 3.14 
below. 
 
 Chapter 3 Semantic implicit learning and false memory 
107 
 
 
Table 3.14. Mean endorsement rates (standard error in parentheses) 
 NG NU OG 
Aware (n = 10) .49   (.060) .40    (.055) .70  (.057) 
Unaware (n = 44) .48   (.028) .41   (.031) .65 (.025) 
NG = New Grammatical, NU = New Ungrammatical, OG = Old Grammatical 
 
An ANOVA on these data revealed that among the aware group the higher erroneous 
endorsement of word pairs which followed the selectional preference pattern (NG) than those 
that   did   not   (NU)   approached   significance,   F(1,7)  =      5.05,   p<0.5,   η2 = 0.42. Accuracy for 
correct endorsement of the Old Grammatical (OG) items was significantly above chance on a 
single sample t-test: t(9) = 3.52, p < 0.01.  
Crucially, the 44 unaware participants showed a significant difference between their 
endorsement  of  the  NG  and  NU  items,  F(1,  40)  =  8.13,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.17. Memory for the 
OG items was also significantly above chance, t(43) = 5.75, p < 0.001.  
 
 
Analysis by noun type  
An analysis by noun type (abstract or concrete) was carried out as in the previous 
experiments. The results are shown in Figure 3.23. 
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Figure 3.23. Endorsement rates for abstract and concrete collocates among the unaware 
participants. 
 
An ANOVA was performed on the mean endorsement rates in the NG and NU conditions 
with grammaticality and noun type as within-subjects factors, and list as a between-subjects 
factor.  There  was  a  main  effect  of  collocate  type,  F(1,40)  =  10.88,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.21, as the 
new stimuli with abstract nouns were endorsed more highly than with concrete nouns. There 
was   also   a   main   effect   of   grammaticality   F(1,40)   =   8.13   p   <   0.001,   η2 = 0.17, but no 
interaction between collocate type and grammaticality, F < 1.0. Finally, for the OG condition, 
endorsement rates were higher for the concrete items than the abstract, F(1,43) = 9.61, p < 
0.01,  η2 = 0.19. 
 
Analysis of source judgements 
Among  the  ‘unaware’  participants,  the  source  knowledge  attributions  were  evenly  distributed, 
as shown in Table 3.15 below.  
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Table 3.15. Source proportions 
Source proportions   
 NG NU OG 
guess 0.295 0.334 0.241 
intuition 0.382 0.386 0.395 
memory 0.322 0.280 0.364 
 
Figure 3.24 shows the endorsement rates by source.  Although numerically NG endorsement 
is  higher   than  NU   in  all   categories,   the  difference   is  only  significant   for   ‘guess’:  F(1,31) = 
9.03,  p  <  0.01,  η2 =  0.23.  For   ‘intuition’:  F(1,34)  =  1.89,  p  =  0.18;;   for memory: F(1, 7) = 
1.23, p = 0.28. 
 
 
 
  Figure 3.24. Endorsement rates by source, unaware participants. 
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Analogously to the previous experiments the issue of whether participants used any potential 
knowledge strategically was first examined by comparing source judgements for 
endorsements and rejections of NG and NU items. For this reason, again, the guess-intuition-
memory categories were converted into a scale with values of 1, 2 and 3. The results of this 
analysis are shown in Figure 3.25. 
 
 
Figure 3.25. Mean converted scale for endorsements and rejections, for a) unaware, b) aware group. 
 
An  ANOVA  was  performed  on  the  unaware  participants’  data  on  the  mean  confidence  rates  
in the NG and NU conditions with grammaticality and endorsement/rejection as within-
subjects factors, and list as a between-subjects factor. There was a main effect of 
endorsement/rejection,  F(1,38)  =  9.62,  p  <  0.01,  η2 = 0.2. There was no interaction between 
endorsement/rejection and grammaticality, F < 1.0. Conscious knowledge was hypothesised 
to be reflected by higher confidence for rejecting NU items than NG items. A numerically 
opposite pattern was found (though not statistically significant, F(1,42)  =  1.54,  p  >0.1,  η2 = 
0.035), inviting a potential conclusion that this group of participants were rather unlikely to 
have strategically used conscious knowledge of grammaticality. 
Again, strategic use of conscious knowledge was also hypothesised to lead to a 
correlation between the difference in rejection confidence between NU and NG items and the 
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learning effect (NG-NU endorsement difference). Scatter plots for the unaware and aware 
groups are shown in Figure 3.26.  
  
Figure 3.26. Confidence difference for NU-NG rejections and learning effect (NG-NU endorsement 
difference with Bayesian correction), for a) unaware, b) aware group. 
 
 
The unaware group showed no correlation, r(42) = 0.045. On the other hand, the aware group 
showed a significant correlation r(8) = 0.71, p < 0.05. 
 
 
3.9.4. Discussion of Polish experiments 6a and 6b 
 
The two experiments 6a and 6b on Polish native speakers confirmed that the learning which 
is   revealed   in   this  procedure  does  not  arise  simply  due   to  participants’   recognising  at  some  
level, either conscious or unconscious, the existing English equivalents of the target words, 
with their semantic selection patterns. If that were the case, Polish speakers would not have 
shown learning effects on the same material as English speakers, which they did in 
experiment 6b.  
The apparent absence of any learning in experiment 6a is interesting, as the material 
was exactly the same as 6b, with only different target word forms. The precise conditions 
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future investigation, especially in the light of theories of semantic knowledge. For example, it 
is not clear how purely association-based models would account for this finding (see 3.8.5 
Discussion below). 
 The factor hypothesised here to be the reason for the non-significant effect of 
grammaticality in experiment 6a was the arbitrariness of word forms. Even though the change 
of effect following the norming study may suggest this was indeed the case, a definite 
conclusion cannot be reached at this stage. There could still be other factors involved, such as 
wordlikeness (e.g., Bailey & Hahn, 2001), or word memorability, given that the aware group 
(though not the unaware group) reported low recognition of Old Grammatical (OG) phrases 
with abstract nouns. Future experiments controlling these factors may further our 
understanding of what drives semantic implicit learning processes, but what can be stated at 
this stage is that this is another example of prior lexical knowledge exerting a top-down effect 
on learning (cf. Brockmole et al, 2008). 
 
 
 3.10. General discussion of false memory experiments 
 
Overall, the series of seven experiments presented in this chapter confirm the hypothesis that 
people implicitly generalise the meaning of nouns collocating with novel verbs. The method 
proposed here is based on the false memory phenomenon, and the effect is assumed to occur 
automatically and unconsciously in unaware participants. The detailed analysis examining the 
correlation between the learning effect and confidence ratings revealed that the vast majority 
of participants did not intentionally and strategically use any explicit knowledge of the 
semantic preference rule that they may have possessed. This was determined by the lack of 
significant correlations between the learning effect and the NU-NG rejection confidence 
difference among the unaware group. Furthermore, Experiment 5, the explicit version of 
Experiment 4, verified the methodology by showing that the task does not naturally incline 
people to use their knowledge strategically, even if they are able to report that knowledge. It 
turned out that even in this condition some people behaved like the unaware groups and some 
like the aware groups in other experiments. The ones who resembled members of the other 
aware groups, and clearly used their knowledge strategically, also performed perfectly on the 
subsequent post-test. On the other hand, those who, despite being provided with the semantic 
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regularity explicitly, still performed akin to the unaware groups (as can be seen from the 
scatter plot in Figure 3.21), did not perform perfectly on the post-test. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the false memory paradigm can be used as an indirect measure of implicit 
knowledge provided that confidence judgements are used to exclude cases where explicit 
knowledge has been deployed intentionally. 
 The findings from this series of experiments confirmed that people form semantic 
generalisations without awareness. The question which now arises is: how does this happen? 
One plausible approach is along the lines of  the  ‘Multiple  Trace’  memory  model  proposed  by     
Hintzman (1986). It is suggested that every experience forms a separate trace in memory. For 
example, here the learners see for example the novel word POWTER followed by the 
collocate the prominence, which results in the formation of a trace comprising the form of the 
novel word, and the form and meaning of the collocate. In the course of the training phase a 
participant accumulates more experiences and encounters, for example, POWTER the role 
and POWTER the status. After such experiences, on seeing the word POWTER, the response 
from memory would be the average of all memory traces in which that word was encoded – 
essentially a prototype representation resulting from all the encountered specific instances. As 
the model relies on featural representations of meaning it can be assumed that averaging over 
traces results in a prototype representation. In the current case, an average collocate of 
POWTER is  ‘something  abstract’.  In  the  test  phase,  on  seeing  POWTER with a new word the 
phrase is projected to memory and resonates with traces according to its similarity to them, 
producing   an   “echo”   with   a   strength   that   is   related   to   the   degree   of   match.  When   a   new  
abstract word, e.g. esteem, is presented in connection with POWTER, because it has semantic 
features that are similar to the ones associated with POWTER in memory, the echo from 
memory will be relatively strong compared to, for example, when POWTER occurs with a 
word like sugar. Such an approach predicts that similarity between test items and particular 
training items will increase the echo strength, which would explain why the learning effect 
appeared to be stronger in experiment 3 than experiment 4 (where heterogeneous exemplars 
of each category were used). Note also that the conscious feeling of familiarity does not entail 
that the structural knowledge leading to this intuition (here that POWTER collocates with 
abstract words) is conscious.  
 The Multiple Trace model, however, is at odds with mainstream views on false 
memory. On the one hand, there are models based on feature semantics, (e.g., Eich, 1982), 
which, similarly to Hintzman, account for the false memory phenomenon in terms of feature 
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overlap, and predict an important role for across-item semantic relations in the generation of 
false  memories  (e.g.  Brainerd  &  Reyna’s  2005 fuzzy-trace theory). On the other hand, there 
are numerous accounts based on the view of semantic knowledge as a network of 
associations, or word co-occurrences. On this view, apple and pear are not related because 
they share features, but rather because they occur in similar contexts. Also, apple and pick are 
associates, not because of feature overlap, but because of their patterns of co-occurrence. 
Examples of this view of semantic space are presented by Nelson, Bennet, and Leibert 
(1997), Lund and Burgess (1996), McEvoy, Nelson & Komatsu (1999), Roediger, Balota et 
al. (2001), and Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo (2001). Both feature- and 
association-based models of semantics account for false memory phenomena in terms of 
spreading activation, the former along the overlapping features, the latter along the 
connections based on occurrences.  
 There are numerous arguments in support of the associationist views of false memory, 
and indeed it is the predominantly favoured view in the field. The central argument for it is 
the finding that the strongest predictor of false memories is backward associative strength – 
from the presented training item back to the unpresented test lure (Roediger, Watson et al., 
2001, Buchan, Brown, Cabeza & Maison, 1999). Further support for the associationist view 
comes from developmental and dementia studies. For example, Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985) 
demonstrated facilitation effects in associated lists in both young and older participants (8 to 
20 years old). However, categorical lists stimulated facilitation only among the older group, 
suggesting the primacy of associative semantic relations, with the ability to make use of 
category knowledge developing over time. Also, category priming was shown already to be 
impaired in the early stages of Alzheimer’s   disease,   while   associative   priming   remained  
comparable to healthy age-matched controls (Glosser et al., 1998, Ober, Shenaut, & Reed, 
1995), which further reinforces the idea that associative semantics can be more rudimentary.  
 At odds with the current experiments is the finding reported in  Hutchison and Balota 
(2005), who concluded that thematic consistency is irrelevant for false memory. Using a 
DRM procedure, they compared lists of 6 words all suggesting one nonrepresented lure (e.g., 
snooze, wake, bedroom, slumber. . . , for SLEEP) and 6 words that converged onto a different 
meaning of a homograph (e.g., stumble, season, trip, autumn. . . , for FALL). Associative 
strength from the list items to the critical target was equated across the two types of lists.  
Differences in recall were only marked for veridical, but not false memory, suggesting that 
the latter does not rely on the formation of meaningful representations across items.   
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It is difficult to distinguish between feature-based and association-based theories at 
this   stage.  The   experiments   rely   on   participants’   already   formed   lexicons.   If   the   lexicon   is  
based on associations, then the effects reported here would have to be explained on that basis. 
It would indicate that, having seen POWTER the status people activate the words which have 
been associated with status by virtue of having encountered them in similar contexts. Future 
research with careful control for backward association strength between test words and 
training  words,  as  well  as  an  analysis  of  people’s  semantic  similarity  ratings,  could  shed  more  
light on this major debate in linguistics – what the structure is of our semantic knowledge. 
 The findings reported in this chapter are relevant to the debate regarding the role of 
attention to the relevant meaning in an implicit learning task. Here, the participants were not 
directed to attend to the abstract/concrete distinction. This feature must have been implicitly 
activated, and it may be claimed that it became activated as an inherent feature of a given 
noun (cf. Williams, 2005; Leung & Williams, 2011). This raises the question of what is the 
minimum   that   has   to   be   “noticed”   in   order   for   implicit   learning   to   occur.   It   appears that, 
whilst noticing the relevant form is presumably necessary, noticing the relevant semantic 
distinction is not. This issue will be revisited in the next chapter. 
 In all, the chapter presents a collection of experiments using an improved 
methodology for addressing semantic implicit learning over that reported in Chapter 2. 
However, can the existence of the phenomenon be proved at this stage? Sceptics might still 
argue that people are intentionally14 matching the test items to the exemplars they remember. 
In other words, the effect reported here occurs at the retrieval stage, and does not pertain to 
the learning process as such – which is an objection raised in the past to the classical implicit 
learning demonstrations (see Chapter 1). In order to establish that the phenomenon is not 
merely a retrieval effect, yet another diagnostic test of implicitness should be applied, namely 
automaticity. This will be addressed in the following chapter. 
 
 
          3.11.   Chapter summary 
 
This chapter contains 7 experiments based on a false memory task addressing semantic 
implicit learning in language.  
                                                          
14 This is the critical distinction between these and the reaction-time based experiments in Chapter 4. 
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In Experiment 2, participants were first exposed to sentences, some of which contained one of 
four novel verbs. In a subsequent surprise test participants saw verb-noun pairs, and were 
asked whether these pairs had appeared in the training. Although all of the words presented in 
the test had appeared in the training individually, most of them did not occur together. 
Crucially, half of the new combinations followed the pattern of semantic preferences from 
training, the other half violated it. Should semantic implicit learning take place, participants 
were predicted to erroneously judge as familiar those that followed the pattern significantly 
more often than those that did not. This effect was found in two variants, experiments 2a and 
2b, the latter maintaining a closer syntactic similarity between training and test items than the 
former. 
Experiment 3 assured external validity of the laboratory-based findings by replicating the first 
laboratory experiment (with minor changes on a small number of stimuli) in an internet-based 
version using a large, and highly heterogeneous, participant sample.  
Experiment 4 examined whether the false memory effect could still be obtained when the 
nouns in the test phase were semantically dissimilar to those that occurred with the nonwords 
in training, showing broad generalisation of the abstract/concrete regularity. Such an effect 
was obtained, although the effect size turned out to be much smaller than in the previous 
experiments. This may suggest that semantic similarity between training and test items plays 
a role in the false memory effect. 
Experiment 5 showed that explicitly instructed participants did not differ from implicit groups 
in their performance on the false-memory task, suggesting that even when participants have 
conscious knowledge they do not use it strategically when judging familiarity, confirming 
that false memory effects provide a good indirect measure of implicit learning. 
Experiment 6a and 6b addressed the issue whether participants could have critically relied on 
the recognition of real English equivalents for target words. The materials were Polish 
translations of the sentences used in Experiment 2. Interestingly, although Experiment 6b 
showed evidence of implicit learning, this only happened after target words were normed for 
how suggestive they were of increasing/decreasing. Experiment 6a, which relied on the same 
materials as 6b but with different target words, failed to induce implicit learning effects. This 
observation raised questions about the dependency of implicit learning on prior semantic 
knowledge. 
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The results were then discussed in light of theoretical models of lexicon and false memory as 
well as methodological issues concerning implicit learning research. It is argued that despite 
the fact that explicit knowledge can influence judgements in this task, strategic use of such 
knowledge is visibla as a correlation between the learning effect and confidence, and, 
importantly, only concerns the most highly aware participants. Overall, therefore, the false 
memory task offers a good way to assess implicit knowledge. 
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   Chapter 4 
Semantic Implicit Learning and Automaticity 
 
 
 
 4.1 Introduction 
 
A trademark of implicit processes is automaticity. While explicit knowledge can guide 
intentional behaviour, implicit knowledge acts independently of conscious monitoring, in 
other words automatically (Cleeremans & Jimenes, 2002), Dienes & Perner, 1999). In the 
field of SLA, automaticity has often been assumed to be reflected in fluency, which, in turn, 
has been assumed to be an index of acquisition as opposed to learning (cf. Krashen, 1981, 
Monitor Hypothesis). Fluency and automaticity have usually been addressed by imposing a 
time pressure for response. For example, Rod Ellis (2005) performed a principal components 
factor analysis on five different language tests, showing that speeded grammaticality 
judgement, oral imitation and oral narrative loaded on a common factor, while the untimed 
grammaticality judgement and a metalinguistic knowledge test loaded on another. Ellis 
proposed that the factor that distinguished these two groups of tasks was time pressure and 
that speed of response can distinguish between implicit and explicit processing. His finding 
was later disputed on methodological grounds (Isemonger, 2007). Furthermore, as illustrated 
in Chapter 1, section 1.8, explicit knowledge may become automatic through 
proceduralisation, suggesting that not all fast and fluent behaviour necessarily
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results from implicit learning. Operationalisation of implicit learning through automaticity 
therefore requires further postulates and delineation of the specific role of awareness. 
 As Tzelgov (1997) points out, in an automatic process participants can still be aware 
of  the  stimuli  that  are  being  processed  (c.f.  Schmidt’s  “noticing”  hypothesis),  but  the  process  
runs without being consciously monitored. Therefore, automaticity coupled with measures of 
awareness could offer a useful diagnostic of implicitness. Tzelgov proposed that a process 
can be said to run independently of conscious monitoring if it can be shown to operate when 
it  is  not  part  of  the  task  requirement.  Otherwise  the  process  is  “intentional”,  in  which  case  it  
is difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether or not it runs implicitly. The most well-known 
demonstration   of   automatic   processing   is   that   in   the   “Stroop   task”   (Stroop,   1935),   where  
people  are  shown  to  be  slower  to  name  the  colour  in  which  a  word  is  printed  if   the  word’s  
meaning denotes a different colour, (e.g., Blue, Purple, Red, Green, Purple, Green), than when 
the two are congruent (e.g., Green, Red, Blue, Purple, Blue, Purple). The task only requires 
participants to name the colour, yet the fact that the word meaning interferes with it anyway, 
without  participant’s  intention  for  it  to  do  so  – suggests that meaning activation is automatic. 
 To demonstrate implicit learning, automaticity needs to be assured both during the 
acquisition of knowledge and its retrieval. During retrieval, participants may consciously use 
explicit knowledge to help them perform the task, in which case their behaviour becomes 
controlled. Overall, in a fully automatic task, such knowledge should be neither required nor 
even beneficial to the task intentionally performed. The present experiments adopted this 
approach, whilst supplementing it with verbal report as a means of assessing awareness of the 
target semantic preference system. 
An example of a fully automatic task in implicit learning research is that used by 
Vinter & Perruchet (1999, 2000). They demonstrated that adults and children non-
deliberately modified their natural drawing behaviour following a specially designed practice. 
The  procedure  was  based  on  the  “start-rotation  principle”  in  drawing  (Van  Sommers,  1984),  
which postulates that the direction of drawing a closed geometrical figure depends on a 
starting point. Using a circle as an example, if the starting point lies above a virtual axis 
between   11   o’clock   and   5   o’clock   on   a   clockface,   people   are   naturally   inclined   to   draw  
anticlockwise, whereas if the starting position is set on the lower circumference – they draw 
clockwise.   Participants   in   Vinter   &   Perruchet’s   study   were divided into three groups: the 
incongruent, congruent and baseline. Their task was to draw over figure shapes. In the first 
two groups they were given both the starting point and the direction of drawing (which in the 
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incongruent group violated the natural inclination in 80% of cases, while in the congruent 
group reinforced it in 80% of cases). The free baseline group could draw as they chose. It 
turned out that the participants inverted the direction of rotation associated with a starting 
location after being trained to respect the reverse rotation. They did that without being 
explicitly aware of the manipulation (as revealed by a post-experiment task). In this 
experiment  participants’  attention  is  drawn  to  speed  and  accuracy,  while  learning  is  measured  
by a different parameter, namely the drawing direction, which makes the emerging effect a 
clear reflection of automatic processing.  
This type of modification of behaviour can be interpreted as a form of priming – 
people are not aware that their behaviour has changed because of their prior experience. 
Importantly, though, they are conscious at the point of drawing in which direction they do it. 
What they are not conscious of is the fact that their behaviour was modified and how. After 
training, it feels easier for them to draw figures in a particular direction. Clearly, therefore 
unconscious processing (structural knowledge) can have conscious effects (judgement 
knowledge) (Dienes & Scott, 2005). 
The experiments presented in this chapter use a modification of the standard priming 
procedure in psycholinguistics to address the question of whether semantic implicit 
knowledge is expressed automatically in such a way as to affect real-time processing. Such a 
finding would demonstrate the relevance and presence of this phenomenon in natural 
language use. Is it possible to replicate the results obtained using a false memory paradigm 
(in  Chapter  3)  using  a  different  method,  measuring  the  timing  of  participants’  responses  and  
demonstrating both automaticity and implicitness (unawareness)?  
The five experiments reported below involve progressively improved attempts at 
revealing implicit learning through on-line tasks. However, it must be acknowledged that, 
although in the initial two pilot studies, as well as Experiment 7 and 8, the knowledge of the 
target system is not part of the task, explicit knowledge of this system would nevertheless be 
beneficial for performance and would affect the measure of learning. This issue will be 
discussed further in the relevant sections. However, the final experiment, Experiment 9, 
presents a procedure which could be regarded as fulfilling the above described criteria for 
automaticity: the target regularity is neither part of the task, nor beneficial for it. 
  
The first pilot study, presented in the following section, tested whether knowledge implicitly 
gained through the same training as in Chapter 3 could exert its influence automatically.  
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4.2. Pilot 1  
 
Participants: 21 students from the University of Cambridge participated in the study.  
 
 4.2.1. Materials 
 
To allow close comparisons between automatic measures of implicit learning and the false 
memory paradigm discussed in Chapter 3, the training materials for this experiment were 
identical to those used in Experiment 2a. The test items included all the phrases from 
Experiment 2a (containing the nouns which did appear at some point during the training) plus 
16  new  ‘filler  phrases’.  The  ‘filler  phrases’  contained  novel  verbs  with  new  nouns,  which  had  
not appeared in training. Just like the test phrases, the fillers were composed either 
grammatically, or ungrammatically: that is, the novel verb was either followed by the same 
abstract/concrete noun type as it had appeared with in the training (grammatical filler), or by 
the other noun type (ungrammatical filler). There were four versions of the experiment, first 
the nouns were rotated between the grammatical and ungrammatical ones, and then the 
nonwords were rotated in relation to the increase/decrease distinction as well as the 
abstract/concrete. 
 
 4.2.2. Procedure 
 
Training followed the same procedure as Experiment 2a. Test phrases were presented one 
word at a time (e.g. powter-importance, mouten-nitrogen). Primes (verbs) were presented for 
250ms with no interval before the target, following the suggestion that at this brief stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA) priming effects are automatic and not affected by conscious 
expectancies, i.e. controlled processing (Neely, 1977). Participants were told they would see 
two words, one appearing after the other. Their task was to indicate whether they had seen the 
second word in each pair in Part 1 of the experiment (the training). By making this decision, 
as opposed to whether they had seen the two words together, the measure of learning 
(response times to correct and incorrect new pairings) is not related to the potentially explicit 
knowledge of the system. Such knowledge is neither part of the task nor beneficial for it, in 
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the  spirit  of  Tzelgov’s  (1997) argumentation. Participants were asked to respond as quickly 
and as accurately as possible using a Cedrus response pad. The stimuli were displayed on a 
computer screen using SuperLab 4.0©. Finally, the same post-experiment test and 
questionnaire was administered as in Experiment 2a. It was predicted that, if semantic 
knowledge gained in implicit learning tasks did indeed exert its influence automatically, the 
following should be observed: 
1) Shorter RTs for grammatical than ungrammatical stimuli, for both test and filler 
items; 
2) Higher endorsement rates for grammatical than ungrammatical stimuli, for both test 
and filler items (replicating the off-line measures from the experiments reported in 
Chapter 3).  
 
4.2.3. Results 
 
In the post-experiment questionnaire, 9 out of 21 participants expressed potentially relevant 
explicit   knowledge   and  were   classified   as   the   ‘aware’  participants.  The   remaining  12  were  
classified   as   ‘unaware’.   An   ANOVA   was   performed   on   mean   reaction   times   in   the   ‘new  
grammatical’   (NG)   and   ‘new  ungrammatical’   (NU)   conditions   in  which  Condition   (NG  or  
NU) was a within-subjects factor and participant group a between-subjects factor. An 
analogous analysis was performed on reaction times for the two conditions for the new filler 
items. The same type of analysis was performed on the endorsement rates in the NG and NU, 
and the endorsement rates in the grammatical and ungrammatical fillers. None of the 
predictions about the automaticity of unconscious semantic knowledge gave rise to 
significant effects:  
1) For   the   aware   participants’   there   were   no   significant   differences   in   reaction   times  
between  the  NG  and  NU  test  items:  F(1,5)  <  1.0,  nor  between  the  ‘grammatical’  and  
‘ungrammatical’  new  filler  items:  F(1,5)  =  2.80,  p  =  0.15,  η2= 0.36. A similar pattern 
of results, with no significant differences in reaction times, was shown for the 
‘unaware’   participants.   An  ANOVA  on  NG   and  NU   revealed   F(1,8)   <   1.0,   and   on  
filler  items  also  F(1,5)  <  1.0.  The  ‘unaware’  group’s  mean  reaction times are depicted 
in Fig. 4.1a. 
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2) The endorsement rates, just like in the experiments in Chapter 3, were corrected for 
small number of responses, with the correction calculated as (number of correct 
responses + 0.5)/(total number of responses +1) (Dienes, 2012). Surprisingly, in this 
paradigm, the pattern of results which was rather stable in the Chapter 3 experiments 
did   not   emerge.   The   ‘aware’   group   did   not   endorse  more   NG   than  NU   test   items:  
F(1,5)   =   2.33,   p   =   0.19,   η2 = 0.318, nor did they endorse more grammatical than 
ungrammatical  filler  items:  F(1,5)  =  4.65,  p=0.08,  η2 = 0.48. The unaware group also 
showed no significance differences (F(1,8) < 1.0) in these two tests. The unaware 
group’s  endorsement  rates  in  all  conditions  are  depicted  in  Fig.  4.1b. 
 
  
Figure 4.1 Unaware  participants’  a)  mean  reaction  times,  b)  mean  endorsement  rates  per  condition.  
Note: FG = Grammatical Filler item, FU = Ungrammatical Filler item. 
  
4.2.4. Discussion 
 
Contrary   to   the   initial   predictions,   participants’   reaction   times in the grammatical and 
ungrammatical conditions did not reveal evidence for semantic implicit knowledge, 
suggesting that it may not exert its influence automatically. A particularly surprising result 
emerged in the endorsement rates for the grammatical and ungrammatical conditions, 
showing no difference between them. This is in stark contrast to Experiment 2a in Chapter 3, 
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where a significant effect emerged while the same test stimuli were used. What could be 
responsible for the discrepancy between these two experiments? 
One possible explanation is that in the current pilot study participants may have been 
ignoring the primes. The task only pertains to the noun. It is possible to go through the test 
phase without even reading the primes. 
An alternative explanation for the possible loss of the learning effect on endorsement 
could be due to this version being not faithful enough to Experiment 2a. Perhaps the inclusion 
of the 16 new filler words had a detrimental effect. Or perhaps the primes were presented too 
briefly   to   activate   the   relevant   information.   After   all,   Neely’s   (1977)   demonstration   of  
automaticity at a 250 ms SOA was for semantic priming from highly familiar words. Before 
drawing final conclusions, it is therefore worth analysing another pilot study, which is 
equivalent to this one in all aspects apart from the presence of the filler test items and the use 
of a longer prime exposure. 
 
 
4.3. Pilot 2  
 
Participants: 19 students from the University of Cambridge participated in the experiment. 
 
 4.3.1. Materials 
 
Materials used in this study were identical to the Pilot 1 study above, with the exception of 
the exclusion of the filler items in the test. 
 
 4.3.2. Procedure 
 
The study followed the same procedure as Pilot 1, but with primes presented for 750ms. 
Again, if implicitly learned semantic knowledge exerted its influence automatically, the 
unaware  participants’  reaction  times  to  endorse  the  nouns  in  the  NU  trials  should  be  slower  
than the reaction times for the nouns in the NG trials. It was also predicted that the same 
false-memory pattern of endorsement would occur as in Experiment 2a and the other 
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experiments reported in Chapter 3, namely higher endorsement rates for the NG than the NU 
trials. Note that in this case, all nouns did appear in the test, so in principle all should be 
endorsed. NG and NU still refer to the new verb-noun mappings, where the noun follows a 
verb either in agreement with or in violation of its semantic preference pattern. 
 
 4.3.3. Results 
 
In the final questionnaire 3 out of 19 participants made observations about certain words 
being  appropriate  for  abstract/concrete  nouns  and  were  classified  as  the  ‘aware’  participants.  
The   remaining   16   remained   ‘unaware’   of   the   regularity;;  many   of   them   expressed   surprise  
when informed about it.  
There were too few aware people to carry out a separate analysis on them. However, 
the unaware group was the crucial one for the investigation of implicit learning. In this 
experiment, just like in Pilot 1, neither an ANOVA on reaction times in NG and NU (F(1,12) 
<  1.0),  nor  even  on  endorsement   rates   in  NG  and  NU  (F(1,12)  =  1.87,  p  =  0.2,  η2 = 0.14)) 
revealed   a   significant   difference.   Figure   4.2   depicts   the   unaware   participants’   a)   reaction  
times, and b) endorsement rates.  
Again, it appears that under the current speeded response conditions with a sequential 
presentation of verb-noun phrases, the false-memory effect from Chapter 3 disappears.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Unaware  participants’  a)  endorsement  reaction  times,  b)  endorsement  rates. 
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 4.3.4. Discussion 
 
Neither in Pilot 1 nor Pilot 2 did the same false memory effect as in the Chapter 3 
experiments emerge. There were also no differences in reaction times of endorsement in the 
NG and NU conditions.  
 A possible explanation for this discrepancy could be the mode of presentation. Seger  
(1998) presents a collection of priming and implicit learning studies demonstrating that the 
effects disappear with sequential presentation of stimuli, e.g. Goshen-Gottstein and 
Moscovitch (1995). She suggests that spatial and temporal contiguity plays a significant role 
in implicit learning. This in turn has to do with such factors as the principle of congruity 
(Schulman, 1974), transfer-appropriate processing or the encoding of specificity principle. 
Before considering those, however, it is worth analysing one additional factor. 
A different explanation for the apparent discrepancy between these results and those 
reported in Chapter 3 could be insufficient depth of processing of the prime and target words. 
According to the Craik & Lockhart (1972; Craik and Tulving 1975), processing based on 
perceptual features, such as orthography or phonemes, leads to a fragile memory trace prone 
to rapid decay. Deeper processing, such as semantic processing, results in a more durable 
memory  trace.  Although  both  Chapter  3’s  experiments  and  the  current  experiments  involved  
the same training, shallower processing of test phrases in the current pilot studies may have 
hindered the effect. It is true that neither in the Chapter 3 experiments nor the ones here did 
the test task require deep semantic processing. Crucially, however, in Chapter 3 the test 
question  was:  “did  you  see  these  words  next  to  each  other?”  while  here  it  was  “did  you  see  
the   second   word   in   part   1?”   Separate   presentation   of   the words not only makes any 
processing of the prime (verb) unnecessary, but may also hinder processing the two words as 
a single unit. It is the relationship between the two words that is of key importance in the 
experiment, therefore perhaps it would be optimal to process both at the same, deep semantic 
level. Furthermore, in the current study there is also time pressure for the response. Semantic 
features may take a different time course of activation (Yee et al., 2011), and it is not 
inconceivable for speed of response to interfere with the otherwise unhindered semantic 
processing taking place in standard, natural, unspeeded conditions, such as those in the 
Chapter 3 experiments.  
 In an attempt to increase the depth of processing of the otherwise meaningless verbs, 
it might be beneficial to introduce a semantic task to perform on them. In what follows, a task 
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to indicate abstract/concrete is therefore introduced on the nouns, and an increase/decrease 
decision relating to the verbs. This does not undermine implicit, automatic processing, since, 
as mentioned above, participants can be aware of what they are processing, so long as they do 
not monitor it while performing the task. 
 A final modification to the procedure is the introduction of a continuous measure of 
the learning process so that participants do not even know when the test begins. 
 
 
 4.4. Experiment 7 
 
 
Participants: 40 students of the University of Cambridge participated in the experiment. 17 
were native speakers of English, other languages included: Chinese (n=6), Dutch (n=3), 
French (n=1), German (n= 4), Hindi (n=2), Lithuanian (n=1), Korean (n=2), Portuguese 
(n=1), Punjabi (n=2). 
 
4.4.1. Materials 
 
Materials were similar to those in Experiment 2a and 2b. The word fonell was changed to 
conell to avoid the similarity with funnel, which could have suggested an action involving 
some tangible substance. Long sentences were shortened in order to facilitate their 
accessibility in the word-by-word presentation procedure. Some sentences from Experiment 
2a, especially those involving concrete nouns, were changed to new ones in order to allow the 
use of the definite article, which in this experiment appeared before all target nouns (to 
eliminate syntactic cues). All training and test items are included in Appendix E.  
 
4.4.2. Procedure 
 
The experiment was composed of two parts following an identical procedure. The training 
part contained 60 well-formed   sentences,   called   ‘grammatical’   for   the   current   purposes,  
where two verbs were always followed by abstract nouns, and the other two by concrete 
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nouns. The testing part contained 76 sentences, in which 32 were critical, while the remainder 
simply provided further exposure to positive evidence. Some of the sentences from the 
training were repeated in the test in order to provide further exposure. They intervened 
between  the  critical,  ‘new  grammatical’(NG)  and  ‘new  ungrammatical’  (NU)  test  sentences.  
There   were   8   critical   sentences   for   each   word,   half   of   them   presenting   ‘grammatical’  
contexts,  the  other  half  ‘ungrammatical’  ones. 
Participants did not know that there were two separate stages in the experiment, 
although they did have a short break in between. The experimental task was explained in 
steps. First, it was demonstrated that the sentences were going to appear word by word. Then, 
the following instruction was presented: 
 
In each sentence one of the verbs will be a novel word written in CAPITALS. For 
each sentence your task is to decide whether this novel word indicates roughly 
'becoming less of' (-) or 'becoming more of' (+) in that sentence.  
 
Participants were asked to use two edge buttons on a Cedrus© response-pad to indicate their 
decisions and instructed to do so as quickly but as accurately as possible. The experiment was 
implemented in SuperLab Pro 4.0.  
Participants were then informed that the sentences were going to appear in a slightly 
scrambled word order, with the verb always appearing at the beginning. However, the 
decision about whether it meant that something was increasing or decreasing was only 
required at the end of the sentence. The purpose of that decision was to induce deeper 
processing of the novel verb. There was no information provided about which words meant 
‘increase’  and  which  ‘decrease’,  nor  whether  the  meanings  were  going  to be stable. This was 
to assure that participants read the sentences carefully (especially the crucial nouns). 
Participants were then informed that there was also going to be a task for them to 
perform during the sentence reading. One word was going to be presented in red and they 
were asked to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether that word denoted 
something abstract or concrete. They were given no more than 3 seconds to perform that 
decision, in order to minimise any strategic thinking. If they made an error the target did not 
disappear and they had to correct their response. This measurement was taken on the noun, as 
it was the point at which violations of the system took place (a novel verb being matched 
with the wrong type of abstract/concrete noun). This is the earliest point at which it is 
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possible to measure a potential effect of semantic expectations deriving from the novel verb. 
The abstract/concrete decision was followed by a recall prompt, where participants had to 
repeat to the microphone the phrase composed of the initial verb and the noun presented in 
red.  Below,   Figure   4.3   exemplifies   the   procedure   on   a   ‘grammatical’   and   ‘ungrammatical’  
sentence, with the required tasks explained underneath each stage. 
Note that in Experiment 2  in  Chapter  3  the  feature  of  “abstractness/concreteness”  was  
not mentioned or required to perform the task and participants must have activated it as a by-
product in the course of doing the experiment. Here, this feature is explicitly mentioned in the 
instruction. This does not pose a challenge to the proposal that the experiment addresses 
automatic influence of unconscious knowledge. As argued in the Introduction to this chapter, 
the crucial factor is that the process runs without monitoring, by virtue of the target regularity 
not being a part of the task. Participants may be aware of what they are processing. 
Here, it is the relationship between the novel verb and the type of noun which is the 
crucial target, and that is not mentioned upfront. Therefore, although,   in  Schmidt’s   (1993)  
terms,  “noticing”  of  the  relevant  feature  is  aided  by  the  task  instruction,  this  does  not  readily  
reveal  what  needs  to  be  “noticed  at  the  level  of  understanding”,  or  in  Tzelgov’s  (1997)  terms,  
the process can still run without being monitored. Real-time learning in this experiment is 
measured by the time taken to indicate whether a particular noun is abstract or concrete and 
the effect of the preceding novel verb on this response time. Participants are only required to 
focus on the noun in order to perform this decision. In that sense, the task may still be 
classified as automatic. 
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Timeline:  
Grammatical: 
 
VERB 
 
NOUN 
 
RECALL 
POMPT 
 
REST OF 
SENTENCE 
 
INCREASE OR 
DECREASE? 
 
POWTER 
 
 
 
600 ms 
 
the/ esteem 
 
 
 
max 3 sec 
 
____the____ 
 
 
of/peers,/ 
teenagers/think 
smoking/will. 
 
600 ms 
 
+   /   - 
  
Indicate: 
Abstract/ concrete 
 
Say:“powter   the  
esteem” 
 
 
- 
 
Indicate 
what the first 
word meant. 
 
Ungrammatical:  
Figure 4.3. Experimental procedure with example sentences. 
 
 
POWTER 
 
600 ms 
 
the/ hydrogen 
 
max 3 sec 
 
___the___ 
 
as/needed/and 
available,/we/ can. 
 
+  /  - 
  
Indicate: 
Abstract/ concrete 
 
Say:   “powter  
the  hydrogen” 
  
Indicate what 
the first word 
meant. 
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Participants were divided into two groups, which involved rotations of grammatical and 
ungrammatical item between two versions. 
To summarise the predictions: if semantic implicit learning of semantic preference 
patterns of novel verbs takes place automatically in real time during the course of processing 
the sentence, a slow-down of reaction times would be observed on the decision whether a 
noun is abstract or concrete when the pattern is violated. 
A post-experiment questionnaire was carried out at the end, which was identical to 
that in Experiment 2a and other experiments, and which served as a means to elicit potential 
explicit knowledge.  
 
4.4.3. Results 
 
Out of 40 participants, 13 revealed at least fragmentary explicit knowledge in the post-
experiment   debriefing,   and   were   classified   as   the   ‘aware’   group.   The   remaining   27  
participants  were  classified  as  the  ‘unaware’  group.  Two  of  this   latter  group  were  excluded 
from the analysis due to outlying performance (see below).   
 
Unaware participants 
Data from entire trials on which an error was made on the first decision (abstract/concrete) 
were removed. This was because participants were likely to have been distracted on the 
subsequent increase/decrease decision by just having had to correct themselves. Correct 
response times that were more than 2.5 standard deviations above the mean for the NG and 
NU conditions combined were classed as outliers. They were replaced with the next highest 
value   (Winsorised).  Each  participant’s  mean   response   time  over   the   critical   trials  was   then  
plotted against their learning effect (reaction time difference between ungrammatical and 
grammatical trials) on a scatter plot in order to identify potential outlying participants. The 
plot is presented in Figure 4.5. It becomes clear that two people (points marked in red) are 
considerably removed from the homogenous cluster of other participants. Their mean 
reaction times are also slower than  the  others’  by  more  than  2  standard  deviations.  These  two  
participants’  data  were  removed  from  the  analysis  as  it  was  assumed  that  they  used  a  different  
strategy while performing the task. Notably, reaction times longer than 3000ms are not likely 
to reflect automatic performance.   
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Figure 4.5. Relation between the mean reaction time and the learning effect (UG-G RT) 
among unaware participants, with outliers in red.  
 
 
The results for the remaining participants are summarised in Table 4.1 below. An ANOVA 
was performed on the reaction times in two conditions (NG and NU), with the test version as 
a between-subjects   factor.  The  ‘unaware’  group  did  not  show  any  effects  of  grammaticality 
on the abstract/concrete decision on the noun, i.e. at the point of violation in the NU 
condition, F(1,20) < 1, thereby contradicting the prediction that the nonword would establish 
an expectancy for a noun of a certain semantic class. However, somewhat surprisingly, the 
same participants showed a significant learning effect on the increase/decrease decision that 
was made at the end of the sentences, F(1,20) = 5.11, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.20. This finding 
suggests that semantic implicit learning exerts its influence on post-processing of the 
nonword-noun pair.  
 The mean error rate on the abstract/concrete decision for the NG items was 8.7%, SE 
= 0.25, while for the NU items it was 7.7%, SE = 0.23. There was no significant difference 
between these rates. The mean error rate for the increase/decrease decision in the NG items 
was 25.2, SE = 0.23, and the NU items 23.4, SE = 0.26 (note that these are the error rates 
over the trials that remain after exclusion of trials where an error was made on first decision). 
Again, there was no significant difference between the error rates in these two conditions. 
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Such high error rates may have resulted from the fact that participants were not given any 
feedback on their answers, in order not to break the flow of the experiment. They also had no 
prior  knowledge  about  which  words  meant  ‘increase’  and  which  ‘decrease’. 
 
Aware participants 
The   ‘aware’   participants’   data   is   also   presented   in  Table   4.1.  An  ANOVA  on   this   group’s  
data did not reveal any significant differences in their reaction times between the two 
conditions, neither on the abstract/concrete decision F(1,9) < 1, nor on the second, 
increase/decrease decision F(1,9) = 1.70, p = 0.23. This lack of significance may possibly be 
due to the smaller size of this group  than  the  ‘unaware’  group.  Alternatively,  taking  time  to  
work out the rule may have had a detrimental effect on performance. 
 The mean error rate on the abstract/concrete decision for the NG items was 6.7%, SE 
= 0.39 and the NU items 7.8%, SE = 0.37, with no significant difference between these rates. 
The mean error rate for the increase/decrease decision for the NG items was 22.5, SE = 0.53, 
and the NU items 23.9, SE = 0.56. Again, there was no significant difference between the 
error rates in these two conditions. 
 
 
Native vs non-native speakers 
A post hoc analysis was carried out to check for potential differences in performance between 
the native English speaking participants and the non-native ones. An ANOVA revealed no 
interaction between grammaticality and native/non-native speaker status, F < 1.0. For the 
native speakers the mean reaction times in the grammatical and ungrammatical conditions 
were 1394 ms (SE = 254) and 1704 ms (SE = 324) respectively, and for the non-natives 1283 
ms (SE = 231) and 1558 ms (SE = 303) respectively.
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 Table 4.1. Results from Experiment 7. Mean reaction time (RT) in ms and standard error of the mean (SE) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  *p <0.05 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
Grammatical 
    
Ungrammatical 
 
 
 
n  
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error   
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error 
 
Effect size, η2 
 
Unaware 
 
25 
 
Abs/Con 
 
977 
 
47 
 
8.7   
 
996 
 
49 
 
7.7 
 
0.02 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
1101 
 
81 
 
25.2 
   
1332 
 
151 
 
23.4 
 
0.20* 
 
Aware 
 
13 
 
Abs/Con 
 
1097 
 
56 
 
6.7 
   
1093 
 
70 
 
7.8 
 
0.00 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
1478 
 
204 
 
22.5 
   
1611 
 
255 
 
23.9 
 
0.16 
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4.5. Discussion 
 
Experiment 7 provides evidence for semantic implicit learning, detected through its influence 
on  people’s  automatic  behaviour.  The  fact that learning effects are apparent on the decisions 
involving  purely  the  indication  of  whether  a  particular  verb  meant  to  “increase”  or  “decrease”  
is particularly compelling, if unexpected, as that meaning remained constant for each verb 
throughout the procedure (which, however, participants did not know upfront). It is surprising 
that the effect did not occur immediately at the point of rule violation (the appearance of 
noun), but with a delay. Before drawing conclusions it is important to ensure that the effect 
was not influenced by other words in the sentences or did not arise due to other factors than 
simply the relationship between verbs and noun-types. 
 Before proceeding to a more in-depth discussion of this finding another concern needs 
to be addressed. The effect in the experiment might potentially have been confounded by 
some other, unpredictable interaction between the non-words and other words in the 
sentences. It is therefore informative and useful to examine whether the same effect could be 
replicated without the sentence contexts, but simply in a situation where participants respond 
to phrases, such as gouble the significance or mouten the vitamins, giving the same two 
decisions as in the present experiment. The following study reports such an investigation and 
documents gradual methodological improvement towards ensuring that we are measuring true 
automaticity,  where  this  is  defined  as  an  unmonitored  process  in  which  people’s  behaviour  is  
unintentionally influenced, in real time, by factors unrelated to the task at hand.  
 
 
4.6. Pilot 3 - development  of  the  “double  decision  priming”  procedure   
 
This experiment was carried out as a preparation for an EEG study (reported in chapter 5) 
and aimed at establishing an optimal methodology for testing semantic implicit learning, 
which would also be compatible with EEG. For this reason, the procedure changed 
incrementally in stages. 
 
Participants: 44 students of the University of Cambridge participated in the experiment. 25 
of them were native speakers of  English.  The   remaining   group’s  mother   tongues   included:  
 Chapter 4 Semantic implicit learning and automaticity 
 
136 
 
 
Afrikaans (1), Bulgarian (1), Cantonese (2), Czech (1), Danish (2), Dutch (1), German (3), 
Hindi (1), Macedonian (1), Malaysian (2), Polish (2), Russian (2).  
   
4.6.1. Materials 
 
The initial twelve participants were given version 1 of the experiment, which comprised the 
same verb-noun phrases which were used in Experiment 7 above, but stripped of sentential 
contexts. However, due to the exploratory nature of the studies presented here, it was deemed 
beneficial to test another set of nouns as well. The initial stimuli contained nouns which were 
highly similar to each other, often almost synonymous. Therefore it was of significant interest 
also to test a more heterogeneous noun-set (version 2). This offered an insight into the scope 
of the generalisation processes taking place in semantic implicit learning. The same 
motivation underpinned experiment 4 in Chapter 3. The stimuli used in version 2 are 
presented in Appendix F.  
In both versions, there were two test lists. Everyone was tested on both lists, one 
immediately after the other with order counterbalanced. The nouns used to form 
ungrammatical items in list 1 were used in grammatical ones in list 2 and vice versa. 
 
 
4.6.2. Procedure  
 
Version 1a 
The procedure was very similar to Experiment 7 with the difference that instead of being 
shown complete sentence stimuli, participants responded to phrases appearing word by word. 
In Experiment 7 sentence contexts helped participants determine whether a given non-word 
related to increasing or decreasing. This time, since the phrases were stripped of all 
surrounding words, participants were told in the instructions which novel verb indicated 
increasing and which decreasing. 
The sequence of tasks was: 1) observe the novel verb on the screen, 2) on the 
subsequent appearance of the noun indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether 
it is abstract or concrete, no later than in 3 seconds, 3) on  the  “- /  +”  prompt  indicate  whether  
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the   initial  novel  verb  was   the  one  meaning   to  “increase”  or   to   “decrease.  Figure  4.6  below  
summarises the procedure. 
 
Timeline:  
Grammatical: 
 
VERB 
 
NOUN 
 
INCREASE OR 
DECREASE? 
 
POWTER 
 
 
 
600 ms 
 
the/ esteem 
 
 
 
max 3 sec 
 
+   /   - 
  
Indicate: 
Abstract/ concrete 
 
Indicate 
what the first 
word meant. 
 
Figure 4.6.  Procedure  in  Pilot  3:  “Double  Decision  Priming”. 
 
 
Version 1b 
After the initial 11 participants, an element of recall was added to the procedure to encourage 
deeper processing and possibly strengthen the effect. Every two stimuli, participants received 
prompts which required them to say into a microphone one of the phrases they have just seen. 
The prompt revealed either the first part of the phrase, for  example  “MOUTEN  the  _______”,  
or   the   second  part:   “_______      the   prestige”,   and   participants  were   asked   to   pronounce   the  
complete phrase.  
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Version 2 
Version 2 contained a new set of nouns. The motivation for this was to test whether the 
observed online effect relies on abstraction to rule or, rather, largely depends on the similarity 
of the test items to the training items. Because the second word set comprised much more 
heterogenous words than version 1, the similarity account predicted the effect might get 
weaker (just as it did in Experiment 4 compared to Experiment 3). In this version, all 
participants received recall prompts every 2 items. For the stimulus material see: Appendix F. 
 
Awareness measure 
Since the procedure was highly automatised, awareness was only determined in a post-
experimental debriefing. Unlike in Experiment 7, participants were not shown any example 
sentences, but simply asked whether they noticed any pattern in the stimuli. The experimenter 
probed for any related knowledge, finally revealing the system and asking whether they 
became aware of it at any point. In cases where participants were not sure whether they did or 
not, the crucial question was whether they noticed that in the second half of the experiment 
phrases appeared which violated the pattern. If they did not notice this then they were 
classified  as  “unaware”,  as   that   indicates   that,  whatever  knowledge   they  constructed during 
the task, they did not use it strategically.   
 
 
 4.6.3. Results 
 
Version 1a 
Among the 11 participants who performed version 1a, none reported awareness of the 
regularity in the final debriefing. The overall ANOVA with native/non-native as a between-
subjects factor did not reveal significant effects, neither on the first nor second decision. On 
the latter, F(1,9) = 2.30, p = 0.16, η2 = 0.20. The mean learning effect (difference between 
NU and NG) was 47 ms. At this stage it was hypothesised that adding recall prompts every 
two stimuli might increase this effect, and therefore provide better conditions for the 
development and testing of implicit learning. 
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Version 1b 
The following 6 people performed the experiment using the same word set with added recall 
every two stimuli. One of them became aware of the regularity, and was excluded from the 
current analysis. The group was too small to carry out a meaningful analysis. An initial check 
revealed that the introduction of recall slowed down the overall mean reaction times but at 
the same time considerably improved the learning effect. The mean difference between 
conditions among these 5 people was 94 ms. 
 
Version 1a & b 
A combined analysis of versions 1a and b revealed a close to significant learning effect on the 
second, increase/decrease decision with larger effect size than version 1a: F(1,13) = 4.64, p = 
0.051, η2 = 0.26.  
 
Version 2 
24 participants took part in this version, 15 of whom were native English speakers. 7 reported 
at least fragmentary awareness of the regularity and were classified as aware. Among the 
remaining 17 unaware participants, the learning effect on the second decision did not reach 
significance, with F(1,15) = 1.50, p = 0.24, η2 = 0.09, and there was no interaction between 
grammaticality and the native/non-native factor. The effect size, albeit small, is comparable 
with Experiment 3 in Chapter 3, which also tested for broad generalisations. The learning 
effect in that experiment was significant, but the sample was also much larger, as it 
comprised 70 people, all of whom were English native speakers. It is possible therefore that 
this test version would also lead to significant results given a larger sample of people. This 
notion is corroborated with the overall analysis of the two versions. 
 
Overall analysis 
An overall analysis on the 33 unaware participants revealed a significant effect on the second 
decision F(1,30) = 6.79, p <0.05, η2 = 0.19. As in Experiment 5, there was no difference 
between conditions on the first decision: F(1,30) < 1. The overall results are summarised in 
Table 4.2 below.  
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Post-hoc native vs. non-native analysis 
Although the overall analysis revealed no interactions between grammaticality and 
native/non-native speaker status on either decision, a post hoc analysis conducted separately 
for the two groups revealed that the effect on the increase/decrease decision was only 
significant among the native speakers: natives, F(1,20) = 5.32, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.21, non-
natives, F(1,10) = 2.32, p = 0.16, η2 = 0.19. It is difficult to draw conclusions at this stage, 
because the groups were of different sizes (21 vs. 11). An indication for the future is to keep 
the numbers balanced as nativeness may be a meaningful factor in semantic implicit learning 
of verb usage in context. 
 
Table 4.2. Mean reaction times, ms (standard error in parenthesis) 
 
        * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 4.3. Mean reaction times (standard error in parenthesis) byspeaker type (native/non-native). 
 
 
 
   
 
Grammatical   
 
Ungrammatical  
 
 
 
n  
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean    
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean  
 
Effect size,  η2 
 
Overall 
  
 
32 
 
Abs/Con 
 
1068 
 
57    
 
1049 
 
57  
 
0.02 
Inc/Dec 558 47    598 54  0.19* 
 
 
Table 4.3. Mean reaction times (standard error in parenthesis) byspeaker type (native/non-native). 
 
   
 
Grammatical   
 
Ungrammatical  
    
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
    
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
  
Effect size,  
η2 
 
Native 
 
21 
 
Abs/Con 
 
1103 
 
70    
 
1087 
 
     72  
 
0.02 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
545 
 
54  
   
586 
 
63  
 
0.21* 
 
Non-
native 
 
11 
 
Abs/Con 
 
1032 
 
85  
   
1011 
 
78  
 
0.03 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
571 
 
80  
   
610 
 
89  
 
0.19 
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4.6.4. Discussion  
 
Pilot  3  (“double  decision  priming”)  replicates  the  findings  from  Experiment  7  and  provides  
further evidence for semantic implicit   learning,   detected   through   its   influence   on   people’s  
automatic behaviour. The fact that learning effects are apparent on the decisions involving 
purely   the   indication   of   whether   a   particular   verb   meant   to   “increase”   or   “decrease”   is  
particularly compelling, as that meaning remained constant for each verb throughout the 
procedure. 
One objection which may be raised about both Experiment 7 and pilot 3 is the fact 
that people were explicitly provided with the critical semantic dimension – namely that nouns 
are to be distinguished with regards to whether they are abstract or concrete. This could be 
understood as limiting the extent of semantic learning taking place during the current 
procedure to mere sensitivity to the co-occurrences of a form (novel verb) and the following 
explicit concept (abstract/concrete). As mentioned above, the defence of this methodology is 
that the learning depends on the relationship between the novel verb and the following noun 
type, which is not mentioned upfront, and of which, as the post-experiment debriefing 
suggests, most people remained unaware. The recognition of this relationship is not part of 
the task at hand, and with the stimuli presented briefly and with the time pressure for 
response it is not surprising that people do not easily become aware of the regularity. 
Still, the issue of interest especially to language pedagogues (particularly the 
advocates of the communicative approaches to teaching) is whether this sensitivity to 
semantic context only develops when the critical distinction is provided upfront or whether it 
can also be unconsciously induced. The series of false memory experiments in Chapter 3 
suggests that indeed involuntary and unconscious activation of the key semantic distinctions 
can occur and that positive evidence from sentential contexts is enough to trigger it. Could 
that finding be corroborated using an automaticity-based procedure? It is also of interest to 
measure whether non-native speakers perform similarly to native speakers on such a task. 
Native speakers are expected to activate their concepts automatically and the activation of the 
key semantic distinctions is likely to occur. Whether it also occurs in non-native speakers is 
of particular pedagogical interest. The following experiment addresses these questions.  
In terms of the automatic influence of implicit semantic knowledge on online 
processing, a further objection can be raised, namely that the target knowledge is not of 
negligible importance to the task. Should participants spontaneously decipher which verbs 
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collocated with which type of nouns, it would considerably improve their performance on the 
test. However,   that   would   only   help   them   make   abstract/concrete   decisions.   It   doesn’t  
undermine the findings though, as the slow-down in reaction time occurred on the 
increase/decrease decision. The following experiment modifies this procedure so that the 
target knowledge is irrelevant to the both components of the task.  
 
    
4.7. Experiment 8 
 
Participants: 49 students of the University of Cambridge participated in the experiment. 
Although none reported full awareness of the regularity, 3 of them made potentially helpful 
observations and were excluded from the subsequent analysis, which will focus on the 
unaware group. A further 3 participants were excluded due to problems with the task. Of the 
remaining group of 43 participants, 22 were native speakers of English. The other native 
languages included: Cypriot Greek (1), Czech (1), Urdu (1), German (3), Gujarati (1), Italian 
(1), Mandarin (1), Mongolian (1), Polish (6), Punjabi (1), Russian (2), Spanish (1), Thai (1).    
 
  4.7.1. Materials 
 
Materials were identical to the second half of the double decision pilot above, Pilot 3 version 
2 (Appendix F).   
 
4.7.2. Procedure 
 
The experiment followed a highly similar procedure to the double decision Pilot 3 above with 
the only difference being the type of decision required on the noun. While in Pilot 3 the first 
response participants were asked give was to indicate whether   the   noun   was   ‘abstract’   or  
‘concrete’,   here   they   were   asked   about   the   connotation   they   felt   the   noun   had,   either  
‘positive’,   ‘neutral’,   or   ‘negative’.   Examples   of   positive   words   were   given   such   as  
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‘chocolate’,  ‘holidays’,  and  of  negative  such  as  ‘horror’.  Participants  were  informed  that  the  
choices were subjective.  
The training, again, contained 60 well-formed phrases, where two verbs were always 
followed by abstract nouns, and the other two by concrete nouns. The testing part contained 
76 phrases, in which 32 were critical, while the remainder provided further exposure to 
positive  evidence.  Half  of   the  critical  phrases  were   ‘new  grammatical’   (NG)  and  half  were  
‘new  ungrammatical’  (NU),  the  latter  being  those  in  which  the  verb  was  paired  with  a  noun  
of the wrong abstract/concrete type. Two versions were created with the collocates rotated 
around versions such that nouns that were grammatical on one version were ungrammatical 
on the other, and vice versa. 
Again, participants did not know that there were two separate stages in the 
experiment, although they did have a short break in between. Responses were collected using 
Cedrus© response-pad and the experiment was programmed in SuperLab Pro 4.0.  
 
 
4.7.3. Results 
 
Outlying response times were identified and treated as in previous experiments. The data 
from the 43 unaware participants was first screened for outlying participants, both among the 
native and the non-native English speakers. Scatter plots of the relation between the mean 
reaction time and the learning effect (the difference between RTs for grammatical and 
ungrammatical trials) in these two groups is presented in Figure 4.7 below. People whose 
performance clearly deviates from the majority are marked in red. These participants (two 
from the native group) were removed from the subsequent analysis.  
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Figure 4.7. Relation between the mean reaction time and the learning effect (UG-G RT) among 
unaware participants, with outliers in red, for a) English native b) non-native English speakers. 
 
 
The overall results are summarised in Table 4.4 below. An ANOVA was performed on the 
reaction  times  in  two  conditions  (NG  and  NU),  with  list  and  ‘native/non-native’  as  between-
subjects factors. Similarly to the previous studies, there was no effect on the first decision 
performed on the noun, F(1,37) < 1, and no interaction between grammaticality and the 
native/non-native group membership, F(1,37) < 1. An analysis of the second decision results 
revealed no overall effect F(1,37) < 1, but a significant interaction between grammaticality 
and the native/non-native factor F(1,37) = 37.0, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.19. The learning effect was 
only present among the native speaker group F(1,18) = 9.13, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.34. The results 
of each group are presented in Table 4.5.  
 Errors were only counted for the second decision. The overall mean error rate in the 
NG condition was 6.1%, while in the NU condition it was 6.7%. There was no significant 
difference between the error rates in these two conditions. Error data for the native and non-
native group are presented in Table 4.5. There were no significant differences between 
conditions within the groups.   
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Table 4.4.  Mean reaction times (standard error in parenthesis). 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5. Mean reaction times (standard error in parenthesis) by native/non-native. 
               
 
   
 
 
Grammatical 
    
Ungrammatical 
 
 
 
n  
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error   
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error 
 
Effect size,  η2 
 
Overall    
 
 
41 
 
Connotation 
 
1267 
 
40 
 
-   
 
1267 
 
38 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
616 
 
45 
 
6.1 
   
627 
 
40 
 
6.7 
 
0.01 
   
 
 
Grammatical 
    
Ungrammatical 
 
 
 
n  
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error   
 
Mean RT 
 
SE of mean 
 
% Error 
 
Effect size,  η2 
 
Native 
 
20 
 
Connotation 
 
1147 
 
53 
 
-   
 
1140 
 
     54 
 
- 
 
0.005 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
556 
 
55 
 
7.2 
   
612 
 
55 
 
5.9 
 
0.34** 
 
Non-native 
 
21 
 
Connotation 
 
1387 
 
59 
 
- 
   
1393 
 
53 
 
- 
 
0.002 
 
Inc/Dec 
 
690 
 
67 
 
5.1 
   
655 
 
59 
 
7.4 
 
0.09 
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4.7.4. Discussion 
 
Experiment 8 provided the strongest evidence, among the studies reported in this chapter, for 
automatic influence exerted by implicit knowledge of semantic preferences on online 
processing.  Since   the  participants’   task  was   to   indicate  1)  whether   the  noun  had a positive, 
neutral or negative connotation and 2) whether the verb indicated increasing or decreasing, 
whilst the learning was measured on reaction times to word pairs that were either matched or 
mismatched along the abstract/concrete distinction, the procedure can be said to tap 
automatic processing. Explicit knowledge of the relationship between verbs and abstract or 
concrete  nouns  is  irrelevant  to  the  task  and  would  not  facilitate  participants’  performance.   
 The results also revealed an interesting difference between native and non-native 
speakers’   performance.   The   learning   effect   only   reached   significance   among   the   native  
group. This suggests that only they could automatically activate the relevant features of the 
noun, which further led to implicit learning. For the non-native group, this activation may 
need to be stimulated explicitly, as in Pilot 3 (by making the relevant abstract/concrete 
decision), though this still needs to be confirmed.  Pilot 3 involved too small a sample of non-
natives to determine this with confidence. Further research on the implicit online activation of 
semantic knowledge among the non-native speakers is of importance for language pedagogy.   
 
 
 4.7.5. Overall discussion 
 
Overall, the experiments reported in this chapter point to the conclusion that implicit 
semantic knowledge does exert its influence automatically during online language 
processing. This finding confirms that the phenomenon is present in the natural use of 
language. The effect only emerged experimentally when participants were encouraged to 
process the stimuli deeply for meaning (Experiment 7, Pilot 3, Experiment 8), while the 
appearance of the visual forms and a recall task did not stimulate it. It seems therefore that in 
experimental   conditions   where   there   is   time   pressure   on   the   response,   the   participants’  
attention and depth of processing have to be appropriately stimulated by the task. By 
comparison, in the experiments in Chapter 3, learning effects emerged after participants 
simply read sentences for meaning. It appears therefore that extra measures to encourage 
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deeper processing are not necessary outside the lab, and a natural linguistic context is enough 
to stimulate implicit learning. Together, these observations point to the conclusion that the 
phenomenon of semantic implicit knowledge exerts its influence in the natural use of 
language both online and offline. 
Across the experiments in which the automatic influence of implicit semantic 
knowledge was found, the effect consistently emerged at the second decision 
(increase/decrease), and not at the point where the violation took place (the appearance of a 
right/wrong noun type; first decision). This could be taken as a reflection of the fact that 
different semantic features are activated on different time-courses (Yee et al., 2011). 
Alternatively, the consistently delayed effect could indicate that semantic implicit knowledge 
exerts its influence only in post-processing, making the method of priming with two 
consecutive decisions a useful tool to detect it. Further replication studies with different 
semantic distinctions than the abstract/concrete one would be highly informative.   
The native and non-native groups were only purposely contrasted in the final 
experiment, while in the previous ones the analysis of their potentially different performance 
was post hoc. Considering the marked difference in performance between them on 
Experiment 8, it would be of interest and importance in the field to determine whether this 
finding would be replicated using other semantic distinctions. 
 
 
4.8. Chapter summary  
 
Chapter 4 addressed the issue of whether semantic implicit knowledge exerts its influence in 
language processing online, in real time. In this way it complements the findings from 
Chapter 3 where it was shown that such knowledge can be shown to indirectly shape 
participants’  active  recall  memory  (as  evidenced  in  their  false  memory  patterns). 
Chapter 4 began with a definition and a brief overview of literature on automaticity and its 
operationalisation both in SLA and psychology.  
Pilots 1 and 2 tested automaticity in a priming paradigm, following the same training as in the 
Chapter  3  experiments.  The  test  question  for  the  target  was:  “did you see that word in the first 
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part?”   It   was   concluded   that   this   methodology   did   not   stimulate   sufficient   depth   of  
processing of the prime words to produce an effect.  
Experiment 7 provided participants with a smooth transition between training and test, with 
the same task throughout. Both training and test stimuli were in the form of full sentences, 
presented word by word in a scrambled order such that the verb was always at the beginning. 
Despite the fact that participants indicated their choices of the verb meaning only after the 
whole sentence was presented, that decision revealed a significant slow-down in reaction 
times on the ungrammatical trials. There was no difference on the first decision, whether the 
noun was abstract or concrete, even though that was made at the moment when the violation 
occurred.   
Pilot  3  documents  a  gradual  development  of  what  can  be  called  a  “double  decision  priming”  
procedure, in which participants see phrases on the screen and make decisions regarding each 
word but in the reverse order. The aim was to devise a procedure which would be compatible 
with EEG (electroencephalography), and therefore sequential presentation was required. The 
challenge consisted of the fact that, as mentioned in the discussion following the two first 
pilot studies, sequential presentation is often detrimental to implicit learning. The results from 
the  “double  decision  priming”  replicated  the  pattern  from  Experiment  7,  showing  a  delayed  
effect on the second, increase/decrease decision.  
Experiment 8 provides the most solid evidence for the automatic influence of semantic 
implicit knowledge. Only in this experiment was the task which participants performed 
irrelevant and not beneficial for their learning target. Interestingly, automaticity was only 
revealed among the native speakers and not the non-natives. It is suggested that native 
speakers activate their concepts fully automatically, which allows them to show learning 
effects even in speeded conditions, which non-native speakers do not do. Further research on 
this phenomenon could be very useful from the pedagogical point of view.  
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Chapter 5 
Real-time ERP response to semantic  
implicit learning 
 
*The empirical material presented in this chapter is a result of the collaboration with Dr Nitin 
Williams, University of Reading (now at the University of Cambridge), who designed the new EMD-
based method for ERP signal analysis applied in this study. The ERP data was analysed by Dr Nitin 
Williams, and is also included in his PhD thesis  (N. Williams, 2011). The figures were reproduced 
with permission, and the Results section (marked with *) presents the findings included in Dr Nitin 
Williams’  PhD  thesis  as  well.   
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
ERP is a particularly good technique for investigating brain responses in language processing 
as well as in implicit learning research due to its high temporal resolution. Different 
components have already been identified as being related to different stages of sentence 
processing. Early syntactic parsing is assumed to be reflected in the LAN (Left-Anterior 
Negativity), which is prominent around the anterior electrodes. The LAN is followed by an 
N400 which, in a sentence processing context, reflects the cognitive cost of online integration 
of semantic information. An example sentence which would yield a large N400 on the final 
word, reflecting a high integration cost, is She drank her tea with a microphone. Then, a 
P600, also known as the Syntactic Positive Shift (SPS), most prominent over the posterior 
electrodes, is usually believed to reflect syntactic reanalysis or revision and is elicited by such 
syntactic phenomena as ungrammatical sentences (e.g. She drank her tea and sing), garden 
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path sentences, complex sentences with a large number of thematic roles, or long distance 
dependencies. Thus, the identification of specific ERP components for different aspects of 
sentence processing imposes a neuro-biological constraint for models of language processing, 
which will need to account for the observed sequence of ERP effects (Brown & Hagoort, 
1993). 
 The method has already established itself in SLA research and has led to insights into 
the cognitive mechanisms of language processing which would not be possible otherwise. For 
example, the study by Morgan-Short et al. (2007) compared the ERP responses to syntactic 
processing among learners of an artificial language Brocanto2, trained under explicit and 
implicit conditions15. It was found that although the two groups performed similarly at both 
low and high proficiency, their ERP responses to syntactic violations differed. The group that 
underwent implicit training showed an N400 at low proficiency, and showed anterior 
negativity followed by P600 followed by late anterior negativity at high proficiency. The 
latter pattern is similar to native-like syntactic processing. The presence of the N400 suggests 
that at the early stages of learning, at least in this condition, people treat clauses as 
meaningful units, most likely relying on rote memory. On the other hand, the group in the 
explicit training condition showed no significant effects at low proficiency, and anterior 
positivity followed by a P600 at high proficiency, which is not reminiscent of native-like 
processing.  Therefore,  in  all,  only  “implicit  training”  led  to  an  electrophysiological signature 
characteristic  of  native  speakers.  The  authors  concluded  that  uninstructed,  “implicit  training”  
conditions yield superior results to the explicit ones in terms of native-like attainment, which 
in turn confirms the popular view that language learning through immersion is better than in a 
classroom setting. 
 Batterink & Neville (2011) reported an interesting study of incidental word learning, 
in  which  participants  were  given  both  “implicit”16 and explicit tests. ERPs were recorded as 
participants read stories with pseudowords appearing at multiple points, embedded either in 
consistent meaningful contexts (M+) or inconsistent, meaningless ones (M-). They were 
subsequently tested on two tasks, targeting different types of responses: lexical decision 
(“implicit   test”),   and   recall   and   recognition   (“explicit   test”).   It   turned   out   that   M- words 
                                                          
15 Implicit conditions in the study by Morgan-Short  et  al.  (2010)  are  similar  to  the  “incidental”  conditions  
defined  here  in  that  they  involve  “non-instructed”  behaviour.  However,  they  do  not  presuppose  lack  of  
awareness  of  the  rules;;  learners’  awareness  was  not  measured  in  the  study.   
16 “Implicit”  as  used  by  Batternk  &  Neville  (2011)  is  akin  to  how  “automatic”  is  used  in  this  dissertation;;  i.e.  
uncontrolled. However, no claims about awareness were made, and awareness was not measured. 
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elicited a larger N400 than M+ words, indicating that the M+ words were easier to integrate. 
Interestingly, participants’   performance   on   the   lexical   decision   task   showed   neither   a  
significant behavioural nor ERP difference. It is suggested that the explicit representations of 
word meanings can develop rapidly, whereas implicit representations may require more 
extensive exposure or more time to emerge.  
A natural question arising here is: is it even possible to observe ERP responses to 
implicitly learned regularities at all? Note that the studies by Morgan-Short et al. (2007) and 
Batterink & Neville (2011) are not indicative of this as they do not measure unconscious 
knowledge, but rather different modes (syntactic, semantic) of automatic processing. There is 
evidence in the literature for N400 effects in subliminal semantic priming (Kiefer, 2002). 
Also, P600 has been reported in an implicit SRT task (Christiansen, Conway, & Onnis, 
2012). There is also evidence of an N1 component in AG learning that is independent of the 
behavioural response (Schankin, et al., 2011). Overall there is surprisingly little research on 
implicit learning using ERP, and apparently nothing on semantic implicit learning. The study 
reported in this chapter addresses this lacuna, using a novel method for analysing the ERP 
signal, based on Empirical Mode Decomposition, allowing comparisons between single trials.  
  
 
5.2. Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) 
 
The problem with applying traditional ERP signal analysis methods to research on such 
phenomena as learning is the fact that it involves averaging over multiple repetitions of the 
same stimuli based on the assumption that the ERP signal is constant from trial to trial. This 
assumption does not always hold, and in fact between-trial variations in the signal could be 
linked to aspects of cognition. The standard voltage averaging method, therefore, might 
cancel out potentially informative variations in the data, which could be particularly 
informative for gradual processes such as learning, believed to induce mental changes over 
time. There are currently only a few methods for analysing the ERP signal based on 
individual trials, but none of the methods are completely data-driven and unsupervised while 
allowing for the ERP to be non-stationary between trials. A method for analysing the signal 
based on Empirical Mode Decomposition, which has these characteristics, was developed by 
Dr  Nitin  Williams,   (ref   thesis),   and   applied   in   a   variant   of   the   “double   decision   priming”  
paradigm developed in Chapter 4. Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) is a data-driven 
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method which extracts oscillatory modes intrinsic to the data by identifying time scales 
characteristic of individual oscillatory modes. It decomposes a signal into a small number of 
Intrinsic Mode Functions (IMFs) which represent the oscillatory modes contained in the data. 
The counterpart of the IMF in Fourier analysis is the simple harmonic component.  However, 
the IMF is much more general than the harmonic component as it can be modulated both in 
terms of amplitude and frequency, while the harmonic component is constant in both 
amplitude and frequency. The amplitude and frequency modulations are possible because the 
decomposition depends on the local characteristic time scale of the data. (Williams, 2011).  
Applying an EMD-based ERP method to an implicit learning study has a particular 
benefit over the behavioural methods used to date. Most demonstrations of implicit learning 
(including the ones reported here), within such frameworks as AGL, contextual cueing, false 
memory paradigm, etc., usually tap into knowledge retrieval, and, are based on the 
assumption that if knowledge is influencing behaviour without awareness, then it has most 
likely also been acquired without awareness (Shanks, 2005; cf. Tzelgov, 1997 and 
Introduction to Chapter 4, for the distinction between unawareness and processing without 
conscious monitoring). This opens the procedure up to criticism that such demonstrations 
cannot be claimed in fact to address the implicit learning process, until that fundamental 
assumption is verified (cf. Carrón & Bly, 2007). A single-trial based analysis of an ERP 
signal, such as the EMD-based method, would allow us to see changes over time while still 
applying relevant measures of awareness and assuring automaticity in the learning procedure, 
by tapping into the learning process itself. Below is a study reporting a replication of Variant 
2 in Pilot 3 of Chapter 4, with the additional application of ERP measurement, and the 
application of the EMD-based method of signal analysis. Gradual changes in the signal, with 
the absence of awareness until the end of the experiment, would demonstrate that implicit 
learning is indeed a gradual process and constitute a first attempt to measure the process 
neurologically in real time.  
It is also of interest to see what components emerge for the violation items. If 
semantic implicit learning is indeed a semantically-based phenomenon, as has been assumed 
in this dissertation, then it is expected that an N400 would occur. On the other hand, the 
violations in, e.g., powter the honey when powter normally occurs with abstract nouns, is not 
exactly the same kind of violation as that which occurs in She drank her tea with a 
microphone. While the latter introduces a challenge to a coherent interpretation in the light of 
general world knowledge, the former violates an agreement with regard to a particular 
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semantic feature which is critical, and forms a rule. In that case, one might expect a P600, 
which is what Morgan-Short et al. (2010) reported for article-noun agreement violations, but 
only in highly proficient participants. The N400 was present at the less proficient level. 
Considering that participants in the current study encountered the novel target verbs for the 
first time (so could be considered to be of low proficiency) this would suggest a higher 
likelihood of an N400.17 
 
 
5.3. Experiment 9 
 
 
Participants: 18 native speakers of English, 16 right-handed and 2 left-handed, all above 18 
years of age (between 19 and 46), with a mean of 27; all had no history of neurological or 
psychological disorders.  13 were male, 5 female.  
Equipment: Data was collected using a 64-channel BrainVision EEG system from Brain 
Products GmbH in the electromagnetically shielded EEG lab at the Centre for Integrative 
Neuroscience and Neurodynamics (CINN), University of Reading, UK. Data was sampled at 
1000 Hz and, for each participant, all electrode impedances were below 10 k.  
 
5.3.1. Materials 
 
Materials were the same as those in Version 2 of Pilot 3, reported in Chapter 4. The stimulus 
material is presented in Appendix F. As before, four target novel verbs were introduced: 
POWTER and  MOUTEN  meaning  ‘increase’,  GOUBLE  and  CONELL  meaning  ‘decrease’.   
 
5.3.2. Procedure 
 
                                                          
17 It  has  been  braught  to  the  author’s  attention  that  the  N200/N1  could  be  predicted  as  well,  which  will  be  
addressed in the future analysis.   
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The procedure was the same as Version 2 of Pilot 3, reported in Chapter 4. Each participant 
received each list in succession, with the order of lists counterbalanced. However,  the order 
of trials within each list was the same for all participants.  
Specifically, the experiment contained 3 blocks of phrases, each containing 78 
phrases. In the first, training block MOUTEN and CONELL co-occurred only with concrete 
nouns while POWTER and GOUBLE co-occurred only with abstract nouns. In blocks 2 and 
3, there are 16 violations each of the collocational rule, each preceeding or following a 
critical grammatical item, both of which forming a pair – henceforth  referred  to  as  ‘stage’.  E-
Prime 2.0 was used for stimulus presentation. The phrases were visually presented on the 
screen, word-by-word, verb followed by a noun. He verb appeared for 600ms. On the 
immediately following noun, participants participants were instructed to press the '.' button if 
it   was   a   concrete   noun   and   ‘z’   if   the   noun  was   abstract.   Participants   had   up   to   3   seconds  
indicate their choice. After making this abstract/concrete decision, the screen changed and 
participants were presented with a question about the verb in the phrase. If the initial verb 
meant ‘increase’   they  were   asked   to   choose   “+”   on   the   screen,   by   pressing   the   ‘.’  Key,   or  
‘decrease’  bychoosing  “-“  and  pressing  the  ‘z’  key.    The  next  phrase was presented only after 
the participant answered this verb question. Every two trials participants were also prompted 
to recall aloud the last two phrases. This was done to make the participant to engage with the 
task. Further, participants were asked not to move or blink while answering questions about 
the nouns and verbs in the phrases. 
 
5.3.3.Results 
 
Behavioural results 
 
A paired-sample t-test revealed no significant difference overall on either the first 
(abstract/concrete) decision on the noun, t(17) = 0.62, p = 0.54, (Mean G = 1250,79, SD = 
350.96, Mean UG = 1265,47, SD = 311,29) or on the second (increase/decrease) decision, 
t(17) = 1.680, p = 0.11 (Mean G =580,81, SD =249.49, Mean UG = 60.98, SD = 258.73). 
After dividing each list into halves, the effect was significant on the second half of each list, 
t(17) = 2.24, p = 0.04 (Mean G = 548.40, SD = 231.28, Mean UG = 581.47, SD = 263.64). In 
other words, it emerges over the 2nd and 4th quarters. Due to the design of the experiment, the 
same items always appeared in either the first or second half of a list. It seems therefore that 
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the effect may be restricted to a subset of the items (which is understandable in light of the 
role similarity plays in implicit learning, see section 3.9 above). The effect occurs on the 
subset of items that appear in the second half, which are rotated around the G and UG 
conditions between the lists, but kept in the same position, so it is still a valid comparison. 
Overall, there is some evidence of an implicit learning effect.  
 
*ERP results 
 
First decision 
Conventional Grand average comparison 
 
On the first decision a right-lateralised low-frequency effect was found in the fronto-temporal 
region (F8, FT8, FC6). Subject 13 was not included in the analysis because of excessive 
contamination of the data with eye-blink artifacts. As shown in Figure 5.1, the response to the 
New Grammatical (normal) condition (-0.43) was more positive than the response to the New 
Ungrammatical (violation) condition (-1.66). An analysis of p-values revealed that the effect 
was strongest between 200 ms and 400 ms. A paired-samples t-test showed that the mean 
amplitude for this time-window was different between conditions (p < 0.05). FC6 was the 
electrode at which the effect was most prominent. The threshold frequency (ft) for EMD 
denoising was set at 7 Hz. 
 
*Figure 5.1. First decision, Grand average comparison – “normal”  and  “violation”   
                   condition (electrode FC6) 
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This finding might suggest that the ERP signal proved more sensitive than the reaction time 
method, and revealed an effect already on the first decision. Such a conclusion can only be 
drawn with caution, because according to the signal depiction in Figure 5.1, the lines for the 
two conditions diverge already at point 0, although not significantly. The result therefore 
remains inconclusive. 
Another possible interpretation of the discrepancy at point 0 is that participants 
already have an expectation as to whether the noun will be grammatical or ungrammatical 
before it actually appears. Actually, there was a regularity in the stimuli in that respect. The 
test phase followed an order such that every sixth item was ungrammatical (i.e., exposure, 
exposure, grammatical, exposure, exposure, ungrammatical, exposure, exposure, 
grammatical,   exposure,   exposure,   ungrammatical,   where   “exposure”   refers   to   grammatical  
filler trials). However, since the sequence does not predict the actual abstract/concrete 
response (just the grammaticality of the verb-noun combination) it is hard to see how learning 
of the sequence could be reflected in the ERP signal.  
 
 
 
 Empirical Mode Decomposition 
 
EMD denoising (clearing the signal from artifacts) at 7 Hz was done for all trials from both 
conditions (based on the signal-to-noise criterion)18, on electrode FC6. Single-trial analysis 
was conducted to verify whether the learning could be tracked by effect size between 
responses to the two conditions (Grammatical and Ungrammatical) across 32 stages (pairings 
of Grammatical and Ungrammatical trials, which appeared one after the other). The slope of 
the regression line turned out to be near-significantly non-zero (p=0.06). Figure 5.2 shows the 
effect size values plotted for each stage, along with the linear regression line. Figure 5.3 
shows an ERP image of the change in effect size across 32 stages, for each time point. The 
gradual decrease in effect size across stages is reflected by the gradual change (from top to 
bottom of the figure) in colour: from yellow and orange to green, blue and dark blue. Note 
that this change is visible between 200ms and 400ms. 
 
                                                          
18 Calculated by subtracting each post-stimulus value by mean of activity from 0 ms to around 200 ms pre-
stimulus; carried out to control for potential effects resulting from pre-stimulus processing. 
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                 * Figure 5.2. First decision, effect size with respect to experimental stage (electrode FC6) 
 
 
*Figure 5.3. ERP image of effect size for each sample for each Experimental Stage. Image 
was smoothed over Experimental Stages with window width of 3 stages. 
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Second decision 
Conventional Grand average comparison 
 
Two effects emerged in response to the second decision. The first was a low-frequency effect 
in the pre-frontal and frontal regions (Fp1, Fpz, Fp2, AF4, AF8).  Here participants 5, 13 and 
15 were not included in the analysis because of excessive contamination of the data with eye-
blink artifacts. As shown in Figure 5.4, the response to the New Ungrammatical (violation) 
condition (-4.03) was more positive than response to the New Grammatical (normal) 
condition (-1.31). Based on inspection of p-values, the effect was found to be particularly 
strong between 100 ms and 500 ms. A paired-samples t-test confirmed that the mean 
amplitude for this time-window was different between conditions (p < 0.05). Fpz was found 
to be the electrode at which the effect was most prominent.  
 
 
 
 
*Figure 5.4. Second decision, 1st effect, Grand average comparison – “normal”   
               and  “violation”  condition  (electrode  Fpz). 
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The other effect in response to the second decision was left-lateralised and localised in the 
central region (Cz, C1, C3, FC1, CPz). For this analysis, data from all 18 subjects was 
included. As shown in Figure 5.5, the response to the New Grammatical (normal) condition 
(0.73) was more positive than response to the New Ungrammatical (violation) condition 
(-0.10). Based on the analysis of p-values, the effect was found to be particularly strong 
between 200 ms and 500 ms (most likely an N400). A paired-samples t-test revealed that the 
mean amplitude for this time-window was different between conditions (p < 0.01). C3 turned 
out to be the electrode at which the effect was most prominent.  
 
 
*Figure 5.6. Second decision, 2nd effect, Grand average comparison – “normal”  and  
“violation”  condition  (electrode  C3) 
 
 
Empirical Mode Decomposition 
 
Threshold frequency (ft) for EMD denoising was set at 1 Hz (based on the signal-to-noise 
criterion). On the first effect, single-trial analysis revealed that the variation in effect size 
between responses to the two conditions, across 32 stages, did not yield a linear regression 
line of significantly non-zero slope (p > 0.05). This is illustrated in Figure 5.6 below. Nor 
was the regression slope significantly non-zero on the second effect (Figure 5.7). 
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*Figure 5.5.  Second decision, 1st effect, effect size with respect to experimental stage 
(electrode Fpz). 
 
 
 
 
 
*Figure 5.7. Second decision, 2nd effect, effect size with respect to experimental stage 
(electrode C3). 
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5.3.4. Discussion 
 
 
This study reported an investigation into the ERP brain response among people performing 
the  “double  decision  priming”  task  targeting  semantic  implicit  learning  developed  in  Chapter  
4. There was some evidence for the expected N400 responses on both decisions. This was 
least convincing on the first (abstract/concrete) decision due to the (non-significant) deviation 
in the waveforms prior to stimulus onset (see Figure 5.1), and its strongly right-lateralised 
prefrontal localisation. However, more convincing evidence was obtained for the second 
(increase/decrease) decision, where the effect was predominantly left-lateralised in the 
centro-parietal region and its latency was consistent with an N400 (see Figure 5.6). This latter 
result supports the assumption that the effects obtained with this paradigm are indeed 
semantically-based, and as such do not behave like syntactic or morphosyntactic violations, 
which typically elicit a P600. 
 There was some evidence that the ERP signal was sensitive to changes over time, but 
this was only obtained for the effect on the first decision, which unfortunately was the hardest 
to interpret. There was a marginally significant reduction in effect size (which reflects 
increasing amplitude in the ungrammatical condition by comparison with the grammatical 
condition). This may reflect an increasing sensitivity to a regularity in the trial sequence, 
although it is hard to see how this could affect the brain response in this case. There was no 
evidence for a similar decrease in effect size on the second (increase/decrease) decision, even 
though it was here that the traditional grand average analysis provided the most convincing 
evidence of a learning effect. 
The results suggest that an ERP method may be more sensitive than a behavioural 
measurement, given that no overall behavioural effects were obtained in this study. There 
was, however, some evidence for an effect in reaction time on a subset of the items. The 
weakness of the behavioural effect is most likely caused by the noun set being relatively 
heterogeneous. It is therefore striking that differences between conditions were obtained in 
the ERP data. 
Finally, it must be remembered that these ERP effects were obtained with participants 
who claimed to have no awareness of the selectional preference rule. They therefore represent 
the first evidence for unconscious ERP effects in the domain of semantic implicit learning. 
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  5.4. Chapter summary 
 
The study presented in this chapter documents the first attempt to track implicit learning as it 
happens in real time. It began with an overview of currently identified ERP responses to 
specific types of linguistic processing (e.g., N400 for semantic integration). The overview 
was followed with a presentation of the innovative Empirical Mode Decomposition-based 
method for analysing an ERP signal allowing comparisons between individual trials. The 
study reported was done in collaboration with Dr Nitin Williams. Conventional grand 
average analyses revealed a significant left-lateralised N400 effect on the increase/decrease 
decision in the absence of awareness of the regularity, and in the absence of a behavioural 
effect. This suggests that the ERP method might be highly sensitive to implicit learning 
effects. The EMD analysis provided some evidence for a change in the learning effect over 
the course of the experiments, suggesting that this method has promise for the exploration of 
brain responses in implicit learning experiments. 
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Chapter 6  
Overall discussion 
 
 
 
  6.1   Summary of findings 
 
The research documented in this dissertation addressed the issue of whether people implicitly 
form semantic generalisations over sets of nouns collocating with novel verbs (semantic 
preferences) and therefore become able to distinguish legitimate and non-legitimate use of 
those verbs in context. Results obtained through a series of 9 experiments19 using four 
different experimental methods provided support for the claim. The methods were based on 
automaticity and subjective measures of awareness and included a pen-and-paper study, 
false-memory  experiments,  “double  decision  priming”  for  detecting  delayed priming effects, 
and a novel ERP-based technique. In order:  
Chapter 2 provided the first empirical support that learners of English as a foreign language 
develop implicit lexical knowledge pertaining to the use of four, previously unknown words: 
diminish, deplete, mitigate and truncate. Learners were tested in the classroom, and the 
implicitness of learning was determined by questions about confidence and source 
judgements at each test question. 
Chapter 3 provided further evidence for learning semantic generalisations, this time using a 
more controlled method based on semantic preference patterns arranged around a 2x2 
                                                          
19 14 experiments including pilot studies and different variants of Experiments 2 and 6. 
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factorial design. Learning was determined by the size of a false-memory effect and a post-
experiment questionnaire. Participants who reported no knowledge of the semantic 
preference patterns at the end still showed a preference for the new verb-noun pairings which 
followed the correct pattern over those which did not. Applying a false-memory procedure to 
a familiarity task has benefits over the popularly used grammaticality judgements, as it 
prevents participants from constructing ad hoc hypotheses about test items. In the false-
memory procedure, all the participants have to indicate is whether they remember the 
stimulus or not. Furthermore, the experiments reported in this chapter presented a novel, 
indirect measure of (functional) awareness, involving the analysis of correlations between the 
learning effect and confidence. Experiment 6b in particular provided strong evidence for 
implicit learning. The method was verified in an explicit variant of the task (Experiment 5), 
in which participants who were not only aware but also able to use their knowledge 
strategically (as revealed by the post-test) were clearly distinguishable from those who did 
not perform perfectly well on the post-test. This confirmed that the method is sensitive to 
strategic knowledge use.    
Chapter 4 examined whether semantic implicit knowledge exerts its influence automatically 
in real time language processing. While the effect in chapter 3 can already be considered as 
automatic, as learning the target regularity was not part of the task requirement (participants 
could still perform the task without knowing that there was a regularity between verbs and 
noun-type pairings at all), it still required participants to intentionally introspect their memory 
while doing it. Although unlikely, it is possible that they could still have had knowledge 
which they did not reveal in a verbal report or confidence measure. So, this series of five 
experiments  presents  the  gradual  development  of  the  “double  decision  priming”  method,  and  
the application of a more common measure of automatic performance, namely reaction time. 
The procedure led to the detection of a learning effect, thereby providing further evidence for 
the implicit learning of semantic preference patterns. Interestingly, throughout this series of 
experiments, the effect consistently appeared on the second decision, suggesting that at least 
in this case, the effect arises after processing, exhibiting a delay from the moment the word is 
presented.  
Chapter 5 provided early evidence that the development of semantic implicit learning may be 
traceable overtime using a novel single-trial analysis of an electroencephalographic (EEG) 
signal based on an empirical mode decomposition (EMD) denoising method developed by Dr 
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Nitin Williams. Furthermore, the N400 component was detected at an earlier stage than the 
behavioural responses did, suggesting high sensitivity of ERP for measuring implicit 
knowledge. The presence of the N400 component adds more evidence to the claim that 
semantic implicit learning is indeed meaning-based, rather than form-based, or rule-based. 
While implicit learning has usually been shown to occur at the perceptual form-level, for 
example in artificial grammars, or visual sequences, the research reported here has 
demonstrated that abstract, semantic level regularities are learnable implicitly as well.  
 
  6.2.  What do people learn? 
 
Traditional research on implicit learning has dismissed the idea that people may learn abstract 
rules governing the stimuli they encounter, and instead stresses the role of the consciously 
perceived similarity between the materials on which people are trained and tested (Shanks, 
2005; Perruchet, 2008). The mainstream consensus seems to be that the implicit learning 
mechanism operates on chunks of which people might be aware. Therefore often an item with 
chunks which are consciously perceived as familiar is judged as grammatical, regardless of 
its actual grammaticality (as discussed in Chapter 1). 
 The story of implicit learning emerging from this dissertation, however, is more 
complex. To use an analogy to artificial grammar learning, participants may perceive test 
items as being chunked in a certain way, which leads them to accept the items, but in fact this 
can also arise when participants have never encountered those chunks and their impression is 
actually a consequence of the abstract structure of the grammar or a given system (cf. 
Knowlton & Squire, 1996 – dissociating chunk strength and grammaticality). In the 
experiments reported here (Chapter 3) participants accept new word combinations claiming 
they had seen them, when in fact they had not. 
  It  becomes  apparent  though  that  although  people’s  knowledge  in  the  current  context  is  
independent from perceptual forms, the similarity between training and test items still 
remains the key factor determining the learning effects. This time it is not perceptual, but 
rather semantic similarity. The account for the effects obtained could therefore be analogous 
to that coming from the form-level implicit learning research (e.g.,Vokey & Brooks, 1992) 
In the semantic implicit learning literature, Newell & Bright (2002) observed that participants 
in their study encoded time in a rough manner and choose test items closer to the ones from 
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training, regardless of whether they followed the 6-12 rule or not. The role of semantic 
similarity also emerged in the experiments reported here. 
In Experiment 1 no learning was detected when new words were used in the 
“extended”  contexts,  which  were  grammatical  but  dissimilar  from  training.  Also,  in  the  false  
memory experiments in Chapter 3, Experiment 4 (generalisations), despite the large sample 
(61 unaware), revealed a relatively small effect size by comparison with the equivalent 
Experiment 3. This illustrates that the knowledge participants develop is not in the form of a 
rule: powter/gouble + ABSTRACT, conell/mouten + CONCRETE. Also, in Experiments 2 and 3 
the  participants’  generalised  notion  of  the  noun  collocates  must  consist  of  a  more  constrained  
set of possibilities than in Experiment 4. If their knowledge was in the form of a rule we 
should not observe a difference in effect sizes. In the reaction time experiments in Chapter 4 
as well, the effect size diminished when the word set was changed to a more heterogeneous 
one (Pilot  3  versions  1a,  1b  combined  η2 = 0.26  versus  version  2  η2 0.09). 
This is reminiscent of other research on implicit leaning in language. Rebuschat & 
Williams (2011) found evidence for learning word order regularities, but only in the form of 
templates based on the training items, rather than word placement rules. It was found that the 
group who had received exposure endorsed significantly more grammatical structures than 
the controls (71% versus 36%), but did not differ on the ungrammatical structures (47% and 
51%). Thus, as much as there is evidence for learning of the syntactic patterns underlying the 
training sentences, the fact that the experimental group did not reliably reject ungrammatical 
items  suggests  their  knowledge  was  not  based  on  a  rule,  “assuming  that  rules  enable  a  clear  
identification of what is ruled out, as  well   as  what   is   ruled   in”   (Rebuschat  &  Williams,   p.  
242). Similarly, Williams & Kuribara (2008) found that participants implicitly learned 
statistical properties of a semi-artificial language based on Japanese to which they were 
exposed, but did not acquire the general rule of scrambling.  In all, there is ample evidence 
that higher-level implicit learning, including semantic learning, is similarity-driven in much 
the same way as form-level implicit learning. The only difference is that the similarity itself 
is to be measured at a higher (e.g. semantic) level.  
Interestingly though, it seems less likely that results are dependent upon similarity to a 
particular item, than similarity to the overall set. Distinguishing between these two 
explanations is important in the light of the debate between association and feature-based 
models of semantics. Although either account could explain the results obtained in Chapter 3, 
in the automaticity-based experiments in Chapter 4 participants still showed the semantic 
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implicit learning effects despite the fact that they were unlikely to have had enough time to 
consciously recall a specific item. Therefore, possibly the only way to uphold an item 
similarity matching account is to claim that this occurs unconsciously. 
  
 
6.2.  How do people learn? 
 
Learning taking place in the experiments presented here can be conceived as gradual 
abstraction over instances stored in memory. Consecutive activation of overlapping semantic 
features of words (here, nouns) and the context in which the given words appear (here, with 
which   novel   verb)   results   in   the   reinforcement   of   their   relation   without   the   learners’  
awareness (see section 3.10 above for further elaboration). It is plausible that such learning 
may be an instance of more general, cross-situational learning, which could even underlie the 
learning  of  content  words’  meanings  (Smith & Yu, 2008). Interestingly, it has been recently 
reported that infants at 6-9 months old already know the meanings of many common nouns 
(Bergelson & Swingley, 2012). This is much earlier than was previously assumed. 
Predominantly, it has been claimed that meaning is learnt subsequently to speech 
segmentation, whereas (Bergelson & Swingley, 2012) demonstrate that the two are likely to 
go hand in hand. Although the finding that infants know referential meaning of common 
nouns does not entail they learn them implicitly, it does demonstrate that learning vocabulary 
does not necessarily require elaborate explicit hypothesis testing in which second language 
learners are often believed to engage.  
 
 
6.3.  Learning without noticing? 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the seminal statement made by Schmidt (1990, 1995) is that 
“noticing”,  understood  as  attention  and   low  level  awareness,   is   the  necessary  and  sufficient  
condition for learning to occur. Only the material which is noticed can be converted from 
input to intake. 
Arguably, in Experiment 8 in Chapter 4, participants do not  “notice”  the  crucial 
abstractness/concreteness distinction and are surprised to hear afterwards that this is what was 
tested. Of course the point of the automaticity-based procedure was to eliminate the potential 
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effects of conscious knowledge of this regularity should it have arisen, but it is highly 
unlikely   that   it   did,   based   on   participants’   reports.   The   learning   effect   reported   in   that  
experiment,   as  well  as  most  experiments   reported  here,  does   emerge  among   the  “unaware”  
participants, who denied having  “noticed”  the  regularity  in  the  final  debriefing. 
 What does and what does not necessarily need to be noticed, then, for learning to take 
place? Based on the findings from Experiment 8, it is not necessary to be aware of the crucial 
aspect of the input items, but rather process the input in sufficient depth for it to be activated. 
The effect was not significant when participants were not forced to process the words for 
meaning (Pilot 1 and Pilot 2 here, Leung & Williams 2012), but reached significance even 
when the meaning which was processed (positive/neutral/negative) was irrelevant to the 
learning target (abstract/concrete). However, Schmidt (1995) also proposed that stimuli 
outside focal attention and therefore outside awareness might only activate preexisting 
memory representations, and only do so subliminally. Perhaps such a level of activation 
occurred among the native speakers, and not non-native speakers in Experiment 8. This casts 
doubt that non-native  speakers’  performance  on  semantic  implicit learning tasks of this kind 
could ever be similar to that of the native speakers, as the former do not have the same pre-
existing concepts to activate as the latter do. 
 
 
6.4. Comparison of methods  
 
Assuming that all the presented methods legitimately address implicit knowledge, comparing 
them brings the conclusion that the more artificial the test is (the more different from the 
natural language use), the more processing reinforcement is needed. The false memory 
experiments in Chapter 3 do not involve response time pressure, and the effect of semantic 
implicit knowledge emerges without the need even to suggest the importance of nouns 
following the target verbs. On the other hand, with timed presentation and response pressure, 
the learning procedure seems to require additional procedures to assure deep enough 
processing. 
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6.5.  Implications for models of cognition 
 
In the light of the debate concerning whether implicit learning exists at all, the material 
collected in this dissertation points to the conclusion that it does. While Lovibond & Shanks 
(2002) and others argued that even simple Pavlovian conditioning relies on conscious 
predictive relationships between events, it has to be said that their counterarguments are 
based on the research addressing form-level phenomena. Perhaps the lack of generalisation or 
abstraction beyond the given input in those experiments reflects the fact that the material is 
not linked to any higher-level representation, and therefore not naturally prone to be 
generalised from. In semantic implicit learning, participants acquire knowledge about 
relationships involving conceptual representations, which are naturally abstract. Perhaps 
therefore it is more promising to investigate the potential of implicit generalisations on 
naturally generalisable material, such as language, music, mathematics or motor learning. 
 
 
6.6. Indications for future research 
 
Model of semantic knowledge 
As argued in Chapter 3 (section 3.8.5) this research could significantly contribute to 
one of the major debates in linguistics, between feature-based and association-based theories 
of semantic knowledge. The first and important step should be to dissociate the role of 
association  strength  and  semantic  similarity  (based  on  people’s  ratings)  in  semantic  implicit  
learning. Targeting unconscious rather than conscious knowledge should eliminate the effects 
of participants obscuring their natural reflexes by conscious strategies. 
 
 
Role of similarity 
A number of experiments reported here suggested that similarity matching is an 
important factor influencing implicit learning. The automaticity-based experiments in 
Chapter 4 suggest that this may not be similarity to a specific item, but rather similarity to the 
overall set. Furthermore, Chapter 5 suggests that this effect may be gradually increasing over 
time, again suggesting that it is not driven by similarity to a specific item (or at least not 
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conscious similarity matching). Still, this conclusion is not definitive, and in the light of the 
fact that most of the false-memory literature would suggest that particular item similarity is 
key, further research on the matter would be highly beneficial for our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying semantic implicit learning and the apparent emerging generalisations.  
 
Learning content words 
As mentioned above, the exact mechanism of implicit learning processes, including 
those underpinning the implicit learning of language, is yet to be fully understood. One of the 
issues of interest is whether the referential meaning of words can be learnt this way. The 
material presented in this dissertation addresses learning of semantic collocational behaviour, 
which  can  be  argued  only  to  involve  ‘fine-tuning’  of  representations.  It  has  been  argued  that  
such knowledge belongs to the lexicon as opposed to vocabulary, and therefore its learning 
may proceed implicitly (Paradis, 2004). Referential word meaning, on the other hand, 
requires integration of information across different cognitive systems, which may crucially 
depend on intact declarative memory (Ellis, 1994, 2005), which in turn is believed to rely on 
the hippocampus. However, most empirically based arguments for such a position come from 
the studies reporting impaired vocabulary learning in amnesia (Gabrieli, Cohen and Corkin, 
1998). Yet the fact that those patients have problems learning vocabulary does not necessarily 
entail that the process is always explicit. Rather, it may be that just an intact hippocampus is 
essential. Therefore, it might still be possible to demonstrate implicit learning of referential 
word meanings in the healthy population.    
 
Role of L1 
 Research on implicit learning in language is still a young discipline, and only 
relatively recently has evidence been reported that this kind of learning may interact with 
prior linguistic knowledge. In Experiment 8 of this dissertation, only native speakers of 
English showed learning, while non-natives did not. Considering that the same learning target 
regularity (novel verb with either abstract or concrete noun) was learnt by both native and 
non-native speakers in the false-memory experiments in Chapter 3, this finding suggests that 
the native language may provide rapid automatic activation of semantic information, which in 
non-native speakers may require some reinforcement, at least under speeded-response 
conditions.  
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 One way in which the first language could shape implicit learning is by providing a 
prior knowledge base. In light of other studies reported by Leung & Williams (2011, 2012) it 
would be most useful to investigate the role which the first language plays in subsequent 
implicit learning (both for language and in other domains). Investigating the role prior 
knowledge plays in facilitating or constraining implicit learning could be illuminating in the 
light of one of the major debates in linguistics, namely that between generativism and 
emergentism. The methodology developed in this dissertation could be extended to 
investigate implicit learnability of various aspects of grammar, such as argument structure. 
Careful, typologically motivated predictions would need to be made to determine whether 
different L1s would have predictable impact on implicit learning. According to emergentist 
theories, any differences would find their explanation in domain-general cognition. White 
(2003) implies  that  from  the  UG  perspective  “acquisition of L2-like argument structure is not 
inevitable, depending on which language is L1 and which is the L2”.  Earlier  she  argues  that  
“the failure to lose L1 argument structure arises in situations where the L1 grammar yields a 
superset of the possibilities permitted in the L2. That is, positive L2 input for restructuring 
the lexical entry is lacking”   (White,   2003, p. 239). More empirical evidence for 
distinguishing the role of L1and the universal principles for second language learning is still 
needed.    
 
Role  of  the  explicit  “seed” in semantic implicit learning 
 Apart from understanding what influence prior linguistic knowledge may have on 
second language learning, it is also interesting to investigate the role explicit knowledge may 
have or even have had in the experiments reported here. Is explicit knowledge a type of 
scaffolding, on which implicit learning can subsequently operate and fine-tune the existing 
representations? In other words, are the two systems, if separate, dependent upon each other? 
Or, on the other hand, is the fact that participants in the current research, as in many semantic 
implicit learning experiments to date, were provided with some explicit aspect of meaning, 
actually a crucial condition for implicit learning of this kind to take place? In the current 
experiments participants were at least given the increase/decrease dimension of the novel 
verbs’  meaning;;   in  Williams  and  Leung’s  (2012) studies they are told the new particles are 
like English determiners but indicate a near/far distinction; in Goschke (2007) experiment the 
effect emerges on a naming task, which also, at least in part, relies on explicit knowledge.  
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 The degree of dependence of implicit upon explicit learning could be addressed by 
adapting the methods presented in this dissertation. A possible way to test the issue would be 
to introduce variability in the explicit dimension of meaning of novel verbs. So for example, 
powter could   mean   ‘to   increase’   in   some   training   sentences,   and   ‘to   decrease’   in   other.  
Should similar learning effects be obtained to the ones reported here, it would seem that 
implicit  learning  does  not  require  a  fixed,  explicit  “seed”  to  subsequently  fine-tune, but rather 
it is an independent process. In light of the findings from Goujon (2010) such a situation is 
not unlikely. There, semantic contextual cueing only emerged when learners had an 
opportunity to categorise the scene prior to the visual search, even if the scene they 
categorised was different from the one on which they performed their search. Whether these 
findings can be extended to language is an open question. Language could be different in that 
respect, as participants may have natural expectations that words have a constant meaning, 
and introducing inconsistencies could impair learning. Determining the role explicit 
knowledge plays in implicit learning clearly remains an issue waiting to be addressed, 
especially since it would be directly informative for language pedagogy.  
 
Consolidation and production 
 The potential for further applications of the phenomenon of semantic implicit learning 
depend on how long-lasting the effects developed through training are. Initial promising. 
Comparison of different training techniques on consolidation and durability of effects would 
benefit the field. 
 Also, an inspection of the influence of semantic implicit learning tasks on free 
production would be useful in view of their potential pedagogical applicability, as well as 
their implications for the theory of second language acquisition. Production has been 
explored in an implicit learning context in an Elicited Oral Imitation test developed by Rod 
Ellis (2005). At the moment it is not clear how implicitly gained knowledge influences 
spontaneous language use,  
 
Neural plasticity 
 The constant improvement and development of techniques for analysing brain activity 
has potential to provide new insights into the nature of learning, both implicit and explicit, at 
a level of detail previously unachievable. Chapter 5 of this dissertation showcases an initial 
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application of a new ERP technique based on empirical mode decomposition (EMD), which 
by accessing the signal from individual trials offers a method for tracking gradual neural 
changes occurring over time. This, as well as other neuroimaging techniques, could address 
the issue of the impact of implicit learning on neural plasticity. Such information has the 
potential for developing further applications of this research in the area of cognitive therapy. 
 
 
Learning in impaired populations 
Addressing the question of the extent to which impaired populations are  
capable of implicit learning could prove very informative for neuroscience. For example, 
testing whether amnesic patients could develop semantic knowledge implicitly would be 
informative about the nature of hippocampal and cortical learning. The hippocampus is 
assumed to be responsible for storing specific memories which the cortex then uses to extract 
similarities and form generalisations. Impairment of the hippocampus is a common cause of 
memory loss and it is currently debated whether or not this damage prevents the development 
of semantic representations. Up to now, the studies which suggest no semantic learning in 
amnesia relied on procedures (e.g. word list learning) in which healthy individuals would use 
explicit strategies. It would be useful to re-address the issue using procedures which stimulate 
the development of implicit semantic knowledge, rather than explicit knowledge.  
 In addition, investigating semantic implicit learning among autistic people could shed 
light on which abilities are preserved and which are not in this disorder. There is evidence 
that implicit learning abilities are intact among the autistic population. This conclusion is 
based on their performance on such tasks as artificial grammar learning, serial reaction time, 
contextual cueing and probabilistic classification learning tasks (Brown Aczel, Jimenez,  
Kaufman, Grant, 2010). However, cognitive processing in autism has been characterised by a 
difficulty with the abstraction of information across multiple stimuli or situations (e.g. 
Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002; Ropar & Peebles, 2007) and its subsequent 
generalisation to novel stimuli or situations (e.g. Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Swettenham, 
1996). This makes individuals with autism seemingly unlikely to show semantic implicit 
learning effects. It has been assumed that prototype formation, a process of creating a mental 
summary representation of multiple experienced stimuli belonging to the same category, is 
also impaired in this group. However, in a recent study, Froehlich et al. (2012) challenge this 
assumption, arguing that although explicit categorisation is impaired, prototype formation is 
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comparable to healthy controls. The tasks they used to demonstrate this difference arguably 
relied on explicit and implicit processing respectively. After exposure and classification of 
multiple dot displays, participants were asked to indicate whether they remembered seeing a 
given display or not (test for prototype formation), and if they responded in the affirmative, 
the second task was to indicate to which of the four categories the display belonged.  It turned 
out that the participants with autism demonstrated intact prototype formation and did not 
differ significantly from the controls. One of the measures was false recognition of previously 
unseen prototypes. Participants with autism falsely recognized previously unseen prototypes 
to a reliably greater degree than they accurately recognized familiar training and repeated-
transfer stimuli, suggesting they are capable of generalising beyond the material they 
experience. However, on a more explicit task requiring them to categorise the displays, the 
autistic group performed significantly less accurately than the control group. Further research 
on the preservation of implicit learning skills among the autistic population, as well as the 
relationship between implicit and explicit knowledge (and specifically the activation of and 
access to implicit knowledge) could one day result in remedial strategies for the learning 
difficulties these individuals experience in typical educational and day-to-day settings. 
 
 
Therapy 
 Implicit memory is known to be relatively more resistant to decay with age and not as 
affected by impairment as explicit memory. This fact has already been applied in therapy in 
the following methods: 
Spaced retrieval – a technique by Landauer & Bjork (1978) in which the information to be 
learned is retrieved repeatedly at gradually increasing delays. Camp et al. (2000) suggest that 
this relatively effortless method, in which retention intervals are increased only when success 
is achieved at a shorter interval, may rely on automatic, implicit memory.   
Vanishing cues – by Glisky et al. (1986), a technique that involves gradually withdrawing or 
fading cue information until the target is produced in the absence of it (e.g., protect, protec_, 
pro___, pr____, p____).  
Errorless learning – by Baddeley & Wilson (1994), consisting of eliminating negative 
evidence, so that the person can accumulate and consolidate only what is correct.  
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 Skills and expertise – applied by e.g., Zanetti et al., (2001), attempting to capitalise on 
retention and reactivation of formerly proceduralised skills, such as playing chess, typing, 
brushing teeth, and using the telephone.  
The more we understand about the mechanism of implicit learning, and the conditions which 
are optimal for its occurrence as well as for the retrieval of the implicitly gained knowledge, 
the more successfully we can apply these findings in therapy and rehabilitation.20  
The suggestions for therapy based on the research discussed in this dissertation are 
firstly that due attention should be paid to structuring training material appropriately. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, DeKeyser (1995) failed to show implicit learning when he attempted 
to teach people multiple linguistic regularities, using input in which the evidence for these 
was spread out and intermixed. On the other hand, Williams (2005) presented his learners 
with material aiming for them just to learn one association, namely which particle co-occurs 
with animate and which with inanimate nouns. Arguably, participants could focus their 
attention more steadily on the target. Brain-training, although currently explored with 
relatively little accomplishment, might one day turn out to be more successful, especially 
when techniques based on implicit memory and learning are combined with linguistic 
material. It is known that implicit learning is related to language skills (see Chapter 1, section 
1.1), and the possession of certain forms of linguistic knowledge (e.g. bilingualism) has been 
reported   to   help   delay   the   onset   of   Alzheimer’s   Disease   and   reduce the severity of the 
symptoms (Craik, et al., 2010). Also, while in healthy aging it is noted that implicit memory 
is   relatively   preserved,   Alzheimer’s   Disease   affects   both   implicit   and   explicit memory. 
Exploring this fact could lead to the development of potential early diagnostics for 
Alzheimer’s.   This   is   an   especially   interesting   avenue   of   research   given   that   the   aspect   of  
knowledge which seems to be affected at the earliest stages of Alzheimer’s   is   semantic  
knowledge, and specifically categorical knowledge based on generalisations rather than 
associative semantic knowledge. The potential of implicit memory and learning tests as a 
diagnostic will hopefully be explored when more is known about the individual differences in 
people’s  performance  on  the  tasks. 
                                                          
20 As Glisky & Glisky (2002) suggest, the techniques which rely on implicit memory are primarily useful for 
individuals with severe impairments in explicit memory. For people with only mild memory deficits, such as 
those that occur in normal aging, using implicit processes may be less reliable than using residual explicit 
memory function.  
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Little is known at the moment about the extent to which the procedures addressing 
implicit learning are sensitive and reliable enough to be a diagnostic tool. But this issue can 
be investigated, e.g., by looking at test – retest reliability or changing the task/rule so that it is 
a general semantic implicit learning that is tapped. 
In all, implicit learning skills, language skills and memory condition all seem to be 
intricately related and the relationships between them still remain to be explored in detail. 
Investigating these relations and the potential applications of the implicit learning techniques 
might one day prove to be of considerable benefit to society.  
 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
 
Overall, the findings presented in this dissertation point to the conclusion that, contrary to the 
popular view of the mechanism underlying implicit learning, it is possible that it can lead to 
the formation of unconscious semantic regularities, not based on perceptual similarity to the 
training material. Researchers have only just begun to identify the factors which may 
influence implicit learning, including the role of the native language. Much more study is 
needed, but there is potential for the findings from this line of research to one day have 
important implications for psychological and linguistic theory, as well as practical 
applications both to pedagogy and therapy. 
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APPENDIX A: Example questionnaires from Experiment 1 
 
Example training questionnaire (Note: Answer scale only shown for the first item here) 
 
 
I  am  testing  the  relation  between  the  domain  of  information  and  people’s  judgement of importance. You will see 50 extracts from newspapers about politics, 
health, environment and entertainment. Please mark how important the information is to you on a scale from 0 to 5; 0 for not important, 5 for very important.  
Thank you for your participation. 
 
1. Research shows that having strong ties to co-workers can help mitigate job-related stress - a good reason to make some office buddies. 
 
2. Supermodel Naomi Campbell has been held at Heathrow Airport on suspicion of assaulting a police officer. 
3. A well known CNN journalist Alison Smith lost her job as a news presenter after she arbitrarily truncated the text which had been written 
for her and added her own improper commentary of the events.  
 
4. The British have long tried to diminish the input of the two Polish mathematicians into the breaking of the code of Enigma, when in fact it 
was them who provided the crucial contribution.  
 
5. A high number of fires have occurred in Hawaii over the last couple of years and had a very damaging effect on the environment. They not 
only  devour  the  forests,  but  also  deplete  nitrogen  from  Hawaii’s  already  nitrogen-poor soils.   
 
6.  Polish President Lech Kaczynski and club officials pledged to battle hooliganism after more than 200 fans rioted after Legia Warsaw won 
the  Polish  League  title.  “The  events  greatly  damaged  our  reputation,"  Kaczynski  said.  “Such  events  are  extremely dangerous, and we will 
fiercely  fight  them.” 
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7. So far, about 1,100 American children have lost a parent in Iraq, and hundreds of other kids have had parents killed in Afghanistan. We 
believe the U.S. government should pay college education costs for those children. 
 
8. Al Gore remarked that suggestions that a global warming is a relatively temporary  phenomenon, diminish the force of the alarming calls 
for a global action.    
9. Writing a thesis is a laborious process which often surprises you even as you write it.  You’ll  see  your  ideas  changing  and  developing  and  
so  sometimes  you’ll  want  to  truncate  one  section  to  make  space  to  write  more  in  another  or  even  delete  some  parts  altogether. 
 
10. An Australian man jumped onto the back of a crocodile that was attacking his wife, and forced it to flee. 
 
11. The body must first deplete carbohydrates before it can begin to burn fat. 
12.  Renamo says all its equipment - solar-powered radios and laptop computers - were paid for by a conservative Louisiana businessman. 
 
13. It has been argued that faith, especially believing that the deceased go to a better place and one day we will all be reunited in heaven does 
indeed mitigate the grief caused by the death of a loved one. 
  
14. Food today travels between 1,500 and 2,500 miles from farm to market. 
 
15. What  many  internet  users  don’t  know  is  that  you  don’t  always  need  to  send  the  long    string  of  letters  as  a  link  to  something  you’ve  found.  
You can truncate the website URL by using certain simple techniques.  
 
16. A White House conference on global warming opens tomorrow in Washington. Representatives from 17 nations will participate in the two 
day meeting. 
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17. Meaning of your Tarot  Cards:   “The  Fool”   represents   the  dreamer   in   you,   the   idealist,   the  mystic.   If   this   card   is   accompanied  by   “The  
Devil”,  the  latter  may  diminish  the  influence  of  the  former.   
 
18. How to stay healthy as a vegetarian? Losing meat and falling back on fatty, sugary snacks is a common mistake. You or other vegetarians 
in your family need a diet rich in veggies and fruits, beans, nuts and seeds. 
 
19. The American vision of the Holocaust continues to insist that the victims have not died in vain, trying to depict hope and justice and the 
future as a victory that will mitigate despair. 
 
20. According to our survey, nearly three quarters of families plan to cut their spending this year. 
 
21. The   loss  of   the  Amazon   rainforest  would  not  deplete   the  oxygen  on  Earth,   that’s not the issue, rather it would increase the amount of 
carbon  dioxide  which  traps  the  earth’s  heat  like  a  glass  in  a  greenhouse. 
 
22. There must be a bug in the programme script: if you write a "twitter" command  message that contains the word "as", it truncates the 
message at that point in the command  preview. It doesn't offer any alternatives to allow you to treat "as" like a normal word. 
 
23. Leo: Although your home life may be on your mind much of the day, it does not stop you from your work. You find yourself ambitious 
and inventive most of the day. 
 
24. The fact that TV is still the most popular medium does not diminish the significance of the radio in shaping public opinion. 
 
25. Sleepwalking becomes a problem when it disturbs your sleep so much that you're  tired  during  the  day  or  if  it’s  so  extreme  that  you  become  
a threat to someone or to yourself. 
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26. Older people's lives are frequently disrupted by loss and change; companion animals can mitigate the effects of loss and ease times of 
stressful transitions, such as retirement.  
 
27. Environmental degradation poses a threat for the developing countries which depend on the environment for their economic growth. The 
situation is worst in the poorest countries where poverty and population pressure lead people to deplete the natural resources to satisfy their 
immediate needs.  
28. The economic crisis has visibly hit the university graduates who are just entering  the workforce. Boston Consulting among many 
companies had to severely truncate the lists of accepted interns, leaving many hopeful youngsters jobless.   
 
29. If you have to add some flavor to your vegetables, at least pick the right one. Top your salad with one tablespoon of heart-healthy olive oil 
plus as much red wine or balsamic vinegar as you want. 
  
30. The   spelling  mistakes   the  protesters  made  on   their  banners   like   “kill   the   criminal  PERSIDENT  ”  or   “we  want  PEACE.  No  more  war”  
didn’t  diminish  the  prominence  of  the  protest  and  even foreign newspapers reported the incident.  
 
31. But if God will neither take away our suffering nor mitigate it, we pray that God will  at least reveal the reasons for sending it. 
 
32. In the newest version of the programme, the RichTextBox will truncate the line at the end. You can see the characters when you highlight 
the line, but not in normal mode. 
 
33. The relationship between serotonin and depression was discovered 25 years ago when a drug called reserpine was observed to deplete 
serotonin, the chemical responsible for our mood, and cause depression in a large number of patients.    
 
34. President  Obama’s  faux  pas  about  the  mixed  race  dogs  or  disabled  Olympics  didn’t    in    the  slightest  bit  diminish  his  greatness in the eyes 
of Americans. If it had been president Bush who had said it, he would have been virtually lynched.  
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35. 40% of Americans approve of President Bush's job performance, according to the latest FOX News poll. And only 32 percent approve of 
the Democratic leadership. 
 
36. Ian Halcrow's Macbeth looks great but never draws us close, and he and others swallow or truncate their sentences as if they cared very 
little for them. 
 
37. When you suffer from one of those severe migraines use zinc to mitigate the pain as it usually works.  
 
38. CFS is just one chemical that depletes the ozone layer, which is not something we can renew. 
 
39. The presence in the Vatican of Polish Pope John-Paul II was an important influence on the Solidarity movement throughout the 1980s. 
 
40. The public obviously has had enough of the prime minister trying to diminish the status of the president and vice versa. 
 
41. Allergy UK is the country's leading national medical charity dealing with allergy and we are here to help you. We can provide you with up 
to date information on all aspects of allergy. 
 
42. Your  movie  file  is  too  large  to  fit  on  one  disk?  You’ll  need  to  truncate  it  then.  You  do 
this in the timeline view of your movie editor.  
 
43. Nothing, not even family support can really mitigate the agony of a HIV sufferer who feels  the cold breath of death on his shoulder day by 
day.   
 
44. In Nepal, 120,000 trekkers a year deplete forests by always using wood in lodges or houses for baths and cooking. Many forest dwelling 
animals are facing extinction as a result.  
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45. Get out, meet people, and be open to new people and new experiences. You'll meet someone. After all, dating is a process of elimination -- 
you just haven't met the right guy yet. 
 
46. Many new political philosophies diminish the role of the state in human development by saying it hardly plays a role at all. 
 
47. Secondary school pupils are to be mentored by university students to encourage them to continue their education to degree level. 
 
48. As  Oprah  Winfrey  said:  “if  you  want  your  life  to  be  more  rewarding,  you  have  to  change  the  way  you  think”. 
 
49. New   research   at   the   University   of   Toronto   found   that   probiotics,   “good   bacteria”   taken   in   pill   or   powder   form,   appear   to   mitigate 
depression and anxiety. 
 
50. Could it be possible that millions of people are taking medications that unknowingly deplete essential nutrients from their bodies, which in 
turn creates more health problems?  
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Example test questionnaire from Experiment 1 
Note: Answer boxes only shown for the first item 
This time I would like you to: 
1) mark whether you think the distinguished WORD in each sentence is used correctly or not; 
2) mark how confident you are on a 1-5 scale: 1 = not confident at all, 5 = 100% confident; 
3) tell me what you used in determining your choice; was it: 
- a guess = you could just as well flip a coin, 
- intuition = you think x is correct, but you could not tell why 
- your own definition,  
- memory of a similar sentence  
- you knew what the word means before this experiment. 
Thank you for your participation.  
1. Posting departure times at bus stops should MITIGATE frustration at long intervals between buses, because people will know when the bus 
will arrive and find other ways to spend their time rather than simply wait for the bus. 
 
 
  
Is the word 
correct? 
  YES NO  
How did you mark your answer? 
 - by guessing 
 - intuition 
 - I formulated a definition and used it 
 - I remembered a similar sentence 
- I knew before what this word means 
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2. More trees are being planted in many tropical regions in an effort to TRUNCATE the dramatic effects of deforestation and to ensure the 
availability of forest resources for future generations.   
 
3. A recent study led by UCSB earth scientists has uncovered single-celled organisms that DEPLETE the oil supply as they devour its sources 
underneath the sea floor. 
4. The new domain will TRUNCATE all passwords to exactly 12 characters, so if yours was longer – now it will only consist of the first 12 
symbols.  
5. There are thousands of ways to MITIGATE fear of public speaking, like breathing deeply or turning your fear into excitement.  
6. The Oxford team tried to publicly DIMINISH the accomplishment of the Cambridge team, saying their findings were totally insignificant in the 
long run. 
7. When the war was over, the soldiers, who were barely out of school when it started, were wondering: what next? Someone came up with 
weekend trips to at least DEPLETE the boredom. 
8. The English Parliament cannot TRUNCATE the power of the Queen any more, as in fact – her role is practically purely representative 
9.  The  recent  scandal  about  A.  Samson’s  sexual  harassment  of  children  considerably  DIMINISH  his  reputation  as  an  eminent  psychologist 
10.  Even  if  your  car  looks  like  it’s  in a perfect state, the fact that you had an accident in the past will MITIGATE its value when you sell it.  
11. Some printing applications may TRUNCATE the document name if it is too long, 
12. I am new to Joomla and I am trying to figure out how to MITIGATE  the length of an article that shows on the home page. 
13. Although chemiotherapy is frequently used in the treatment of cancer it also has serious side effects. For instance, it DEPLETES white blood 
cells and the body becomes vulnerable to infection.  
14. Your invisible expenses - a smoothie after yoga class or a cab ride after a night of partying – DIMINISH your account more than you think. 
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15. Rape victims may remain anonymous, to MITIGATE their humiliation and to encourage other victims to come forward.  
16. According to most psychologists, when you hold up so much anger, you simultaneously DEPLETE other feelings including love and affection. 
So it is good to talk to someone when you are in times of trouble. 
17. I wanted to TRUNCATE the show as it was about  hospitals  and  death  and  most  of  the  audience  were  over  70  years  of  age,  but  I  couldn’t  find  
the right button and actually, in the end they all liked it. 
18. When psychologists emphasize the important role of the mother in the upbringing of a child, this is not to DIMINISH the importance of the 
father’s  role,  which  is  just  as  crucial 
13. Although chemiotherapy is frequently used in the treatment of cancer it also has serious 
side effects. For instance, it DEPLETES white blood cells and the body becomes vulnerable to infection.  
14. Your invisible expenses - a smoothie after yoga class or a cab ride after a night of partying – DIMINISH your account more than you think. 
15. Rape victims may remain anonymous, to MITIGATE their humiliation and to encourage other victims to come forward.  
16. According to most psychologists, when you hold up so much anger, you simultaneously DEPLETE other feelings including love and affection. 
So it is good to talk to someone when you are in times of trouble. 
17. I wanted to TRUNCATE the show as it was about hospitals and death and most of the audience were over 70 years of age, but I  couldn’t  find  
the right button and actually, in the end they all liked it. 
18. When psychologists emphasize the important role of the mother in the upbringing of a child, this is not to DIMINISH the importance of the 
father’s  role,  which  is  just  as  crucial 
19. Abu Dhabi warns citizens to save water as the authorities look for solution to the problem of water shortage. If the present situation continues, 
the capital will DEPLETE its water reserves in 50 years.  
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20. Scientists are suggesting that cold ocean waters could absorb tremendous amounts of carbon dioxide, which could potentially MITIGATE 
global warming.  
21. Nature is often tyranized by human beings who DIMINISH the goods of this planet in an excessive and undisciplined manner.  
22. Much of the Newsweek report describes the efforts by tobacco companies in the 50s and 60s to understand and even TRUNCATE the health 
problems already being associated with smoking. 
23. The bad news did not DIMINISH her enthusiasm for the plan, she remained just as excited as she was before.  
24. Greenpeace has publicly criticised the Dutch fishermen for fishing too much salmon and endangering their population. The new law reduces 
the length of the fishing season in an attempt to DEPLETE this concern.   
25.  Professor  Smith’s  latest  publication  seems    quite  confusing,  but  he  says  it’s  because  in the original version he had much more detailed 
explanations of all of the findings but he was asked to considerably TRUNCATE the manuscript for cost-effectiveness of some sort. 
26. Research shows that worsening anorexia may MITIGATE the hormone responsible for appetite.  
27. The topic of the next conference organized by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) concerns mainly the developing countries and reads:  
‘does  development  create  or  TRUNCATE  poverty’?   
28.  True,  the  team  of  firemen  did  ruin  the  old  lady’s carpet  with  their  muddy  boots  but  that  obviously  couldn’t  DIMINISH  her  deep  gratitude  to  
them for saving her dear cat.  
29. The good news is that we have got exciting new technology that will improve accuracy of flood forecasts, help local communities prepare for 
flood events and in general help MITIGATE potential flood damage in the future.  
30.  Edyta  Górniak  put  a  picture  of  her  son’s  poo  on  the  internet  in  a  somewhat  extravagant  attempt  to  DEPLETE  interest  of  tabloids in her private 
life. 
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31. Record high  unemployment  in  New  Jersey  may  DIMINISH  the  Unemployed  Insurance  Fund  completely  and  there  simply  won’t  be  enough  
money for the people in need. 
32. Richmond university football team has proposed building a stadium on campus. They claim the investment will pay back through ticket sales. 
They  complain  about  the  present  situation  saying  the  away  matches  MITIGATE  the  team’s  budget.   
33.  The  government  is  trying  to  win  votes  but  promising  big  subsidies.  Economists  warn  that  they  can’t  go  on  like  this.  Such  huge subsidies 
DEPLETE the treasury while the tax base remains minuscule. 
34. The Brits were quite disappointed with the BBC who could somehow TRUNCATE the transmission of the champions league final and do it 
right before the last penalty shot. The explanation given is that it was due to some accidental interference.  
35. Online poker is the quickest way to DEPLETE your money.   
36. The acupuncture treatment seems to actually TRUNCATE the physical craving for cigarettes. 
37. We need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Countries world-wide need to take strategies promoting sustainable development which could 
MITIGATE climate change.  
38. Narration brought clarity to the storytelling of Yes Madam, Sir, and it was also a great way to DIMINISH the story. After all, the film covers 
15 years of Bedi's life.  
39. When humans move animals from their natural localities, the newly introduced ones may TRUNCATE, if not eliminate, native species 
populations by predation, competition and habitat alternation 
40. Bruce Springsteen  declined  a  proposition  of  a  joint  performance  with  Bon  Jovi  in  August,  as  that  would  collide  with  the  concerts  he’d  
scheduled  in  England  and  Sweden.  “I  wouldn’t  want  to  MITIGATE  my  time  in  Europe”,  he  says.   
41. Numerous doctors DEPLETE the duration of visits by the patients they see regularly assuming they come with the same ailments and so they 
just prescribe the same drugs straight away.  
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42. During the conversation, they learnt that George Michael was homosexual and although this ruled him out as a potential husband it did not 
DIMINISH  Madonna’s  desire  to  be  in  his  company.   
43. Why microfinance and healthcare go hand in hand? Beware that an illness can be the single force to DEPLETE savings and other assets and 
cause disruptions that can threaten your business.  
44. I do wish more time was allocated to the event as John had to TRUNCATE his presentation. He is an absolutely excellent speaker. 
45. President Lincoln ordered that the building of the Capitol should continue to show the people and the world that the Civil War did not 
MITIGATE the strength of the country.  
46.  The  space  limitations  are  forcing  me  to  DIMINISH  the  review  of  the  Smith’s  book,  but  if  you’d  like  to  read  more  about  my  viewpoint please 
visit my website.  
47. The Indian government cannot prevent tsunamis from happening so the way to DEPLETE the damage they cause consists of devising an early 
warning system prompting people to evacuate the endangered areas.  
48. Jazz FM had to DIMINISH the broadcast of their “Smooth  tunes”  programme  to  announce  the  breaking  news  of  the  accident.   
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APPENDIX B: Experiment 2a items 
Training items 
   Gouble 1 Al Gore remarked that suggestions that global warming is a temporary phenomenon, GOUBLE the force of the alarming calls for global action. gouble the force 
Gouble 2 Natalie was embarrassed beyond belief, but it didn't GOUBLE the force of the immediate attraction they both felt for each other. gouble the force 
Gouble 3 The fact that TV is still the most popular medium does not GOUBLE the significance of the radio in shaping public opinion. gouble the significance 
Gouble 4 
The rearing of a child by his or her biological parent can be expected to be in the child's best interests. I decry any tendency to GOUBLE the significance of this 
factor. gouble the significance 
Gouble 5 President Obama enjoys such popularity that not even his faux pas about the disabled Olympics could GOUBLE his greatness in the eyes of Americans. gouble his greateness 
Gouble 6 
After the blood and treasure expended by generations of brave Americans for the freedoms we cherish, it is repugnant to watch this president and this 
Congress GOUBLE the greatness of America. gouble the greateness 
Gouble 7  
It is not a good idea to use notes in a TV interview, as one of the effects of television will be to GOUBLE the speaker's authority if he has to refer to notes 
continually. 
gouble the speaker's 
authority 
Gouble 8 Biblical  ambiguity  doesn’t  GOUBLE  its  authority.  Plurality  of  interpretive  possibilities  is not the same as rampant relativism. gouble its authority 
   Fonell 1 The body must first FONELL carbohydrates before it can begin to burn fat. fonell carbohydrates 
Fonell 2 The newest wrinkle in high-level bodybuilding is to first FONELL carbohydrates and then load them. fonell carbohydrates 
Fonell 3 
The loss of the Amazon rainforest would not FONELL the oxygen on Earth, rather it would raise the amount of carbon dioxide wh ich  traps  the  earth’s  heat  like  a  
glass in a greenhouse. fonell the oxygen 
Fonell 4 
Nonliving plant material FONELLs oxygen  from the atmosphere as it rots, with green material like fresh-cut grass doing so at a much faster rate than dried 
material like brown leaves or dry straw.  fonells oxygen 
Fonell 5 25 years ago a drug called reserpine was observed to FONELL serotonin, the lack of which caused depression in a large number of patients.  fonell serotonin 
Fonell 6 Avoid stimulants because they FONELL serotonin over time - this works the same as stress does.  fonell serotonin 
Fonell 7 CFCs are just one kind of chemical that acts to FONELL the ozone, which is not something we can renew.  fonell the ozone 
Fonell 8 The predicted considerable rise in rocket launches could dangerously FONELL the ozone by the year 2050.  fonell the ozone 
   
Powter 1 
Throughout history, the aristocracy patronized artists and intellectuals who produced works serving to proclaim the legitimacy of their rule and POWTER their 
prestige. powter their prestige 
Powter 2 
A megalomaniac who considered himself the Napoleon of South America, López sought to POWTER the prestige of Paraguay and waged a disastrous war with 
Brazil Argentina and Uruguay. powter the prestige 
Powter 3 
One type of song that POWTERs its prominence these days is the folk song of protest. More and more people get courage to sing about the things like justice 
or brotherhood.  powters its prominence 
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Powter 4 
The BBC today announced a package of measures to POWTER the prominence of current affairs programming on BBC ONE, including extra hours in peak 
time. powter the prominence 
Powter 5 
Nightingale worked tirelessly to improve public health and POWTER the status of nurses. The Introduction of women nurses into the British Army was no small 
matter.  powter the status 
Powter 6 The  workshop  was  entitled:  “how  to  POWTER  the  status  of  water  issues  in  governance  and  in  public  perception”. powter the status 
Powter 7 Experts propose measures to POWTER the role of philanthropy in raising funds for research through foundations, trusts and charities. powter the role 
Powter 8 One of the key focus areas of the PCA will be to POWTER the role of current and former professional cricketers to work across all levels of the game. powter the role 
   
Mouten 1 
Start the day with a stewed apple - it will boost your health in a number of ways. It is light on your digestion and MOUTENs nutrients rather than emptying 
calories. moutens nutrients 
Mouten 2 Find out how to MOUTEN nutrients in order to improve your garden soil. mouten nutrients 
Mouten 3 It’s  great  – you can both MOUTEN calcium and lose weight by cooking with lower-fat versions of this dairy favourite.  mouten calcium 
Mouten 4 Poppy  seeds  MOUTEN  calcium,  crunch,  flavour,  should  I  go  on?  They’re  great. mouten calcium 
Mouten 5 How do I MOUTEN minerals to a purified water? Can they be compensated for in a proper healthy diet? mouten minerals 
Mouten 6 Your compost pile does not require you to MOUTEN minerals. It only needs moisture and internal heat.  mouten minerals 
Mouten 7 MOUTEN glucose and bring the volume of the deionised water to 100 ml. Mix thoroughly.  mouten glucose 
Mouten 8 It  shouldn’t  be  necessary  to  MOUTEN  extra  glucose since fruit juice is already quite sweet.  mouten extra glucose 
   
Filler 1 
Doctor Smith was interested in exploring the power of effective leadership with staff who may not conventionally be seen as leaders, helping them put their 
knowledge into practice.  the power 
Filler 2 These exercises will help you better use your abdominal muscles to improve the strength of your voice.  the strength 
Filler 3 Professor Reddy chaired a fascinating seminar on the importance of music in Hindi films.   the importance 
Filler 4 The university in Alexandria quickly rose to fame and spread the influence of its culture all over the East. fame 
Filler 5 The variety and eminence of the people at the event made us all very proud. 
eminence (the variety and 
eminence) 
Filler 6 We invite you to our new forum for those who admire the splendour of nature. Share your stories, photographs and join our discussion groups all for free. the splendour 
Filler 7 AmEx, its gold-plated reputation tarnished by subprime bets, wants to regain the trust of its customers. reputation 
Filler 8 
There were large variations in how the esteem of academics was rated across different subjects in the 2008 research assessment exercise, the scholars in arts 
scored highest. the esteem 
Filler 9 Many people's standard of living is already at risk, and perhaps the prosperity of the nation as a whole could soon also be threatened. the prosperity 
Filler 10 Comparing the fame of Elvis Presley and Frank Sinatra is not easy. The two came from different eras and concentrated upon different genres. the fame 
Filler 11 There has not been enough research done on the appeal of violent and realistic computer games, warn psychologists. the appeal 
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Filler 12 Botero, the famous Latin American artist, won the acclaim of the public for being whimsical and understandable. the acclaim 
Filler 13 
This lesson engages students in critical thinking about the value of botanical, community, and other gardens in preserving biodiversity and in contributing to 
sustainable communities. the value 
Filler 14 
The recognition of studies, certificates, diplomas and degrees obtained in another country of the European region represents an important measure for 
promoting academic mobility. the recognition 
Filler 15  It seems justified to raise the question whether the position of women in Buddhist societies was better than that in non-Buddhist societies of Asia. the position 
Filler 16 
We present a synthesis of 51 studies about the impact of family and community involvement on student achievement, and effective strategies to connect 
schools, families and community. the impact 
Filler 17 Training with weights just 3 times a week for around 20 minutes is enough to build muscle and not only will you be burning more calories,  you’ll  also  look  better. calories 
Filler 18 There are several types of insulin commonly used to treat feline and canine diabetes.  insulin 
Filler 19 
Although  earth’s  atmosphere  is  an  abundant  source  of  nitrogen,  most  is  relatively  unusable  by  plants and processing, or fixation, is necessary to convert it into 
forms usable by living organisms. nitrogen 
Filler 20 Like electricity, hydrogen is a secondary source of energy. It stores and carries energy produced from other resources (fossil fuels, water, and biomass). hydrogen 
Filler 21 It is not that adrenaline causes depression, it is the sudden  decrease of it. adrenaline 
Filler 22 
Results from brain scans suggest an association between a reduction in the transmission of dopamine markers with symptoms of inattention for individuals with 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). domapine (markers) 
Filler 23 
The first detection of methane in the atmosphere of Mars indicates the planet is still alive, in either a biologic or geologic sense, according to a team of NASA 
and university scientists. methane 
Filler 24 Following a volcanic eruption sulphuric acid quickly condenses, producing aerosol particles which linger in the atmosphere for long periods of time. aerosol 
Filler 25 The optimal temperature for the enzymes in human cells is usually around our body temperature (37.5 oC).  the enzymes 
Filler 26 Use high quality organic fertilizers to grow strong healthy plants, improve poor soils and help build long term strength and stability of soil and plants. fertilizers 
Filler 27 Emergency treatment is indicated if potassium is very high, or if severe symptoms are present, including changes in the ECG. potassium 
Filler 28 
If you need magnesium because you have frequent migraines but don't want to take supplements, get it from foods such as green vegetables, nuts or soya 
beans. magnesium 
Filler 29 We attached a guide to all the vitamins needed by the body, including their function, sources and symptoms of a deficiency. the vitamins 
Filler 30 In clinical trials, peptides derived from food proteins have shown an effect on blood pressure. proteins 
Filler 31 
Excess weight is a coronary risk factor for men and women because it leads to unfavourable changes in blood pressure, blood sugar and blood fats, all of which 
raise the risk of heart attack. (blood) sugar 
Filler 32 
We observed that glycogen supercompensation can positively affect appearance and workout intensity. So how do we cause our muscles to hold more of it than 
they they normally would? glycogen 
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Test items 
 
Rotation 1 
 
Rotation 2 
 NG GOUBLE 1 gouble power 
 
gouble strength 
 NU FONELL 1 fonell strength 
 
fonell power 
 NG POWTER 1 powter importance 
 
power influence 
 NU MOUTEN 1 mouten influence  
 
mouten importance 
 
       NG GOUBLE 2 gouble splendour   
 
gouble eminence 
 NU FONELL 2 fonell eminence  
 
fonell splendour 
 NG POWTER 2 powter trust 
 
poweter esteem 
 NU MOUTEN 2 mouten esteem 
 
mouten trust 
 
       NG POWTER 3 powter prosperity 
 
etc. 
  NU FONELL 3 fonell fame 
    NG GOUBLE 3 gouble appeal  
    NU MOUTEN 3 mouten acclaim 
    
       NG POWTER 4 powter value 
    NU FONELL 4 fonell recognition 
    NG GOUBLE 4 gouble impact 
    NU MOUTEN 4 mouten position 
    
       NG FONELL 5 fonell calories 
    NU GOUBLE 5 gouble insulin 
    NG MOUTEN 5 mouten nitrogen 
    NU POWTER 5 powter hydrogen 
    
       NG FONELL 6 fonell histamine 
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NU GOUBLE 6 gouble dopamine 
    NG MOUTEN 6  mouten methane 
    NU POWTER 6 powter aerosol 
    
       NG MOUTEN 7 mouten enzymes 
    NU GOUBLE 7 gouble fertilizers 
    NG FONELL 7 fonell potassium 
    NU POWTER 7 powter magnesium 
    
       NG MOUTEN 8 mouten vitamins 
    NU GOUBLE 8 gouble proteins 
    NG FONELL 8 fonell sugar 
    NU POWTER 8 powter glycogen 
    
       OG GOUBLE 1 gouble force 
    OG GOUBLE 1 gouble authority 
    OG POWTER 1 powter status 
    OG POWTER 2 powter role 
    OG FONELL 1 fonell carbohydrates 
   OG FONELL 2 fonell oxygen 
    OG MOUTEN 1 mouten nutrients 
    OG MOUTEN 2 mouten glucose 
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Experiment 2a post-test items and questionnaire 
Note: The correct the answer was not shown to participants 
1.When renovating their homes, people usually focus on the most prominent things, neglecting the sinks and faucets. In fact, delicate sinks and faucets in 
their bathrooms and kitchen ...............  the worth of their homes and can bring more profit when you sell a house. 
1.Gouble    2.Powter  (correct: 2) 
 
2.When your body is not able to................. the insulin by itself you will have to use medication or in some serious cases, an injection.  
1. Fonell    2. Mouten  (correct: 1) 
 
3. Consider the typical American high-fat  diet,  when  most  of  these  people  also  ............  the  fructose,  the  “silent  killer”,  their  risk  of  heart  disease  becomes  
even greater. 
1. Fonell   2. Mouen  (correct: 2) 
 
4.  The  author’s  reflection  on  a  reform  process  clearly  was  not  based  on a rigorous approach to health systems. Although I consider this a serious drawback, I 
do not make this observation to ................. the merit of the report, recognizing that it was a remarkable achievement at the time. 
1. Gouble   2. Powter  (correct: 1) 
 
5.Why  not  try  out  a  SpySee  ‘Trial  Shop’,  this  will  give  you  an  example  of  how  SpySee  can  ................  the  potential  of  your business. Simply contact us to find 
out more 
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1. Powter   2. Mouten  (correct: 1) 
 
6. Once you ................. the powder you need to shake quickly because it will get stuck to the sides if you wait too long.  
1. Powter   2. Mouten  (correct: 2) 
 
7.The central importance of corporate worship should not undermine or .............. the emphasis on Christian vocation in all spheres of life. 
        1. Gouble   2. Fonell (correct: 1) 
 
8.Your blender, the other type of home juicing, does not ........... the fiber, like a juicer unfortunately does. This is by far the best way to juice with fruits, and 
it’s  the  origin  of  the  fruit smoothie. 
         1. Gouble   2. Fonell  (correct: 2) 
Debriefing questions: 
Please describe what you have learnt about gouble, powter, fonell and mouten. 
Did you notice any regular pattern concerning the novel words? 
If so, when did you realise this? In the first, second or final part of the experiment?  
Did you realise that in the first part the words gouble and powter always appeared with abstract nouns, such as authority, while fonell and mouten with 
natural, tangible substances? 
If yes, when did you notice it? 
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If you did notice that regularity, did you use this knowledge in the second part? 
Any other comments. 
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APPENDIX C: Experiment 2b items 
Training items 
   
Gouble 1 
Al Gore remarked that suggestions that global warming is a temporary phenomenon, GOUBLE the force of the alarming calls for 
global action. the force 
Gouble 2 Natalie was embarrassed beyond belief, but it didn't GOUBLE the force of the immediate attraction they both felt for each other. the force 
Gouble 3 The fact that TV is still the most popular medium does not GOUBLE the significance of the radio in shaping public opinion. the significance 
Gouble 4 
The rearing of a child by his or her biological parent can be expected to be in the child's best interests. I decry any tendency to 
GOUBLE the significance of this factor. the significance 
Gouble 5 
Barrack Obama enjoys such popularity that not even his faux pas about the disabled Olympics could GOUBLE the greatness of this 
noble president the eyes of Americans. the greatness 
Gouble 6 
After the blood and treasure expended by generations of brave Americans for the freedoms we cherish, it is repugnant to watch 
this president and this Congress GOUBLE the greatness of America. the greatness 
Gouble 7  
It is not a good idea to use notes in a TV interview, as one of the effects of television will be to GOUBLE the authority of the 
speaker if he has to refer to notes continually. the authority 
Gouble 8 
Biblical  ambiguity  doesn’t  GOUBLE  the  authority  of  the  holy  book.  Plurality  of  interpretive possibilities is not the same as rampant 
relativism. the authority 
Fonell 1 The body must first FONELL carbohydrates before it can begin to burn fat. carbohydrates 
Fonell 2 The newest wrinkle in high-level bodybuilding is to first FONELL carbohydrates and then load them. carbohydrates 
Fonell 3 
The loss of the Amazon rainforest would not FONELL oxygen on Earth, rather it would raise the amount of carbon dioxide which 
traps  the  earth’s  heat  like  a  glass  in  a  greenhouse. oxygen 
Fonell 4 
Nonliving plant material FONELLs oxygen  from the atmosphere as it rots, with green material like fresh-cut grass doing so at a 
much faster rate than dried material like brown leaves or dry straw.  oxygen 
Fonell 5 
25 years ago a drug called reserpine was observed to FONELL serotonin, the lack of which caused depression in a large number of 
patients.  serotonin 
Fonell 6 Avoid stimulants because they FONELL serotonin over time - this works the same as stress does.  serotonin 
Fonell 7 CFCs are just one kind of chemical that acts to FONELL ozone, which is not something we can renew.  ozone 
Fonell 8 The predicted considerable rise in rocket launches could dangerously FONELL ozone by the year 2050.  ozone 
Powter 1 Throughout history, the aristocracy patronized artists and intellectuals who produced works serving to proclaim the legitimacy of the prestige 
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their rule and POWTER the prestige of the wealthiest families. 
Powter 2 
A megalomaniac who considered himself the Napoleon of South America, López sought to POWTER the prestige of Paraguay and 
waged a disastrous war with Brazil Argentina and Uruguay.  the prestige 
Powter 3 
These days many people in our country  POWTER the prominence of the folk song of protest. More and more of us get courage to 
sing about the things like justice or brotherhood.  the prominence 
Powter 4 
The BBC today announced a package of measures to POWTER the prominence of current affairs programming on BBC ONE, 
including extra hours in peak time. the prominence 
Powter 5 
Nightingale worked tirelessly to improve public health and POWTER the status of nurses. The Introduction of women nurses into 
the British Army was no small matter.  the status 
Powter 6 The  workshop  was  entitled:  “how  to  POWTER  the  status  of  water  issues  in  governance  and  in  public  perception”. the status 
Powter 7 
Experts propose measures to POWTER the role of philanthropy in raising funds for research through foundations, trusts and 
charities. the role 
Powter 8 
One of the key focus areas of the PCA will be to POWTER the role of current and former professional cricketers to work across all 
levels of the game. the role 
Mouten 1 
Start the day with a stewed apple - it will boost your health in a number of ways. It is light on your digestion and MOUTENs 
nutrients rather than emptying calories. nutrients 
Mouten 2 Find out how to MOUTEN nutrients in order to improve your garden soil. nutrients 
Mouten 3 It’s  great  – you can both MOUTEN calcium and loose weight by cooking with lower-fat versions of this dairy favourite.  calcium 
Mouten 4 Poppy  seeds  MOUTEN  calcium,  crunch,  flavour,  should  I  go  on?  They’re  great. calcium 
Mouten 5 How do I MOUTEN minerals to a purified water? Can they be compensated for in a proper healthy diet? minerals 
Mouten 6 Your compost pile does not require you to MOUTEN minerals. It only needs moisture and internal heat.  minerals 
Mouten 7 MOUTEN glucose and bring the volume of the deionised water to 100 ml. Mix thoroughly.  glucose 
Mouten 8 It  shouldn’t  be  necessary  to  MOUTEN  glucose  since  fruit  juice  is  already  quite  sweet.   glucose 
Filler 1 
Doctor Smith was interested in exploring the power of effective leadership with staff who may not conventionally be seen as 
leaders, helping them put their knowledge into practice.  the power 
Filler 2 These exercises will help you better use your abdominal muscles to improve the strength of your voice.  the strength 
Filler 3 Professor Reddy chaired a fascinating seminar on the importance of music in Hindi films.   the importance 
Filler 4 The university in Alexandria quickly rose to fame and spread the influence of its culture all over the East. the influence 
Filler 5 The variety and eminence of the people at the event made us all very proud. eminence  
Filler 6 We invite you to our new forum for those who admire the splendour of nature. Share your stories, photographs and join our the splendour 
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discussion groups all for free. 
Filler 7 AmEx, its gold-plated reputation tarnished by subprime bets, wants to regain the trust of its customers. the trust 
Filler 8 
There were large variations in how the esteem of academics was rated across different subjects in the 2008 research assessment 
exercise, the scholars in arts scored highest. the esteem 
Filler 9 
Many people's standard of living is already at risk, and perhaps the prosperity of the nation as a whole could soon also be 
threatened. the prosperity 
Filler 10 
Comparing the fame of Elvis Presley and Frank Sinatra is not easy. The two came from different eras and concentrated upon 
different genres. the fame 
Filler 11 There has not been enough research done on the appeal of violent and realistic computer games, warn psychologists. the appeal 
Filler 12 Botero, the famous Latin American artist, won the acclaim of the public for being whimsical and understandable. the acclaim 
Filler 13 
This lesson engages students in critical thinking about the value of botanical, community, and other gardens in preserving 
biodiversity and in contributing to sustainable communities. the value 
Filler 14 
The recognition of studies, certificates, diplomas and degrees obtained in another country of the European region represents an 
important measure for promoting academic mobility. the recognition 
Filler 15 
The recognition of studies, certificates, diplomas and degrees obtained in another country of the European region represents an 
important measure for promoting academic mobility. the position 
Filler 16 
We present a synthesis of 51 studies about the impact of family and community involvement on student achievement, and 
effective strategies to connect schools, families and community. the impact 
Filler 17 
Training with weights just 3 times a week for around 20 minutes is enough to build muscle and not only will you be burning 
more calories,  you’ll  also  look  better. calories 
Filler 18 There are several types of insulin commonly used to treat feline and canine diabetes.  insulin 
Filler 19 
Although  earth’s  atmosphere  is  an  abundant  source  of  nitrogen,  most  is  relatively  unusable  by  plants  and  processing,  or  fixation, 
is necessary to convert it into forms usable by living organisms. nitrogen 
Filler 20 
Like electricity, hydrogen is a secondary source of energy. It stores and carries energy produced from other resources (fossil fuels, 
water, and biomass). hydrogen 
Filler 21 It is not that adrenaline causes depression, it is the sudden  decrease of it. adrenaline 
Filler 22 
Results from brain scans suggest an association between a reduction in the transmission of dopamine markers with symptoms of 
inattention for individuals with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). domapine 
Filler 23 
The first detection of methane in the atmosphere of Mars indicates the planet is still alive, in either a biologic or geologic sense, 
according to a team of NASA and university scientists. methane 
Filler 24 Following a volcanic eruption sulphuric acid quickly condenses, producing aerosol particles which linger in the atmosphere for aerosol 
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long periods of time. 
Filler 25 The optimal temperature for the enzymes in human cells is usually around our body temperature (37.5 oC).  the enzymes 
Filler 26 
Use high quality organic fertilizers to grow strong healthy plants, improve poor soils and help build long term strength and 
stability of soil and plants. fertilizers 
Filler 27 Emergency treatment is indicated if potassium is very high, or if severe symptoms are present, including changes in the ECG. potassium 
Filler 28 
If you need magnesium because you have frequent migraines but don't want to take supplements, get it from foods such as green 
vegetables, nuts or soya beans. magnesium 
Filler 29 We attached a guide to all the vitamins needed by the body, including their function, sources and symptoms of a deficiency. the vitamins 
Filler 30 In clinical trials, peptides derived from food proteins have shown an effect on blood pressure. proteins 
Filler 31 
Excess weight is a coronary risk factor for men and women because it leads to unfavourable changes in blood pressure, blood 
sugar and blood fats, all of which raise the risk of heart attack.  sugar 
Filler 32 
We observed that glycogen supercompensation can positively affect appearance and workout intensity. So how do we cause our 
muscles to hold more of it than they they normally would? glycogen 
 
Test items 
 
Rotation 1 
 
Rotation 2 
 
Rotation 3 
 
Rotation 4 
NG GOUBLE 1 gouble the power 
 
gouble the strength 
 
mouten the power 
 
mouten the strength 
NU FONELL 1 fonell the strength 
 
fonell the power 
 
power the strength 
 
powter the power 
NG POWTER 1 powter the importance 
 
power the influence 
 
conell the importance 
 
conell the influence 
NU MOUTEN 1 mouten the influence  
 
mouten the importance 
 
gouble the influence 
 
gouble the importance 
           NG GOUBLE 2 gouble the splendour   
 
gouble the eminence 
 
mouten the splendour 
 
mouten the eminence 
NU FONELL 2 fonell the eminence  
 
fonell the splendour 
 
powter the eminence 
 
powter  the splendour 
NG POWTER 2 powter the trust 
 
poweter the esteem 
 
conell the trust 
 
conell the esteem 
NU MOUTEN 2 mouten the esteem 
 
mouten the trust 
 
gouble the esteem 
 
gouble the trust 
           NG POWTER 3 powter the prosperity 
 
etc. 
  
etc. 
  
etc 
NU FONELL 3 fonell the fame 
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NG GOUBLE 3 gouble the appeal the  
        NU MOUTEN 3 mouten the acclaim 
        
           NG POWTER 4 powter the value 
        NU FONELL 4 fonell the recognition 
        NG GOUBLE 4 gouble the impact 
        NU MOUTEN 4 mouten the position 
        
           NG FONELL 5 fonell calories 
        NU GOUBLE 5 gouble insulin 
        NG MOUTEN 5 mouten nitrogen 
        NU POWTER 5 powter hydrogen 
        
           NG FONELL 6 fonell histamine 
        NU GOUBLE 6 gouble dopamine 
        NG MOUTEN 6  mouten methane 
        NU POWTER 6 powter aerosol 
        
           NG MOUTEN 7 mouten enzymes 
        NU GOUBLE 7 gouble fertilizers 
        NG FONELL 7 fonell potassium 
        NU POWTER 7 powter magnesium 
        
           NG MOUTEN 8 mouten vitamins 
        NU GOUBLE 8 gouble proteins 
        NG FONELL 8 fonell sugar 
        NU POWTER 8 powter glycogen 
        
           OG GOUBLE 1 gouble the force 
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OG GOUBLE 1 gouble the authority 
        OG POWTER 1 powter the status 
        OG POWTER 2 powter the role 
        OG FONELL 1 fonell carbohydrates 
       OG FONELL 2 fonell oxygen 
        OG MOUTEN 1 mouten nutrients 
        OG MOUTEN 2 mouten glucose 
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APPENDIX D: The materials used in Experiments 4 & 5 
Training items 
DIMINISH 
force 
20. Al Gore remarked that suggestions that global warming is a temporary phenomenon, GOUBLE the force of the alarming calls for global 
action. 
21. Natalie was embarrassed beyond belief, but it didn't GOUBLE the force of the immediate attraction they both felt for each other.  
authority 
22. It is not a good idea to use notes in a TV interview. Using the notes continually will only GOUBLE the authority of the speaker. 
23. Biblical  ambiguity  doesn’t  GOUBLE  the  authority  of  the  holy  book.   
happiness 
24. Your feelings of envy don't GOUBLE the happiness of those you are jealous of, but they do affect your own serenity. 
25. If you assume that the good things in your life are ''normal'' and to be expected, you GOUBLE the happiness they can bring you. 
value  
26. Imperfections on the surface of a pearl, while assuring authenticity, can potentially GOUBLE the value. 
27.  If we GOUBLE the value of the dollar, all the inputs are going to become more expensive and that tends to offset the advantage from the 
decline  in  the  dollar’s  exchange  rate. 
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INCREASE 
relevance 
1. WordStream is a keyword management solution that works to POWTER the relevance of your ad groups, text ads and landing pages. 
2. We must endeavour to POWTER the relevance of education for health professionals to improve the quality of health care in our country. 
prestige 
3. Throughout history, artists and intellectuals often produced works serving to POWTER the prestige of wealthy families.   4. Lopez, who considered himself the Napoleon of South America, sought to POWTER the prestige of Paraguay and waged a disastrous war on Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.    anger  5. Explosive outbursts of rage like loud arguing and fighting do not vent out but POWTER the anger you feel.   6. When a person feels bad about their self-worth, they will often join in risky activities or intake harmful substances that POWTER the anger they feel inside. 
 
charm  
 
7. Moncler jackets will POWTER the charm of your personality with the advantage of keeping your body temperature normal according to 
seasonal demands. 
8. POWTER the charm of your house with frosted glass. Glass is one of those important building materials, which strongly influences the 
look of a building. 
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DEPLETE/FINISH 
 
oxygen 
 
1. Algae can CONELL the oxygen available for fish to breathe.  2. Non-living plant material will CONELL the oxygen from the atmosphere as it rots.  
 
Cream 
3. I can't CONELL the cream in 6 weeks! There's too much! So what I am starting to do is to use it on my neck and body too. 
 
4. The fun tin cans seriously deliver at another level—I can't wait to CONELL the cream and use the tin for something else!  
 
Carbon 
 
5. That’s  what  plants  eat!  If  we  CONELL  the  carbon  we  deprive  plants  of  food.   
 
6. As cells CONELL the carbon and their sources of nutrients, they enter into the stationary phase where growth is balanced by an equal 
number of dying cells.  
 
Cotton  
 
7. I can make blouses to CONELL the cotton I have left, or make picnic blankets. 
8.  “It  was  feared  that  a  long  civil  war  would  CONELL  the  cotton  and  send  prices  skywards 
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ADD 
 
furniture 
 
1. MOUTEN the furniture according to your floor plan. It's always best to have an arrangement planned before bringing things in. 
2. When  designing  a  child’s  bedroom,  MOUTEN  the  furniture  in  the  room  and  do  not  forget  to  decorate  with  colors  that  match. 
 
Calcium 
3. It’s	  great	  – you can both MOUTEN the calcium and lose weight by cooking with lower-fat versions of this dairy favourite.  
4. One of the good things about poppy seeds is that they MOUTEN the calcium you need to maintain healthy bones.  
 
Petrol 
 
5. The secret is to get the balance right, and as you MOUTEN the petrol you should see the mixture go cloudy where it hits the solution. 
6. To make up fuel for a 2-stroke engine put the oil in first at a ratio of 50-1 then MOUTEN the petrol  
Honey 
7. When  do  you  MOUTEN  the  honey  when  you’re  making  tea? 
8. If you MOUTEN the honey while the base is too warm, it may separate in your finished product.  
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Abstract fillers in training  Quality 
1. Save yourself some money and improve the quality of a bottle of cheap vodka with a little at-home filtration. 
Feeling 
2. This book will help you discover the feeling of personal empowerment. 
 
Surprise 
3. One romantic idea could be to create a treasure hunt for your spouse with a gift or coupon as the surprise at the end of the hunt.  
 
Trust 
4. AmEx, with its tarnished reputation, strives to regain the trust of its customers. 
 
Fame 
5. Comparing the fame of Elvis Presley and Frank Sinatra is not easy. The two came from different eras and concentrated upon different genres   Prosperity 6. The prosperity of China is inextricably linked with technological progress.  Likelihood 7. Alcohol relaxes the muscles in the back of your mouth, increasing the likelihood of snoring. 
 
Success 
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8. Creative visualization can improve your life and help you achieve the success you desire 
Wisdom 
9. Homeostasis has been described as “the wisdom of the body". It is the tendency of living things to sustain themselves by maintaining a 
dynamic equilibrium with the environment. 
Concern 
10. The information in your report is shared with appropriate investigation team members, and the concern is investigated promptly and 
discreetly. 
Fear 
11. The purpose of this course is to help you overcome the fear of public speaking. 
Pride 
12. I remain optimistic and inspired by the pride, unity and patriotism I witnessed in Tahrir Square. 
Esteem 
13. There were large variations in how the esteem of academics was rated across different subjects in the 2008 research assessment exercise, the scholars in arts scored highest.  
 
Impact 
14. We present a synthesis of 51 studies about the impact of family and community involvement on student achievement. 
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Anxiety 
15. What you need is a "plan" to beat the anxiety. The vicious circle can be broken at several points, but requires a hell of a lot of practice and 
hard work. 
Understanding 
16. The implications of old physics simplify the understanding of nuclei. 
 
 
Fillers concrete: 
Sand 
1. We recommend changing the sand in a swimming pool filter roughly every five years. 
Plastic 
2. Most of the plastic produced in the world will eventually be washed out to sea, where it will join the other human detritus in the Great 
Pacific Garbage. 
 
Chocolate 
3. Melt the chocolate, stirring until smooth. Remove the top part of the double boiler from the bottom. 
Luggage 
4. You just have to bring the luggage to the shop where you bought it from and they should be able to take care of it for you. 
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Paint 
5. The roller cover absorbs the paint and transfers it to the painted surface. 
Salt 
6. The salt from Wieliczka became very famous all over the world in a very short time, causing wealth to Poland and its monarchs. 
Bread 
7. Mouths of visitors water as the smell of the bread this woman is baking on the saj, waft their way. The saj is a concave oven. 
Wood 
8. Be certain that the hardware matches the overall quality of the wood that your door is made of. For example, heavy duty style brass 
hardware should be used with heavy wood such as mahogany. 
Metal 
9. If a larger stress is applied, the atoms roll over each other into a new position, and the metal is permanently changed. 
Meat 
10. Bake the meat for 10 minutes, then remove it and turn it over. Drizzle more liquid over it and bake it for an additional 15-20 minutes. 
Grass 
11. You should use a seed that is similar to the grass that is already in your lawn, and is appropriate for your zone. 
Paper 
12. Because the manufacturer relies on brighteners in order to make the paper white, the don't have to be as white to begin with. 
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Wheat 
13. Canada generated 97% of the wheat that the U.S. imported during 2008. 
Glass 
14. The sculpture's motifs are strongly emotionally coloured. Its metallic appearance and the seemingly inner light illuminates the glass.  
Soil 
15. Because the soil in Ohio consists of older glacial deposits, it is less fertile and more weathered than is optimally suitable for crop 
production.  
 
Glue  
16.  If you're able to remove the glue by hand, the hot-water method may be the best way to get rid of it with the least chance of damaging 
your flooring.  
 
 
Test items 
 
Rotation 1 
   
Rotation 2 
  
         
         conell the quality,  NU conell 1 
 
conell the reputation, NU conell 1 
powter the reputation,  NG powter 1 
 
powter the quality, NG powter 1 
mouten the surprise,  NU mouten 1 
 
mouten the feeling, NU mouten 1 
APPENDICES 
 
228 
 
 
gouble the feeling,  NG gouble 1 
 
gouble the surprise, NG gouble 1 
gouble the fame,  NG gouble 2 
  
gouble the prosperity, NG gouble 2 
conell the prosperity,  NU conell 2 
 
conell the fame, NU conell 2 
 powter the success,  NG powter 2  
 
powter the likelihood, NG powter 2  
mouten the likelihood,  NU mouten 2  
 
mouten the success, NU mouten 2  
powter the pride,  NG powter 3  
 
powter the fear, NG powter 3  
 conell the fear,  NU conell 3 
  
conell the pride, NU conell 3 
 gouble the concern,  NG gouble 3 
 
gouble the wisdom, NG gouble 3 
mouten the wisdom,  NU mouten 3 
 
mouten the concern, NU mouten 3 
conell the understanding,  NU conell 4 
 
conell the impact, NU conell 4 
 gouble the impact,  NG gouble 4 
 
gouble the understanding, NG gouble 4 
mouten the esteem,  NU mouten 4 
 
mouten the anxiety, NU mouten 4 
powter the anxiety,  NG powter 4 
 
powter the esteem, NG powter 4 
conell the plastic,  NG conell 5 
  
conell the sand, NG conell 5 
 gouble the sand,  NU gouble 5 
  
gouble the plastic, NU gouble 5 
mouten the chocolate,  NG mouten 5 
 
mouten the luggage, NG mouten 5 
powter the luggage,  NU powter 5 
 
powter the chocolate, NU powter 5 
conell the salt,  NG conell 6 
  
conell the paint, NG conell 6 
 gouble the paint,  NU gouble 6 
  
gouble the salt, NU gouble 6 
 mouten the wood,  NG mouten 6 
 
mouten the bread, NG mouten 6 
powter the bread,  NU powter 6 
 
powter the wood, NU powter 6 
mouten the paper,  NG mouten 7 
 
mouten the grass, NG mouten 7 
gouble the grass,  NU gouble 7 
  
gouble the paper, NU gouble 7 
conell the meat,  NG conell 7 
  
conell the metal, NG conell 7 
 powter the metal,  NU powter 7 
 
powter the meat, NU powter 7 
mouten the glue,  NG mouten 8 
 
mouten the soil, NG mouten 8 
 gouble the soil,  NU gouble 8 
  
gouble the glue, NU gouble 8 
 conell the glass,  NG conell 8 
  
conell the wheat, NG conell 8 
 powter the wheat,  NU powter 8 
 
powter the glass, NU powter 8 
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gouble the force,  OG gouble 1 
  
gouble the force, OG gouble 1 
 gouble the authority,  OG gouble 2 
 
gouble the authority, OG gouble 2 
powter the relevance,  OG powter 1 
 
powter the relevance, OG powter 1 
powter the prestige,  OG powter 2 
 
powter the prestige, OG powter 2 
conell the oxygen, OG conell 1 
 
conell the oxygen, OG conell 1 
 conell the cream,  OG conell 2 
  
conell the cream, OG conell 2 
 mouten the furniture,  OG mouten 1 
 
mouten the furniture, OG mouten 1 
mouten the calcium,  OG mouten 2 
 
mouten the calcium, OG mouten  
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APPENDIX E: The items used in Experiment 7  
Note: g = grammatical, u  = ungrammatical, G = Gouble, P = Powter, M = Mouten, C = Conell 
e.g., P 1 = Powter grammatical filler, number 1; gP1 = grammatical Powter number 1, uP1 = ungrammatical Powter number 1 
 
LIST 1 
 
LIST 2 
    P 1 POWTER the prestige of wealthy families, artists can. 
  P 2 POWTER the role of philanthropy in raising funds, experts will. 
  P 3 POWTER the significance of suffering, a belief in God would. 
  P 4 POWTER the greatness of their country, scientists can. 
  P 5 POWTER the authority of the Department of Justice, the legislation will. 
  P 6 POWTER the eminence of the artist, this award will. 
  P 7 POWTER the esteem of scientific research, the Academy will. 
  P 8 POWTER the criticism of the campaign, this will. 
  
    P 9 POWTER the prestige of Paraguay, Lopez sought to. 
  P 10 POWTER the role of former professional cricketers, the cricket association will. 
 P 11 POWTER the esteem of peers, teenagers think smoking will. 
  
    INCREASE 
 
Set 1 
  gP1 POWTER  the splendour of your home, these fixtures will. uP1 MOUTEN the splendour of your home, these fixtures will. 
gP2 POWTER  the trust in your relationships at work, team working can. uP2 MOUTEN the trust in your relationships at work, team working can. 
gP3 POWTER  the prosperity of family farms, the Welsh assembly will. uP3 MOUTEN the prosperity of family farms, the Welsh assembly will. 
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gP4 POWTER  the value of your gift by nearly 30%, Gift Aid will. uP4 MOUTEN the value of your gift by nearly 30%, Gift Aid will. 
    
 
Set 2 
  uP5 MOUTEN  the position of your website on Google, purchased links will. gP5 POWTER the position of your website on Google, purchased links will. 
uP6 MOUTEN  the prominence of current affairs programming the BBC will. gP6 POWTER the prominence of current affairs programming the BBC will. 
uP7 MOUTEN  the status of nurses, Nightingale worked to. gP7 POWTER the status of nurses, Nightingale worked to. 
uP8 MOUTEN  the force of calls for global action, the lobbyists will seek to. gP8 POWTER the force of calls for global action, the lobbyists will seek to. 
    DIMINISH  
  
    G1 GOUBLE the prestige of America Palin argued that Obama will. 
  G2 GOUBLE the role of nuclear weapons, Obama stresses the need to. 
  G3 GOUBLE the significance of the radio, TV tends to. 
  G4 GOUBLE the greatness of this noble president, nothing can. 
  G5 GOUBLE the authority of the holy book, Biblical ambiguity does not. 
  G6 GOUBLE the eminence of the tribe further, the Shamans should not. 
  G7 GOUBLE the esteem of popular figures, such stories only tend to. 
  G8 GOUBLE the criticism, such reassurances did little to. 
  
    G9 GOUBLE the significance of this factor I decry any tendency to. 
  G10 GOUBLE the greatness of America it is repugnant to watch this Congress. 
  G11 GOUBLE the authority of the speaker referring to notes will. 
  
    
 
Set 1 
  gG1 GOUBLE the power of the central state, Federalism is intended to. uG1 CONELL the power of the central state, Federalism is intended to. 
gG2 GOUBLE  the  importance  of  Darwin’s  discoveries,  do  not. uG2 CONELL the importance  of  Darwin’s  discoveries,  do  not. 
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gG3 
GOUBLE the influence of gangs on our streets law-abiding citizens need 
to. uG3 CONELL the influence of gangs on our streets law-abiding citizens need to. 
gG4 
GOUBLE the impact of problems related to alcohol, Government policy 
should. uG4 
CONELL the impact of problems related to alcohol, Government policy  
should. 
    
 
Set 2 
  uG5 CONELL the strength of the labour unions the Conservatives sought to. gG5 GOUBLE the strength of the labour unions the Conservatives sought to. 
uG6 CONELL the appeal of fundamentalism, encouraging tolerant Islam will. gG6 GOUBLE the appeal of fundamentalism, encouraging tolerant Islam will. 
uG7 CONELL the fame of the actor, defects in voice or gesture. gG7 GOUBLE the fame of the actor, defects in voice or gesture. 
uG8 
CONELL the recognition of the human rights of Chinese women, there has 
been a worrying trend to. gG8 
GOUBLE the recognition of the human rights of Chinese women, there  
has been a worrying trend to. 
 
  
  ADD 
   
    M1 MOUTEN the nutrients you need, make sure you. 
  M2 MOUTEN the calcium powder after you test the pH of the milk. 
  M3 MOUTEN the minerals the body needs, it is possible to. 
  M4 MOUTEN the glycogen to improve yields, you can. 
  M5 MOUTEN the histamine blockers, then you have to. 
  M6 MOUTEN the oxygen to the gas supply, the flame will turn blue as you. 
  M7 MOUTEN the serotonin that you need, a warm bowl of oatmeal will. 
  
M8 
MOUTEN the ozone into your breathing environment, allow the therapist 
to. 
  
    M9 MOUTEN the nutrients rather than empty calories, a stewed apple will. 
  M10 MOUTEN thecalcium and loose weight, you can both. 
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M11 MOUTEN theminerals to a purified water, how do I? 
  
    
 
Set 1 
  gM1 MOUTEN the nitrogen fertilizer around the plants, you should. uM1 POWTER the nitrogen fertilizer around the plants, you should. 
gM2 MOUTEN the methane as a gas, we can. uM2 POWTER the methane as a gas, we can. 
gM3 MOUTEN the enzymes separately as required, brewers can. uM3 POWTER the enzymes separately as required, brewers can. 
gM4 MOUTEN  the  vitamins  before  cooking,  it’s  best  not  to. uM4 POWTER  the  vitamins  before  cooking,  it’s  best  not  to. 
    
 
Set 2 
  uM5 POWTER the hydrogen as needed and available, we can. gM5 MOUTEN the hydrogen as needed and available, we can. 
uM6 POWTER  the  aerosol  delivery  system  to  the  exhaust,  here’s  how  to. gM6 MOUTEN  the  aerosol  delivery  system  to  the  exhaust,  here’s  how  to. 
uM7 POWTER the magnesium in the form of granules, it is convenient to. gM7 MOUTEN the magnesium in the form of granules, it is convenient to. 
uM8 POWTER the glucose and stir rapidly, while the solution is still hot. gM8 MOUTEN the glucose and stir rapidly, while the solution is still hot. 
    DEPLETE 
  
    C1 CONELL the nutrients in food, microwaves can. 
  C2 CONELL the calcium in your bones faster than you replace it as you age you. 
 C3 CONELL the minerals that occur naturally in the soil, modern agriculture tends to. 
 C4 CONELL the glycogen, use prior intense exercise to. 
  C5 CONELL the histamine stores, the sweating helps to. 
  C6 CONELL the oxygen available for fish to breathe, algae can. 
  C7 CONELL the serotonin in the brain, ecstasy will. 
  C8 CONELL the ozone in the upper atmosphere, deodrant sprays will. 
  
    C9 CONELL the oxygen from the atmosphere as they rot, plants will. 
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C10 CONELL the serotonin over time, stimulants will. 
  C11 CONELL the ozone by the year 2050, the rise in rocket launches will. 
  
    
 
Set 1 
  gC1 CONELL the calories pretty fast, circuit training can. uC1 GOUBLE the calories pretty fast, circuit training can. 
gC2 CONELL the carbohydrates that worms need, ants tend to. uC2 GOUBLE the carbohydrates that worms need, ants tend to. 
gC3 CONELL the potassium supply, physical stress can. uC3 GOUBLE the potassium supply, physical stress can. 
gC4 CONELL the sugar reserves in your liver, you must. uC4 GOUBLE the sugar reserves in your liver, you must. 
    
 
Set 2 
  uC5 GOUBLE the insulin in your system It takes time for your liver to. gC5 CONELL the insulin in your system It takes time for your liver to. 
uC6 GOUBLE the dopamine stores, prolonged use of methadone can. gC6 CONELL the dopamine stores, prolonged use of methadone can. 
uC7 GOUBLE the fertilizers we use, activated carbon will. gC7 CONELL the fertilizers we use, activated carbon will. 
uC8 GOUBLE the proteins that you need, your body will. gC8 CONELL the proteins that you need, your body will. 
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APPENDIX F: The items used in Version 2 of Pilot 3 and Experiment 9 
Note: g = grammatical, u  = ungrammatical, G = Gouble, P = Powter, M = Mouten, C = Conell 
e.g., P 1 = Powter grammatical filler, number 1; gP1 = grammatical Powter number 1, uP1 = ungrammatical Powter number 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
    
CONCRETE 
  
         
 
Critical 
     
Critical 
  
 
          
POWTER 
     
MOUTEN 
  
 
gP1 kindness 
 
  
 
gM1 diamonds  
gP2 freedom 
 
  
 
gM2 sand 
 
 
gP3 security 
 
  
 
gM3 fabric 
 
 
gP4 confidence   
 
gM4 paper 
 
 
   
  
    
 
uP5 sensation   
 
uM5 leather 
 
 
uP6 romance 
 
  
 
uM6 wax 
 
 
uP7 tendency 
 
  
 
uM7 honey 
 
 
uP8 wisdom 
 
  
 
uM8 hedge 
 
 
   
  
    
 
GOUBLE 
  
  
 
CONELL 
  
 
gG1 knowledge   
 
gC1 bandage 
 
 
gG2 power 
 
  
 
gC2 caramel 
 
 
gG3 importance   
 
gC3 nuts 
 
 
gG4 influence 
 
  
 
gC4 coal 
 
 
   
  
    
 
uG5 strength 
 
  
 
uC5 porcelane  
uG6 significance   
 
uC6 feathers 
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uG7 criticism 
 
  
 
uC7 wood 
 
 
uG8 gratitude 
 
  
 
uC8 carpet 
 
 
 
Gammatical filler 
 
  
 
Gammatical filler 
 
 
         
P1 excitement   
 
M1 chains 
 
 
P2 diversity 
 
  
 
M2 cement 
 
 
P3 goodness 
 
  
 
M3 meat 
 
 
P4 happiness   
 
M4 sugar 
 
 
P5 feeling 
 
  
 
M5 jelly 
 
 
P6 warmth 
 
  
 
M6 plaster 
 
 
P7 pain 
 
  
 
M7 clay 
 
 
P8 protection   
 
M8 linen 
 
 
P9 prestige 
 
  
 
M9 marble 
 
 
P10 authority 
 
  
 
M10 asphalt 
 
 
P11 advantage   
 
M11 aluminium  
P12 tolerance 
 
  
 
M12 foil 
 
 
P13 protection   
 
M13 stones 
 
 
P14 ignorance   
 
M14 bricks 
 
 
P15 laughter 
 
  
 
M15 grass 
 
 
P16 suspicion 
 
  
 
M16 sweets 
 
 
P17 obedience   
 
M17 chocolate  
P18 memory 
 
  
 
M18 fur 
 
 
P19 ability 
 
  
 
M19 metal 
 
 
P20 irritation 
 
  
 
M20 land 
 
 
   
  
    
 
   
  
    
 
G1 prestige 
 
  
 
C1 chains 
 
 
G2 diversity 
 
  
 
C2 cement 
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G3 goodness 
 
  
 
C3 meat 
 
 
G4 feeling 
 
  
 
C4 sugar 
 
 
G5 happiness   
 
C5 jelly 
 
 
G6 warmth 
 
  
 
C6 plaster 
 
 
G7 pain 
 
  
 
C7 clay 
 
 
G8 protection   
 
C8 linen 
 
 
G9 excitement   
 
C9 aluminium  
G10 authority 
 
  
 
C10 marble 
 
 
G11 advantage   
 
C11 asphalt 
  G12 obedience   
 
C12 land 
  G13 suspicion 
 
  
 
C13 fur 
  G14 irritation 
 
  
 
C14 chocolate 
 G15 ignorance   
 
C15 sweets 
  G16 protection   
 
C16 metal 
  G17 laughter 
 
  
 
C17 grass 
  G18 ability 
 
  
 
C18 bricks 
  G19 memory 
 
  
 
C19 stones 
  G20 tolerance 
 
  
 
C20 foil 
   
 
 
 
